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Introduction 
There are many countries in our blood, aren’t 
there, but only one person. Would the world be in the 
mess it is if we were loyal to love and not to countries?  
GRAHAM GREENE, Our Man in Havanna. 
 
“When ethnic identity is at stake, international law should have cause to worry.”1 
Conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, Chechnya, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
India, and Darfour are among the deadliest and best-known ethnic conflicts that have 
shaped international relations over the last 15 years. Provinces, states, and in some cases 
even whole regions have been destabilized through a wave of ethnic insecurity and violence, 
often paired with a downward spiral of economic decline and state failure, accompanied by 
corruption and mismanagement. The early optimism of some that the end of the Cold War 
would lead to a period of stable peace and international security has quickly shattered.  
Despite the fact that the number of ethnic conflicts declined in the past few years, 
ethnic turmoil is one of the main sources of warfare and insecurity in major regions of the 
world.2 Between 1945 and 1990 nearly 100 ethnic groups were involved in violent conflicts. 
During the 1990s about three-quarters of the conflicts were wars between politically 
organized ethnic groups and governments. Over one-third of the world’s countries were 
directly affected by serious intrastate warfare at some time during the 1990s and, of these 
states, nearly two-thirds experienced armed conflicts for seven or more years during the 
decade.3 In 2003, 26 of 29 conflicts were internal, most of them including ethnic issues.4 A 
CIA report issued in 2000 estimated that many “internal conflicts, particularly those arising 
from communal disputes, will continue to be vicious, long-lasting, and difficult to terminate 
– leaving bitter legacies in the wake.”5 
                                                 
1  See STEVEN R. RATNER. “Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict.” NYU Journal of 
International Law and Politics 32 (1999-2000): 591-698. 592. 
2  See Minorities at Risk Project. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management, 2005. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/ [accessed June 2006]. 
3  PETER WALLENSTEEN and MARGARETA SOLLENBERG. “Armed Conflict, 1989-1998.” Journal of Peace 
Research 36/5 (1999): 593-606.  
4  MIKAEL ERIKSSON, PETER WALLENSTEEN, and MARGARETA SOLLENBERG. “Armed Conflict, 1989-2003.” 
Journal of Peace Research 41 (2004): 625-636. 626 and 629. 
5  Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernmental Experts. Washington, D.C.: Central 
Intelligence Agency, December 2000. 49. 
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Ethnic conflict is a matter of global concern and its consequences cannot be ignored. 
Almost every state has within its territory a number of minorities of national, ethnic, 
indigenous, religious, or linguistic character. Ethnic conflicts often involve massive attacks 
on civilians, especially on the weakest part of the population. Widespread and systematic 
human rights violations, mass murder, genocide, rape, torture, and expulsions are among the 
worst atrocities committed during ethnic conflicts. Risks of future genocide and mass 
murder remain high in a half-dozen countries and a significant possibility in a dozen others.6 
Furthermore, spillover effects of ethnic conflict to nearby regions can include refugee 
problems, economic disasters, ecological catastrophes, military complications (armament and 
proliferation), and instability up to interstate war.7 Of these, refugee flows and displacement 
are some of the most common problems. The World Refugee Survey 2005 estimates that 11.5 
million people worldwide were refugees and 21.2 million people were internally displaced.8 
Most of these peoples were fleeing civil wars, ethnic conflicts, or campaigns of mass murder 
and ethnic cleansing. 
 
The international community has frequently failed to react to ethnic conflict and human 
rights violations. Hopes that the United Nations (UN) would play a more effective role in 
international relations after the end of the Cold War – reinforced by the successes in the 
Gulf war in 1991 and the large peace keeping operations in Cambodia and Namibia – were 
dashed by the inability of the UN to react effectively to the conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia, 
or Rwanda.  
The UN was established in the post World War Two spirit to “save succeeding 
generation from the scourge of war,” namely to maintain international peace and security 
while promoting a more just world order. However, the challenges the UN faces today are 
different than those the organization encountered when it was founded in 1945. To avoid 
marginalization, the UN has to find ways and means to address new challenges, including its 
identity crisis, diverse setbacks and failures, financial problems, rapid change in international 
                                                 
6  See MONTY G. MARSHALL and TED ROBERT GURR. Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, 
Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management, 2005. 2. 
7  See MICHAEL E. BROWN. “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict.” In Ethnic Conflict and International 
Security, ed. Michael E. Brown, 3-26. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. 5.  
8  World Refugee Survey 2005. www.refugees.org/WRS2005. 
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relations due to globalization and growing international independence. UN responses to 
current security threats, such as international terrorist networks, organized crime, and 
internal warfare, have to be multilateral and cooperative.  
For international lawyers, the challenge is now to rethink some of their most 
fundamental principles to meet the threat of ethnic conflict. International law has many 
functions, including guiding behavior of parties to the conflict and other actors involved, 
structuring coordinated responses, providing procedures for conflict resolution, and 
establishing the basis for an authoritative decision.9 Many areas of international law, such as 
international human rights and humanitarian law, the law of treaties, the law of state 
succession, state responsibility, and state recognition, and the law of international 
organizations are relevant to the legal analysis of claims by groups. In this context, ethnic 
conflicts pose both challenges and opportunities. The challenge arises from the need to 
contain, and if possible, resolve such conflicts. The opportunities arise from the fact that 
ethnic conflicts may create space for significant social and political changes and thus provide 
opportunities to promote democracy, strengthen human rights, and build up capacity of 
states.10 
 
Issues arising from ethnic conflict influence key aspects of the international order and, 
as a result, international law. These include the legitimate basis for statehood, sovereignty, 
and citizenship; the extent to which group claims should be recognized by the international 
community; the political, social, and cultural rights of ethnic groups and their members; the 
role international organizations can and should play in responding to ethnic conflict and in 
promoting and monitoring rights for ethnic groups; the compatibility of conflict resolution 
strategies and human rights; the circumstances in which force can be used to support claims 
by ethnic groups or to protect them against gross violations of their rights; and the 
responsibilities of the international community in dealing with consequences of ethnic 
                                                 
9  For a more detailed analysis, see BENEDICT KINGSBURY. “Claims by Non-State Groups in International 
Law.” In International Law and the Rise of Nations: The State System and the Challenge of Ethnic Groups, ed. Robert J. 
Beck and Thomas Ambrosio, 156-179. New York , NY/London: Chatam House, 2002. 157/158. 
10  DAVID J. SCHEFFER. “U.N. Engagement in Ethnic Conflicts.” In International Law and Ethnic Conflict, ed. 
David Wippman, 147-177. Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 1998. 148. 
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conflicts such as refugee flows, humanitarian catastrophes, and the reconstruction of war 
torn societies.11  
All of these aspects will be addressed in this study, with a particular focus on human 
rights in the context of the UN. The purpose of this analysis is to examine how international 
law can contribute to efforts of ethnic conflict resolution. It sketches preliminary answers to 
five core questions: (1) What are the points of contact between ethnic conflict and 
international law? (2) What international legal concepts, instruments, and institutions exist to 
address issues involving ethnic groups, minorities, and conflict? (3) How does international 
law deal with claims of ethnic groups? (4) Which international legal instruments, procedures, 
and institutions deal with claims of ethnic groups and the violation of minority rights and in 
what way do they contribute to ethnic conflict resolution? (5) How could these measures be 
improved? 
This study reviews points of contact between ethnic conflict and international law and 
examines international strategies, institutions, and instruments dealing with ethnic conflict. It 
finds significant flaws in the application of international law – both in its norms and 
institutional design – to prevent, manage, and resolve ethnic conflict. It identifies key areas 
where international law may significantly improve the global response to ethnic conflict and, 
in the process, consolidate social progress and political stability. These key areas include the 
way in which the international community deals with claims of ethnic groups and 
international engagement in ethnic conflict resolution. 
The study focuses on the rights, claims, and disputes of suppressed or numerically 
inferior ethnic groups, which in most cases constitute minorities in the countries where they 
live.12 For the purpose of this study, the terms “minority” and “ethnic group” are used 
interchangeably unless indicated otherwise. 
                                                 
11  See more detailed DAVID WIPPMAN. “Introduction: Ethnic Claims and International Law.” In International 
Law and Ethnic Conflict, ed. David Wippman, 1-21. Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 1998. 2. 
12  One exception worth mentioning are the black and colored people in South Africa. Even though they 
constitute a numerical majority within the country, their rights have been rigorously constricted; they face 
economic discrimination, and – during the apartheid regime – were subject to severe human rights 
violations. 
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Current State of Research 
A tremendous amount of literature is concerned with ethnic groups and ethnic conflict 
as well as the rights of minorities in international law. However, despite the fact that ethnic 
conflict touches upon core issues of international law, in most cases studies do not involve 
an interdisciplinary perspective and are focused on either political or legal analysis. 
Theoretical debates among political scientists, international relations experts, and 
international lawyers center around three major topics: first, the question of why 
international rules matter; second, how norms should be interpreted; and third, what 
strategies the international community should adopt when engaging in ethnic conflict 
resolution. All three debates are relevant to this study as they form the theoretical framework 
for the arguments in the following chapters. 
 
International law and international relations theory have offered a variety of 
explanations about why international rules matter. At the most basic level, three different 
answers can be identified which indicate why :  
1. Norms form part of a regime that affects the incentives, and as a consequence, the 
behavior of states when interacting with one another (instrumentalism);  
2. Certain internal traits of norms cause states to obey them and so change their 
identity (normativism); 
3. Certain domestic patterns will affect the state’s propensity to comply with norms 
(liberalism).  
First, the instrumentalist optic describes theories that “focus … on interests and … 
argue that rules and norms will matter only if they affect the calculations of interests by 
agents.”13 Two sub-categories can be distinguished: realism and institutionalism. Realists 
believe that international rules matter because it is in the interest of the state to comply with 
the rule. The norms as such do not play a role in this view.14 Institutionalists share the 
realists’ focus on state interests, but they believe that states can create institutions that issue 
rules. These institutions and rules affect state behavior because they form part of an entire 
                                                 
13  See ROBERT O. KEOHANE. “International Relations and International Law: Two Optics.” Harvard 
International Law Journal 38 (1997): 487-502. 487-489. 
14  See ANDRE NOLLKAEMPER. “On the Effectiveness of International Rules.” Acta Politica 27 (1992): 49-70. 
49, 52. 
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regime that alters incentives of states to comply or not to comply.15 Incentives can be altered 
because the benefits of the regime depend on compliance, the possibility to link compliance 
with a particular norm to cooperation on other issues, and international pressure to comply 
with norms.16 
Second, the normative optic states that “norms have causal impact… They exert a 
profound impact on how people think about state roles and obligations, and therefore state 
behavior.”17 The normative optic comprises two different schools of thought, both based on 
the assumption that norms qua norms directly influence state behavior.18 First, and most 
prominently, the New Haven School of international law argues that an international norm 
produces a “compliance pull”19 based on its legitimacy, which is measured by three factors: 
the norms’ historical origin and the authority connected with it; its determinacy, namely the 
clarity of its content and the possibility to implement it; and its coherence, which means 
consistency with higher norms of the international system.20 Second, constructivists argue 
that legal rules define identity, interests, and structures, and do not rely on already 
determined interests of states or the structure of the international system.21 Some scholars 
have gone even further and try to understand the way in which norms shape the identity of 
states.22  
Liberal scholars combine the two approaches and link state behavior to domestic 
structures and state-society relations in general.23 They shift the focus from instrumentalists’ 
attention to the international system and the normativists’ attention to the characteristic of a 
particular norm to the traits of a particular state that makes the state more or less willing to 
accept international obligations.24 
                                                 
15  KEOHANE, International Relations and International Law, 490. 
16  NOLLKAEMPER, Effectiveness of International Rules, 55-56. 
17  KEOHANE, International Relations and International Law, 492. 
18  An overview of the two opinions is given by RATNER, Does International Law Matter, 649-651. 
19  The term was developed by THOMAS M. FRANCK in his book “The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations”. 
See THOMAS M. FRANCK. The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
20  See FRANCK, Power of Legitimacy, 50-194.  
21  See JOHN G. RUGGIE. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge.” International Organization 52/4 (1998): 855-885. 878-882. 
22  See for instance MARTHA FINNEMORE and KATHRYN SIKKINK. “International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change.” International Organization 52/4 (1998): 887-917.  
23  See for example ANDREW MORAVSCIK. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics.” International Organization 51/4 (1997): 513-553. 
24  RATNER excludes realism because realism essentially holds that norms do not affect state behavior. See 
RATNER, Does International Law Matter, 651-658. 
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When starting from the premise that international rules matter, two basic possibilities of 
interpreting norms exist in law. One contends that law is more than politics and surrenders 
even the most difficult legal questions to courts and judges (positivism); the other contends 
that law is politics through and through and courts are essentially influenced by this 
connection (legal realism, not to be confused with the political realist approach). 
Positivists insist that law and politics are distinct spheres of thought and action, calling 
for different skills and depending on different sources of legitimacy. Consequently, 
positivists see the function of law as judging, namely applying authoritative prescription to 
particular cases. In the view of positivists, international legal obligations are based on a 
sovereign state’s consent to be bound by a normative declaration. Natural law claims, 
whether based on religious convictions (law of a divine authority) or secular notions of 
necessity (law through right reason), are rejected. Insistence on sovereign consent as the 
source of international law has both logical and practical implications: it is logical because, 
under the shared understanding of the sovereignty and equality of states, no higher authority 
should exist; and it is practical because, in the absence of a centralized institution providing 
and enforcing legal prescriptions, compliance with international obligations remains 
voluntary.25 In other words, all that is not clearly forbidden is allowed. Law is a matter of 
fact, and not a matter of degree – an act is either legal or illegal. However, especially in 
international law, there is a large “gray area” between law, history, and politics, and between 
the scope of international legal norms and domestic enforcement. There is never a “bright 
line” between law and politics, and a lot depends on interpretation, context, and interests of 
the actors involved.  
For legal realists, norms are a construct of widely shared opinions that are enforced by 
the state. Law is made by human beings and thus imperfect, a matter of degree, a trend, 
depending on both how strong the shared beliefs are and the ability of the authority to 
enforce it.26 Therefore, positivist and realist international lawyers have different agendas: the 
positivist is concerned primarily with texts of treaties, legally non-binding instruments such 
                                                 
25  TOM FARER. “Conclusion: What Do International Lawyers Do When They Talk about Ethnic Violence and 
Why Does It Matter?” In International Law and Ethnic Conflict, ed. David Wippman, 326-346. Ithaca, 
NY/London: Cornell University Press, 1998. 326-328. 
26  Legal realists include for example Justice OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. See also the works of DUNCAN 
KENNEDY. Critique of Adjudication [fin de siecle]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997; and 
RICHARD A. POSNER. The Problems of Jurisprudence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. 
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as declarations and resolutions, and jurisprudence of domestic and international bodies, 
whereas the realist focuses on the evaluation of state behavior. However, despite their 
differences legal positivists and realists are part of the same intellectual family. Both see the 
international system as a system shaped by common interests and cooperation, which 
coexists with conflicts. Both see law as a means to codify relationships and obligations of co-
existing states, expressing the state’s long-term common interests.27 
To address ethnic conflict through law, one has to find a balance between the 
approaches described in the preceding paragraphs. A legal approach has to decide if an 
action is lawful or unlawful or at least give some predictability if an action will be perceived 
unlawful or lawful. This estimate of lawfulness relies on the interpretation of international 
legal norms such as treaties, statutes, or legally non-binding instruments, as well as customary 
international law and state practice. But neither text nor practice are decisive, because law 
cannot be separated from its political and historical context. Permissible behavior is 
dependent on the new questions, new facts, and different contexts that each new case 
implicates. Furthermore, international law – regarding both development and compliance – 
is always shaped by power relations. Any intervention strategy that is directed at a single 
cause or at only one set of social and political pressures is doomed to fail.28 
 
From a traditional international legal point of view, the international community is not 
allowed to intervene in domestic matters of states, and thus should not get involved in ethnic 
conflict at all. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations (thereafter “UN 
Charter”) states that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state.” However, in the last decades, a shift from the absolute interpretation to a more 
context-specific, relative interpretation of this provision can be observed. The Security 
Council of the United Nations (UNSC) stated on several occasions that ethnic conflicts, the 
                                                 
27  See more detailed FARER, Conclusion, 327-330. 
28  FEN OSLER HAMPSON. “Parent, Midwife, or Accidental Executioner: The Role of Third Parties in Ending 
Violent Conflict.” In Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of  Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, 
Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 387-406. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2001. 399. 
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repressions of minorities, and systematic gross human rights violations pose a threat to 
international peace and security and should thus be addressed by the UN.29  
However, different views exist on how the international community should get involved 
in the resolution of violent ethnic conflict.  The debate among international relations 
scholars can be divided into a “realist” view, a “liberal” view, and a more socio-psychological 
approach to intervention into ethnic conflict. Even among these paradigms, different 
schools of thought exist. Traditional realists argue for a narrow range of intervention 
strategies, most of them including the use of force.30 They argue that intercommunal conflict 
is to a certain extent similar to international conflict, as ethnic groups experience the same 
kind of security dilemmas as states. In the view of realists, the use of force, the balance of 
power, and territorial solutions play key roles in the resolution of ethnic disputes. Some 
scholars argue that an ethnic conflict should be ended by partition or military victories.31 
Ethnic conflict in a realist view can be understood as a rational political process originating 
in strategic behavior by ethnic leaders in which the costs for civil war are lower than those of 
any other political option. The balance of power in a country has to be maintained to 
prevent domestic political orders from breaking down. This can be done by sanctions and 
interventions under the lead of great powers. However, the incentives for great powers are 
limited because ethnic conflict elsewhere does not usually threaten a state’s national interests. 
Representatives of neorealism, a “softer version” of realism, believe that besides the use of 
force, soft power like mediation and negotiation as well as international actors play a role in 
                                                 
29  Most prominently, the UNSC stated this in its Resolution 688 (1991) in the aftermath of the Gulf War, UN 
Doc. S/RES/688 of 5 April 1991, and in its Resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, UN Doc. 
S/RES/751 of 24 April 1992.  
30  See KENNETH WALTZ. Theory of International Politics. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1979. Regarding ethnic 
conflict in particular see BARRY R. POSEN. “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power.” International 
Security 18/2 (1993): 80-124; STEPHEN VAN EVERA. “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.” International 
Security 18/4 (1994): 5-39; CHAIM KAUFMANN. “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars.” 
International Security 20/4 (1996): 136-175. Representatives of a “softer realism” or neo-realism are DAVID A. 
LAKE and DONALD ROTHCHILD. “Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict.” In The 
International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, 3-
32. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998; JACOB BERCOVITCH. Resolving International Conflicts: The 
Theory and Practice of Mediation. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996; and the views presented in the edited 
volume Elusive Peace: Negotiating an end to Civil Wars, ed. I. William Zartman. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1995.  
31  See for example ALEXANDER B. DOWNES. “The Problem With Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil 
Wars.” Security Studies 13/4 (Summer 2004): 230-279. 
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the management of ethnic conflict. Non-territorial, political solutions such as power-sharing 
arrangements or autonomy are seen as good possibilities to settle ethnic tensions.  
Realism is highly state-centric and offers little advice regarding the societal and 
psychological effects of ethnic conflict. Ethnic identities, the polarization of societies, 
violence against civilians, and the level of atrocities committed in ethnic conflicts can hardly 
be explained using only realist approaches.  
Liberal scholars see ethnic conflicts less as a consequence of security dilemmas and 
more in terms of a set of key variables that are based on the governmental, societal, or 
individual level. These include the violation of basic human and minority rights, the rejection 
of the rule of law, and repressive and authoritarian regimes.32 Liberal conflict management is 
rooted in the Kantian model of republicanism that stresses the rule of law and liberal rights 
as the core of the political order. Third party involvement should thus focus on the creation 
on participatory governance structures, the development of new social norms, the 
establishment of democracy, and the protection and promotion of human rights. 
Like neorealists, governance-based liberal approaches stress the importance of political 
institutions. But where soft realists focus on power-sharing at the state level, liberals 
emphasize the importance of democratic political institutions that facilitate participation at 
the societal level. This involves the establishment of a complex system that addresses the 
characteristics of the legal and judiciary system, public service, the private sector, and 
interactions among them. Good governance depends in their view on the active promotion 
of human rights. International actors such as the UN, regional organizations, and Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs) provided with relevant knowledge and resources are 
the key actors that have the ability and capacity to perform a great role in peace building, 
democratic governance, and establishment of the rule of law.  
                                                 
32  See in general MICHAEL W. DOYLE. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism. New York, NY: 
Norton, 1997. Regarding ethnic conflict, see Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. 
Stockholm: International IDEA, 1997; WILL KYMLIKA. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon, 1995; 
PAULINE H. BAKER. “Conflict Resolution v. Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to Peace?” In 
Managing Global Chaos, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 753-764. Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996; DAVID LITTLE. Sri Lanka: The Intervention of Enmity. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994; and Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 1995. 
 
Introduction
 
 
 11
From a realist or neorealist point of view, liberal approaches raise questions regarding 
state sovereignty and the involvement of outsiders in domestic affairs of a state. 
Furthermore, governance-approaches do not appropriately address the difficulties that 
accompany transitions after violent conflict including the treatment of conflict-related 
traumas, confidence building, and reconciliation.  
The work of sociologists and psychologists in the field of conflict management deals 
with these issues.33 In contrast to the state-centered approaches of realism and the 
governance-centered approach by liberals, these methods focus on societal relations and the 
development of dispute resolution systems at the local and individual level. Third parties 
should play a neutral and facilitating role, guiding rather than directing parties to mutually 
acceptable solutions. International actors, especially individuals or NGOs, play a role as they 
have the independence and expertise to deal with this kind of facilitation. However, societal-
based approaches can be problematic in that conflicting parties may not take them seriously. 
Often facilitators do not work with the official representatives of the groups, but with 
middle-range elites such as academics, advisers, and retired politicians. This implicates the 
problem of how to disseminate the results of so-called problem solving workshops to elites 
and decision makers. Unless there is some form of interaction and the individuals 
participating in the workshops are selected carefully, there will be limited or no impact on 
the decision making and behavior of the society as a whole. Furthermore, individuals who 
take part in the workshop may not behave accordingly and return to old patterns once back 
in their normal jobs because of the pressures of their immediate social environment. 
However, as it is difficult to measure the outcomes of problem solving workshops, it is also 
difficult to predict their influence on societal change.  
 
This study starts from the premise that international rules matter in shaping the 
behavior of states and the strategies adopted by the international community. The approach 
                                                 
33  See, for example, HERBERT C. KELMAN. “Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner.” In Mediation in 
International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, ed. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, 64-
96. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1992; JOHN W. BURTON. Conflict and Communication: The Use of 
Controlled Communication in International Relations. London: Macmillan, 1969; anRONALD J. FISHER. 
“Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiations.” In 
Getting to the Table: The Process of International Prenegotiation, ed. Janice Gross Stein, 206-238. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. 
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pursued reflects the opinion that international relations and politics shape international law 
substantially and international norms and instruments cannot be viewed separately from 
political, economic, and social developments. The approach chosen in this study is thus 
comprehensive and interdisciplinary in nature, including approaches from various disciplines 
and schools of thought. Instead of taking one of the discussed approaches, the view taken is 
based on a human rights approach to ethnic conflict, thus combining both legal and political 
aspects. The ability of international law to address ethnic disputes goes to the heart of 
current debates about the pertinence of international law and touches upon fundamental 
issues such as state sovereignty, state decision-making, and human rights. This goes beyond 
the legal discipline and needs to take into account other approaches originating in political 
and social sciences, history, and anthropology. 
 
Outline of the Study 
To address the issues at stake, the study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is 
designed to provide the reader with a broad understanding of basic concepts, causes, and the 
nature of ethnic conflict. It addresses the question how ethnic groups should be defined in 
both political and social sciences as well as international law. It gives an overview of 
underlying and proximate causes of ethnic conflicts as well as its nature, character, and 
international context.   
The second chapter reviews international legal approaches to ethnic conflict and 
minority protection against the context of international human rights law. The tension 
between the notion of equality of all human beings and the concept of the protection and 
promotion of rights for certain groups as well as basic legal norms and institutions are 
addressed in this chapter. A special emphasis is placed on the right of peoples to self-
determination and minority rights under international law. 
The third chapter looks at how international law deals with claims of ethnic groups. 
Claims to protection and empowerment are viewed through an international legal lens. 
Human rights norms, jurisprudence, and documents of UN human rights bodies build the 
basis for the argumentation in this chapter.  
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The fourth chapter is concerned with the UN’s institutional reaction to ethnic conflict 
and ethnic claims. It reviews different methods, instruments, and possibilities used by the 
UN and its agencies to intervene in ethnic conflict at various stages. The chapter starts with 
general considerations about human rights and conflict resolution approaches and how these 
approaches can be combined. 
The last chapter is based on the conclusions of the preceding chapters and gives 
recommendations on how international law and UN involvement in ethnic conflict 
resolution could be improved. The chapter is divided into legal and political measures as 
both are important to address ethnic conflicts comprehensively.  
 
  
1. Ethnic Conflict: Definitions and Concepts  
 
During the 1990s, the international order observed a decrease in inter-state conflict, but 
an increase in intrastate conflict, especially ethnic conflict. The dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, artificial borders in formerly colonized parts of the world, and the concept of the 
nation-state contributed to the emergence of ethnic conflicts throughout the world. In the 
last few years, a “zone of conflict” can be identified, involving sub-Saharan Africa, parts of 
Central and Latin America, South Asia, and the Middle East in deadly wars.  
However, ethnic conflict is not a new phenomenon. Disputes between ethnic 
communities date back to ancient times and have shaped world history. Between 1946 and 
2000, approximately 50 ethnic conflicts took place. Of these, 60 percent started – and in 
some cases ended – before 1990, and 40 percent erupted in the decade following the end of 
the Cold War.34 These conflicts have a variety of causes, take different forms, and affect the 
society and the regional and international environment in many ways.  
 
The following chapter will address concepts, definitions, and the international context 
of ethnic conflict. Starting with an overview of different approaches to define ethnic groups 
and minorities, this chapter is designed to introduce the concept of ethnicity, identity, and 
challenges posed by definitional issues. The second part focuses on the phenomenon of 
ethnic conflict itself, discussing the causes, character, and international consequences of 
ethnic conflict.  
 
1.1 What is an Ethnic Group?  
To address the issue of ethnic conflict, it is crucial to clarify the notion of “ethnic 
groups”. As we will see in the following chapters, several definitions of ethnic groups and 
minorities exist. Most of them are interrelated and share basic ideas, especially the reliance 
                                                
34  With more than 25 people killed per year. See ERIKSSON, WALLENSTEEN, and SOLLENBERG. Armed 
Conflict, 1989-2003, 625-636.  
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on objective factors, such as a shared language, skin, color, or religion, and subjective 
factors, namely the self-identification of an individual with an ethnic group and, in turn, the 
acceptance of the individual by the group. The definition of the term “ethnic group” is 
dependent on the context and the academic approach chosen. The following chapter is 
divided into two parts: political and social science approaches to defining ethnic groups 
(summarized by the term “ethnic conflict research”) and international legal approaches to 
defining minorities.  
 
1.1.1 Definition of Ethnic Groups in Ethnic Conflict Research 
In ethnic conflict research, the terms “ethnic group”, “communal group”, “ethnic 
community”, “peoples”, and “minority” are mostly used interchangeably.35 “Minority” is not 
only used to refer to a group numerically inferior compared to the whole population of a 
society, but also expresses the power structure in a given case, namely to describe a group in 
a disadvantaged position. Two elements provide the basis to identify ethnic groups: first, the 
accentuation of cultural traits or the belief in a common ancestry, and second, the sense that 
these traits distinguish the group from the other members of the society that do not share 
the differentiate characteristic.36 These “ethnic criteria”, or rather origins of communal 
identity, may include shared historical experiences or myths, common descent, religious 
beliefs, language, ethnicity, and region of residence. According to ANTHONY D. SMITH, an 
ethnic community has six characteristics: a common name, a myth of common ancestry, 
shared memories (including historical experiences, myths, and legends), a link with a historic 
territory or a homeland (which the group may or may not currently inhabit), a common 
culture, and a measure of common solidarity and self-awareness.37 Elements of common 
                                                
35  See TED ROBERT GURR. Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington D. C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1993. 3.  
36  See ANTHONY D. SMITH. “The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism.” In Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. 
Michael E. Brown, 27-41. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. 28f. 
37  See ANTHONY D. SMITH. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986. 22-30. 
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culture include language, religion, laws, customs, institutions, dress, music, crafts, 
architecture, and even food.38  
Tangible characteristics such as shared culture, language, or religion are important 
because they contribute to the group’s feeling of identity, solidarity, and uniqueness. As a 
result, the group considers threats to its tangible characteristics, even if it is not a real but 
only a perceived threat, as risks to its identity. If the group takes steps to confront the threat, 
ethnicity becomes politicized and the group becomes a political actor by virtue of its shared 
identity.39  
On the other side, ethnicity is just as much based on what people believe, or are made 
to believe, to create a sense of solidarity among those who are members of a particular 
ethnic group and to exclude those who are not.40 There is no indication that one of the 
tangible traits is more likely to cause conflict than other features. Nor is there a connection 
between the strength of identity and the level of violence in an ethnic conflict.41 There is no 
automatism that leads from the existence of ethnic differences to conflict between groups. 
 
The terms “ethnic” and “ethnicity” have their roots in the Greek word “ethnos” which 
describes a community of common decent.42 Most scholars agree upon the origin of the 
word and its original meaning. However, because of its politicized nature, the exact meaning 
of ethnicity is greatly disputed both among academics and politicians. There are namely four 
broad approaches to the study of ethnicity and ethnic conflict: the primordialist, the 
instrumentalist, the constructivist, and the psychocultural approach.  
First, primordialists explain ethnicity as a fixed characteristic of individuals and 
communities.43 Ethnic divisions are natural as ethnicity is rooted in inherited biological traits 
                                                
38  According to MICHAEL E. BROWN. “Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications.” In Turbulent 
Peace: The Challenges of  Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela 
Aall, 209-226. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. 210. 
39  WALKER CONNOR. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994. 104. 
40  ANTONY D. SMITH. National Identity. London: Penguin, 1991. 21. 
41  As is described in the study of JAMES D. FEARON and DAVID D. LAITIN. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil 
War.” American Political Science Review 97/1 (February 2003): 75-90. 75. 
42  CONNOR, Ethnonationalism, 100. 
43  Primordialists include for example CLIFFORD GEERTZ. “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments 
and Civil Politics in New States.” In The Interpretation of Cultures, ed. Clifford Geertz, 255-311. New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 1973; STEPHEN VAN EVERA. “Primordialism Lives!” APSA Comparative Politics Section 
Newsletter 12/1 (Winter 2001): 20-22; and JOHN M.G. VAN DER DENNEN. “Ethnocentrism and In-
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and/or long history of practicing the differences. Primordialists see ethnic identity as being 
unique in its intensity and durability and stress the importance of ethnicity for individuals 
and communities. Violent ethnic conflict follows directly from ethnicity and only needs 
some catalysts to break out. ANTHONY D. SMITH states:  
Wherever ethnic nationalism has taken hold of populations, there one may expect to find 
powerful assertions of self-determination that, if long opposed, will embroil whole regions in 
bitter and protracted ethnic conflict. Whether the peace and stability of such regions will be 
better served in the short term by measures of containment, federation, mediation, or even 
partition, in the long run there can be little escape from the many conflagrations that the 
unsatisfied yearnings of ethnic nationalism are likely to kindle.44  
 
The primordialist assumption of fixed identities and its failure to recognize variation in 
ethnic conflict over time and places has led to major criticism and the development of other 
approaches. The second approach discussed here is the so-called instrumentalist approach, 
which understands ethnicity as a tool used by individuals, groups, and leaders to achieve 
larger goals.45 In this view, ethnicity serves as a powerful means to unify, organize, and 
mobilize groups to achieve a given aim, which is mostly of political nature. As a 
consequence, ethnicity has little or no independent standing outside the political process and 
is in its character comparable to other political affiliations such as ideology or party 
membership. Ethnicity is seen as a result of each individual’s choice and does not depend on 
either the society or cultural or biological traits. From an instrumentalist perspective, ethnic 
conflict is the result of elites who mobilize their followers on grounds of ethnicity in order to 
pursue their own interests. Ethnic conflict is similar to other conflicts in which elites pursue 
certain interests and, as a consequence, lessons learned can be applied to other civil and 
political strives as well. Critics of instrumentalism argue that ethnicity, in contrast to other 
political affiliations, cannot be decided upon by individuals at will, but is embedded within 
and controlled by the society as a whole.46 They point to the social nature of all ethnic 
                                                                                                                                            
Group/Out-group Differentiation: A Review and Interpretation of the Literature.” In The Sociobiology of 
Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, ed. Vernon Reynolds, Vincent Fagler, and Ian Vine, 1-47. 
Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986; HAROLD ISAACS. Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political 
Change. New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1975; as well as SMITH, Ethnic Origin of Nations and CONNOR, 
Ethnonationalism. 
44  SMITH, Ethnic Origin of Nations, 40. 
45  Instrumentalists include NATHAN GLAZER and DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN. Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1975; and the edited volume Ethnic Groups and the State, ed. Paul 
Brass. London: Croom-Helm, 1985.  
46  See LAKE and ROTHCHILD, Spreading Fear, 6. 
 
Ethnic Conflict: Definitions and Concepts 
 
 
 19 
identities and argue that ethnicity can only be understood in a relational framework.47 In their 
view, it is the interaction among ethnic groups and individuals that shapes their identity.  
This leads to the third, so-called “constructivist” approach that emphasizes the social 
origin of ethnicity.48 In the constructivist view, ethnicity is neither fixed nor completely open, 
but ethnic identity has been constructed by social interactions between individuals and 
groups. As such, ethnicity is a social phenomenon. Ethnic identity remains beyond a 
person’s choice, but is subject to change if the social conditions change. Regarding ethnic 
conflict, constructivists agree with instrumentalists that the outbreak of violence needs to be 
explained, but disagree on the reasons. Conflict is in their view caused by certain types of 
social systems (e.g. discriminatory regimes) in which individuals cannot choose their own 
affiliations.49 
A more psychological view ascribes ethnicity deep cultural and psychological roots, 
which makes it extremely persistent. Like primordialists, psychocultural interpretations50 
stress the importance of shared, deeply rooted worldviews that shape a group’s relationship 
with others, their actions and motives. Understanding a group’s psychocultural 
interpretations or worldviews means making sense of their origin, the intensity of their 
identity, and the significance of political action.51 Ethnic conflict engages central elements of 
each group’s identity and invokes fears and suspicion about the opponents. They are 
polarizing events that become important because of their connection with the group’s 
identity and history. Ethnic conflict is thus not simply a political event, but a drama that 
challenges the very existence of the group and its identity. As a consequence, negotiations, 
                                                
47  MILTON J. ESMAN. Ethnic Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. 40. 
48  For constructivist approaches see inter alia BENEDICT ANDERSON. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 19912; the essays by CHANDRA KANCHAN, DAVID LAITIN and 
DANIEL POSNER, AREND LIJPHART, STEVEN I. WILKINSON, and IAN LUSTICK. “Cumulative Findings in the 
Study of Ethnic Politics.”  APSA Comparative Politics Section Newsletter 12/1 (Winter 2001): 6-25; DAVID 
LAITIN. Hegemony and Culture. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 19862; VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ. 
People as Subject, People as Object: Selfhood and Peoplehood in Contemporary Israel. Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989; and ROGER BRUBAKER. “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External 
National Homelands in the New Europe.” Daedalus 124 (Spring 1995): 107-132. 
49  LAKE and ROTHCHILD, Spreading Fear, 6/7. 
50  See for a general overview VAMIK VOLKAN. Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. New York, NY: 
Farrar Straus Giroux, 1997. 
51  See for a more detailed description MARC HOWARD ROSS. “Psychocultural Interperation Theory and 
Peacemaking in Ethnic Conflict.” Political Psychology 16 (1995): 523-544. 
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the redefinition of goals, and compromise are difficult as ethnic identities cannot be 
changed, only made more tolerant and open-minded.52 
In reality, some ethnic identities have deep historical roots while others do not, and 
some groups have static identities, while others have dynamic. The concrete form and design 
of ethnicity and its propensity to lead to violence and warfare depends on the context of 
each case. In the words of MILTON J. ESMAN:  
Ethnicity cannot be politicized unless an underlying core of memories, experience, or meaning 
moves people to collective action. […] Ethnic identities are also contextual, adaptable to and 
activated by unexpected threats and new opportunities; […] Thus every ethnic collectivity and 
solidarity can be located on a spectrum between (primordial) historical continuities and 
(instrumental) opportunistic adaptations.53  
 
These identities can be hardened by several influences. Indisputably, the first factor is 
war and violence.54 Stories of a common struggle, sacrifices for a common goal, and human 
suffering create a strong feeling of connection among the survivors of a war. A survey of 
ethnic identities in the former Yugoslavia showed that the proportion of Yugoslav residents 
identifying themselves as “Yugoslav” and not in ethnic terms increased from 1.7 percent in 
1961 to 5.4 percent in 1981, but fell to 3.0 percent in 1991 when the Balkan wars broke out.55 
Even those who assess their ethnicity as being unimportant are pressed towards mobilization 
for two reasons: first, extremists on both sides are likely to impose sanctions on those who 
do not commit themselves to the “cause”.56 And second, identity labels are often imposed by 
the opposing group or given by other outsiders.57 Individuals have no right to choose and are 
pegged in a pre-labeled box.  
A second reason why identities become fixed is mass literacy. Mass literacy allows the 
identity to be stored in writing and to be spread out to a mass audience.58 Additionally, 
identity can be further developed and become more uniform as the narratives stay the same 
                                                
52  See MARC HOWARD ROSS. “Psychocultural Interpretations and Dramas: Identity Dynamics in Ethnic 
Conflict.” Political Psychology 22 (2001): 157-178. 168.  
53  ESMAN, Ethnic Politics, 14. 
54  See also DANIEL BYMAN. “Forever Enemies? The Manipulation of Ethnic Identities and Ethnic Wars.” 
Security Studies 9/3 (Spring 2000): 149-190. 154; and KAUFMANN, Possible and Impossible Solutions, 137 and 
140-146. 
55  See Yugoslavia Survey, 14/1 (1973), 24/3 (1983), and 33/1 (1992).  
56  Typical examples include the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 and the killing of moderate Hutu by 
Hutu extremists in Rwanda in 1994. 
57  KAUFMANN, Possible and Impossible Solutions, 143/144. 
58  Arguing in this direction is BYMAN, Forever Enemies, 154. 
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over time. A more clearly distinguished identity with historical and cultural content inspires 
more loyalty because it provides more substance. Even if an ethnic identity lies dormant for 
some time, it can be revived if the content is laid down in writing.59  
Third, the identities of non-immigrant groups are far more fixed than the identities of 
immigrant ethnic groups. Immigrant groups often assimilate, especially if they are small in 
number. Non-immigrant groups, such as indigenous peoples or people who immigrated the 
country centuries ago, assimilate less often, especially if they were not voluntary immigrants 
and/or are easy to distinguish from the rest of the society by tangible traits such as physical 
markers.60  
A fourth reasons for consolidated identities is the extent of an ethnic group’s collective 
disadvantage vis-à-vis other groups. Economic, political, and cultural discrimination 
contributes to the salience of group identity. Memories of discrimination become part of the 
groups’ history over time and contribute to fix their identity and narratives.61 The 
discrimination ethnic groups experience can have many forms: threats on personal security 
(e.g., attacks on asylum seekers in Europe), discrimination in employment, housing, access to 
educational systems, right to property, and/or political discrimination, including limited or 
no access to political institutions, under-representation in government, etc. 
 
In sum, the key to identifying ethnic groups is not the presence of a trait or a 
combination of traits, but the presence of a shared perception that these traits set the group 
apart from others. Ethnic groups can be both self-defined and defined by others, with a 
combination being the most common form of definition. The self-perception and self-
definition of an ethnic group is subject to change, depending on the context and specific 
situation.62 
Ethnic conflict or mobilization of ethnic groups depends to a great extent on the 
opportunities provided for the group to reach their goals. Past experiences shape the way in 
which the group will use its present opportunities. STEFAN WOLFF writes: “The fact that 
ethnic identity had its roots in the past and present is thus a curse as well as a blessing. 
                                                
59  See VAN EVERA, Primordialism Lives, 20. 
60  Examples are the African-Americans in the U.S. Ibid., 22. 
61  See more detailed GURR, Minorities at Risk, 124-129. 
62  CRAWFORD YOUNG. “The Temple of Ethnicity.” World Politics 35/4 (July 1983): 652-662. 659. 
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People cannot escape the fact that ethnic differences exist, but what they make of these 
differences is in their hands, and those of their leaders.”63 
 
1.1.2 An International Legal Approach to Defining Ethnic Groups  
International lawyers agree to some extent with the definitions provided by ethnic 
conflict research. It is generally accepted that the existence of a minority or a people is a 
factual matter to be determined by a mixture of objective criteria, self-identification, and 
acceptance by other groups. Objective criteria depend on evidence, such as parentage, family 
background, religious practice, skin color, or linguistic ability. Self-identification is a matter 
of individual choice – both to identify as a member of a minority as well as the wish not to 
be identified as such – in combination with some form of objective assessment.64 The 
criterion of acceptance by others is the least satisfactory, since it may result in exclusion of 
members of minority on unreasonable or self-interested grounds despite objective criteria 
and identification by individual choice. All three criteria are consequently needed for the 
determination of who constitutes a member of a minority group.65  
However, international lawyers distinguish between “minorities” and “peoples”. The 
determination of who is a member of a minority or what constitutes a people in international 
law has important impacts on the question of what rights an individual belonging to a 
minority or a people is entitled to and what obligations apply to the state. Most significant, 
peoples have the right to self-determination while minorities do not. The question arises in 
which cases ethnic groups constitute peoples who are entitled to self-determination. The 
problem is that neither concept is clearly defined in international law. Consequently, many 
attempts have been made to define the terms “minority” and “people”.  
The first efforts by international legal scholars and courts to determine the meaning and 
scope of the terms “peoples” and minority” date back to the Permanent Court of 
                                                
63  STEFAN WOLFF. Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 40. 
64  The Explanatory Report to the Framework Convention, for example, is very clear on this point: the “choice 
of belonging” principle in Article 3 “does not imply a right for an individual to choose arbitrarily to belong 
to any national minority. The individual’s subjective choice is inseparably linked to objective criteria relevant 
to the person’s identity.” COE H(1997)010, paragraph 35. 
65  TOM HADDEN. “International and National Action for the Protection of Minorities: The Role of the 
Working Group on Minorities.” UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2004/WP.3, paragraph 22. 
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International Justice (PCIJ) advisory opinion in the case concerning Interpretation of the 
Convention between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration (Greco-Bulgarian Communities). 
The court stated that a “community” is “a group of persons living in a given country or 
locality having a race, religion, language and tradition in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view 
preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and 
upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and 
mutually assisting one another.”66 Since then, there have been numerous attempts to define 
the term, thus confirming the significance of the matter. The debate among scholars and 
courts evolves around the scope of application of the definition.67  
 
As mentioned above, no agreement on the definition of the term “peoples” exists. A 
UNESCO report of 198968 offers the following description of a people (the report excludes 
explicitly a definition):  
1. A group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all of the following common 
features: 
(a) a common historical tradition; 
(b) racial or ethnic identity; 
(c) cultural homogeneity; 
(d) linguistic unity; 
(e) religious or ideological affinity; 
(f) territorial connection; 
(g) common economic life; 
2. the group must be of a certain number which need not be large (e.g. the people of micro 
States) but which must be more than a mere association of individuals within a State; 
3. the group as a whole must have the will to be identified as a people or the consciousness 
of being a people - allowing that groups or some members of such grows, though sharing 
the foregoing characteristics, may not have that will or consciousness; and possibly; 
4. the group must have institutions or other means of expressing its common characteristics 
and will for identity. 
 
This “description” of a people reflects some aspects of definition of ethnic groups in 
ethnic conflict research. The problem with this definition is, however, that it is very similar 
to the definition of minorities under international law.  
                                                
66  PCIJ Advisory Opinion, Interpretation of the Convention between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration 
(Greco-Bulgarian Communitities), PCIJ Series B, No. 17, 1930, paragraph 33. 
67  See very detailed and with references GAETANO PENTASSUGLIA. Minorities in International Law: An Introductory 
Study. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2002. 55-75. 
68  International Meeting of Experts on further study of the concept of the rights of peoples. UNESCO SHS-
89/CONF.602/7, paragraph 22.  
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The question of what constitutes a “people” entitled to self-determination has led to 
debates with divergent opinions. Traditionally, self-determination is assigned to the state 
itself and thus to the “whole people” living within the boundaries of a state.69 This was 
confirmed during the decolonization, in which the international community granted 
independence to the peoples along the lines of the former colonial territories (principle of uti 
possidetis juris, see Chapter 3). However, when defining a people entitled to self-determination 
as all people living within the boundaries of the state, only the majority profits from the right 
to self-determination except if measures of minority participation are in place. Concerns for 
cultural diversity and the advantages for democracy and stability if such diversity is 
respected, have resulted in challenging the de facto majoritarian actualization of the “whole 
people” condition.70 The Badinter Commission, a group of European jurists set up in the 
early 1990s by the European Union (EU) to arbitrate disputes and establish criteria for 
recognition for the new states in the Balkans, did not consider the concept of “people” to be 
homogenous and linked the right of minorities to identity to a broader process of self-
determination involving the whole population concerned.71 The right to self-determination 
of ethnic minorities is thus linked to the notion that minorities are part of the “whole 
people”. 
 
Another concept regarding “whole people” identifies the “whole people” as “all distinct 
peoples”, that is “whole people” in the sense of all individual, distinct “peoples” that form 
the “whole”. A U.S. draft of the UN Declaration of Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with Charter 
of the United Nations (thereafter “UN Friendly Relations Declaration”), adopted by the 
General Assembly as Resolution 2625 (XXV) in 1970, makes a reference to “all distinct 
peoples” in the territory of an independent state.72 The question was addressed prominently 
by the Canadian Supreme Court in its Opinion in Reference re Secession of Quebec of 20 August, 
                                                
69  See PENTASSUGLIA, Minorities in International Law, 163-167. 
70  GAETANO PENTASSUGLIA. “State Sovereignty, Minorities and Self-Determination: A Comprehensive Legal 
Review.” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 9 (2002): 303-324. 313. 
71  Arbitration Commission of Conference on Yugoslavia (“Badinter Commission”), Opinion of 11 January 
1992 (Opinion no. 2), International Legal Materials (1992): 1497-1499. 
72  Cited in PENTASSUGLIA, State Sovereignty, 314.  
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1998.73 In relation to the case dealing with the secession of Quebec, a number of questions 
were put to the Supreme Court, including whether the right to self-determination under 
international law would give the province of Quebec the right to unilateral secession from 
Canada.74 The Court states in paragraph 124: “It is clear that ‘a people’ may include only a 
portion of the population of an existing state.” But does a group within a state have the right 
to self-determination? The Canadian Supreme Court states further:  
While much of the Quebec population certainly shares many of the characteristics … that 
would be considered in determining whether a specific group is a “people”, as do other groups 
within Quebec and/or Canada, it is not necessary to explore this legal characterization to 
resolve Question 2 [right to secede unilaterally] appropriately. Similarly, it is not necessary for 
the Court to determine whether, should a Quebec people exist within the definition of public 
international law, such a people encompasses the entirety of the provincial population or just a 
portion thereof. … As the following discussion of the scope of the right to self-determination 
will make clear, whatever be the correct application of the definition of people(s) in this 
context, their right of self-determination cannot in the present circumstances be said to 
ground a right to unilateral secession.75 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court thus declined to argue that the francophone community of 
Quebec was a “people” in the sense of international law, namely a people entitled to 
independence.  
 
Apart from concerns for the preservation of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
political unity, the approach to define the right-holder as one entity instead of its elements is 
reflected by other international instruments. The Human Rights Committee stated in Apriana 
Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand that the right to self-determination under Article 1 of the 
ICCPR is a collective right and thus “attach[es] to ‘peoples’ of a state in their entirety, not to 
minorities, whether indigenous or not, within the borders of an independent and democratic 
state.”76 In other words, “self-determination refers to ‘demos’ not to ‘ethnos’.”77 As a result, 
minorities and ethnic groups are not per se holders of the right. However, they should benefit 
from the right to self-determination because they are part of the whole population. 
                                                
73  2 Supreme Court Reports (1998), paragraphs 123-125.  
74  See below. 
75  2 Supreme Court Reports (1998), paragraph 125. 
76  Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, HRC Communication No. 547/1993, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (2000), paragraph 7.6. 
77  ASBJØRN EIDE. “Possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems 
involving minorities.” UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34, paragraph 76. 
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Therefore, the focus of the right to self-determination is not on the right-holder as a 
monolithic entity, but on the most appropriate means to implement the right (see Chapter 3). 
The basis for implementation is the right to “free choice” for all individuals and groups that 
together constitute the “whole people”.78 
 
Special cases constitute indigenous peoples who are a sui generis category of ethnic 
groups. There is an emerging recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination. This is not unchallenged: Convention No. 169 of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples states in Article 1, paragraph 3 that 
“[t]he use of the term “peoples” […] shall not be construed as having any implications as 
regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law.” The convention 
does not provide indigenous peoples with the right to self-determination. It does however, 
specify some rights for indigenous groups that are strongly connected with self-
determination.79 The UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples explicitly 
uses the term “self-determination” (Article 3), but links it with the establishment of 
autonomy as a special way to accommodate the right within the state (Article 31). 
Furthermore, indigenous peoples have the right to fully participate in the political, economic, 
social, and cultural life of the state (Article 4), especially in matters that concern their affairs 
(Articles 19 and 20).  
 
The traditional definition of the term “minority” embraces different approaches by 
international legal scholars and practitioners to define a minority. The most common 
patterns are: 
• numerical inferiority versus the dominant group in the state; 
• non-dominant position; 
• permanence of the minority (in some cases, the members of minorities must possess 
citizenship); 
• different ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics (later, definitions add 
“nationality” as a further criterion);  
                                                
78  See more detailed PENTASSUGLIA, State Sovereignty, 304-324. 
79  See especially Article 6 and 7 of the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (1989). 
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• and a sense of solidarity that is directed towards preserving their different culture, 
tradition, religion, or language.80 
 
Objective elements such as numerical size, non-dominant position, ethno-cultural 
differences, and citizenship are combined with subjective elements such as the sense of 
solidarity and self-identification with the group. Most important, traditional definitions 
emphasize the firm ties of the group to the state in which they live. Thus, some categories of 
minorities are not covered by the definition and consequently not entitled to minority rights 
– especially immigrants, migrant workers, and refugees. This led to a call for a broader and 
more inclusive approach to defining minorities by progressive international lawyers. 
The more comprehensive option of defining a minority only stresses the distinctive 
ethno-cultural features of the group, which serves as the underlying assumption for the 
whole system of minority protection.81 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) confirmed this 
view in its General Comment No. 23 on Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR): “Just as they [persons belonging to minorities] need not be 
nationals or citizens, they need not be permanent residents. Thus, migrant workers or even 
visitors in a State party constituting such minorities are entitled not to be denied the exercise 
of those rights.”82 As a result of transboundary movements of populations, mainly due to 
socio-economic (migrant workers) or political reasons (refugees), the more comprehensive 
approach became more popular. The question if “new” minorities, such as the Turks in 
Germany, could gain minority status and the eruption of ethnic conflicts over the last 15 
years made the minority problem more prominent on the international agenda. The demand 
to protect the cultural identity of members of minorities of all kinds became a primary 
concern.  
                                                
80  See for example FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI. “Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities.” UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, paragraph 568. 
81  This was a step by step process. Special Rapporteur ASBJØRN EIDE in 1993 defined a minority the following 
way: “a minority is any group of persons resident his within a sovereign State which constitutes less than half 
the population of the national society and whose members share common characteristics of an ethnic, 
religious or linguistic nature that distinguishes them from the rest of the group.” EIDE, Possible ways and 
means, paragraph 29.  
82  HRC General Comment No. 23: Rights of Minorities (Article 27), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 
(1994), paragraph 5.2. 
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However, traditionalists and legalists countered the argument that including migrants, 
refugees, and immigrants makes the definition too broad and difficult to apply in practice.83 
Furthermore, parallel to the attempts of including the controversial categories of minorities 
(foreigners, migrant workers, and refugees), there have been efforts to protect these 
categories by special treaties, resolutions, and declarations.84 These documents provide 
minimum guarantees against discrimination. However, the socio-economic and/or political 
aspects are the main concern in these documents rather than the protection of cultural 
identity, which is the main goal of minority protection.  
In conclusion, the traditional definition still reflects the prevalent understanding of what 
constitutes a minority in international law. With regard to other groups, it is important that 
they at least benefit from anti-discrimination clauses. Fortunately, generous identification of 
the beneficiaries of minority protection cannot be branded contrary to international law. 
There is no international legal rule that prohibits a state from extending the rights enjoyed by 
its minority members to other groups as well. 
 
Despite the lack of an internationally recognized definition, some common criteria for 
defining ethnic groups under international law can be identified. First, the existence of a 
group is not dependent on the recognition of a state, but only on objective and subjective 
criteria. The PCIJ stated in its advisory opinion on the Greco-Bulgarian Communities case that 
the existence of a community was a question of fact, not a question of law.85 This was 
recently confirmed by the HRC in its general comment.86 Thus, from an international legal 
point of view, the question of a state recognizing a minority in its domestic law is not 
decisive for the existence of a minority.  
Second, members of the majority who live on minority territory do not constitute 
minorities under international law, even if they are a minority in the specific region. In the 
                                                
83  See for example JOHN PACKER. “Problems in Defining Minorities.” In Minority and Group Rights in the New 
Millenium, ed. Deirdre Fottrell and Bill Bowring. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999. 223-273. 
84  See for example International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) or the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951). 
85  PCIJ Advisory Opinion, Greco-Bulgarian Communitities, paragraph 22. 
86  HRC General Comment No. 23, paragraph 5.2. 
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Ballantyne et al. v. Canada87 case before the HRC, the complainant, an English-speaking 
storeowner, claimed a violation of his right to use his own language under inter alia Article 27 
of the ICCPR in relation to a Quebec law that only allows commercial advertising in French. 
He wanted to advertise in English, but was prohibited by law from doing so. The HRC 
stated that the case raised no minority issue, since English language speakers are not a 
minority in Canada as a whole and thus not protected by minority rights provided by Article 
27.88  
 
As of today, there is no legal definition of the term “minority”. International institutions 
working with minority issues often follow a pragmatic approach: they recognize a minority 
without a formal definition.89 In the words of former High Commissioner for National 
Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
MAX VAN DER STOEL: 
The existence of a minority is a question of fact and not of definition. I know a minority when 
I see one. First of all, a minority is a group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics, 
which distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a group which usually not only 
seeks to maintain its identity but also tries to give stronger expression to that identity.90 
 
However, the lack of definition results in unforeseeability and unreliability, and 
consequently, in poor law. Good law requires clarification of the subjects of entitlements, 
along with the determination of the content of their rights. Furthermore, the international 
community forfeits its control over the matter to state governments who interpret self-
determination and minority claims for their constituent groups, thereby allowing for 
different standards and the possibility of abuse. The real challenge regarding the definition of 
minorities under international law is not the development of a precise definition but the 
determination of important distinctions for the purposes of positive protective measures 
                                                
87  Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v. Canada, HRC Communications Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 385/1989/Rev.1 (1993). 
88  Ibid., paragraph 11.2: “As to article 27, the Committee observes that this provision refers to minorities in 
States; this refers, as do all references to the “State” or to “States” in the provisions of the Covenant, to 
ratifying States. … Accordingly, the minorities referred to in article 27 are minorities within such a State, and 
not minorities within any province. A group may constitute a majority in a province but still be a minority in 
a State and thus be entitled to the benefits of article 27. English speaking citizens of Canada cannot be 
considered a linguistic minority. The authors therefore have no claim under article 27 of the Covenant.” 
89  HADDEN, International and National Action, paragraph 19. 
90  MAX VAN DER STOEL. Speech at the opening of the OSCE Minorities Seminar in Warshaw, 24 May 1994.  
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such as the size, permanence, and distribution of minorities in form of general principles or 
guidelines. These guidelines should be capable of effective treatment of real problems.91 
 
1.2 What is Ethnic Conflict? 
Conflict is intrinsic to group relations and so is cooperation.92 “Conflict” describes a 
situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible goals. It is not necessarily violent, 
but the use of “tension”, “dispute”, or “unease” is more common in this context. Political 
disputes can become violent internal conflicts such as power struggles of military or civilian 
leaders, criminal rebellions, ideological struggles, and ethnic conflicts. A violent conflict is 
called a “civil war” or “armed conflict” if one thousand people or more have been killed;93 
the conflict had a certain duration; the protagonists have group identities and are organized; 
and military operations are used to achieve political goals. Spontaneous riots are not 
classified as armed conflict because they are neither organized nor durable.94  
Ethnic conflict is a form of conflict in which the goals of at least one party are defined 
in ethnic terms, and the conflict, its causes, and potential remedies are perceived along ethnic 
lines.95 It can involve political, economic, social, cultural, or territorial issues.96 
As such, ethnic disputes are common in every plural or multiethnic society. Less than 
20 percent of all the states in the world today are ethnically homogenous (meaning that 
ethnic minorities constitute less than 5 percent of their population).97 And at least 17.4 
percent of the world’s population identifies with politically active ethnic groups.98 Peaceful 
coexistence between different ethnic groups in one state is the rule rather than the exception. 
Problems between groups and the resulting tension arise in special circumstances such as 
periods of substantial change (e.g. the collapse of the Soviet Union), uncertainty, the 
                                                
91  PACKER, Problems Defining Minorities, 232. 
92  EIDE, Possible ways and means, paragraph 52. 
93  See the definition by J. DAVID SINGER and MELVIN SMALL. Correlates of War Project: International and Civil 
Wars Data, 1816-1992. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1994. 
94  See BROWN, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts, 212-214. 
95  See WOLFF, Ethnic Conflict, 2-4. 
96  BROWN, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts, 211. 
97  See DAVID WELSH. “Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict.” In Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. 
Michael E. Brown, 43-60. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 45. 
98  Survey of the Minorities of Risk Project. www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/about/definition. 
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emergence of opportunities for action, and a number of other reasons that will be discussed 
in this chapter. These situations create grievances that can lead to mobilization ranging from 
political action to violence and civil war.99 Non-violent manifestations of conflict are 
sometimes necessary to achieve new consents and to remove barriers for future cooperation. 
The real issue is therefore not the existence of some degree of conflict, but the way in which 
it is handled – namely through the adoption of non-violent or violent means.  
 
Ethnicity is often associated with nationalism. A “nation” is usually a politicized or 
“self-aware” ethnic group; nationalism is the movement of this group to achieve its political 
goals.100 The use of the word “nation” is problematic. On the one side, “nation” can mean 
the state as such, e.g. as it is used in the term “international law” or in international legal 
documents.101 If it refers to people, “nation” can be understood as the aggregate, permanent 
population of the state linked to the notion of citizenship in its legal sense. On the other 
side, “nation” is also widely used in the meaning of a politicized ethnic group and based on 
ethnicity rather than citizenship.102 If nationalism is ethnic in character, the movement is 
primarily based on ethnic identity and excludes everyone with a different ethnicity. Political 
goals of ethnic nationalism often include the desire to self-government along the lines of 
their own culture, ranging from participation in public affairs to local segmental autonomy to 
territorial claims, including independence.103 Civic nationalism, by contrast, is nationalism 
based on the whole territory of the state and citizenship (e.g., France).104  
 
 
                                                
99  ROBIN M. WILLIAMS. “The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative International Perspectives.” Annual 
Review of Sociology 20 (1994): 49-79. 72.  
100 See WALKER CONNOR. “A Nation is a Nation, is A State, is an Ethnic Group, is a….” In Nationalism, ed. 
John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 36-45. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 45. 
101 A good example is the “United Nations”, whose members are states (see Article 4 UN Charter: 
“Membership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving states…”). 
102 EIDE, Possible ways and means, paragraph 35 and 36. 
103 VAN EVERA, Hypotheses on Nationalism and War, 26. 
104 See more detailed about the distinction WOLFF, Ethnic Conflict, 32/33. 
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1.2.1 Origin and Causes of Ethnic Conflict 
Neither ethnicity nor nationalism in itself causes ethnic conflict. Rather, the issues at 
stakes are very diverse, ranging from political, social, cultural, and economic grievances of 
disadvantaged ethnic minorities to predatory agendas of states and “national security 
interests”. In some cases, ethnicity is only a convenient mechanism to organize and mobilize 
people into groups that will fight each other for resources that are at best indirectly linked to 
their ethnic identity.105 Ethnic conflict arises if the significance of ethnic identity is played out 
in public rituals of affirmation and contradiction.106 It is thus important to determine if the 
conflict is actually about ethnicity or to what extent ethnicity is used for other purposes to 
organize a group’s struggle to gain access to resources, land, and/or power. 
 
The combination of convictions, grievances, and political goals, exacerbated by poor 
leadership, particularistic interests, and spillovers from conflicts in neighboring countries can 
lead to conflict or escalation of tensions. Discrimination, the ongoing violation of human 
rights, and the neglect of social and economic needs of ethnic groups on one side, paired 
with the ability of leaders to streamline the feeling of ethnic differentness, grievances, and 
expectance of material gains of the affected communities on the other, are among the most 
important causes of ethnic conflict.107 The report of a workshop organized by the Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 2005 stated the following root 
causes for ethnic conflict: competition for limited natural resources, discriminatory national 
legislation that does not recognize minorities, lack of opportunities for ethnic minority 
groups to participate in decision making bodies and non-consultation on issues affecting 
their affairs, weakening of traditional forms of dispute settlement (such as “council of 
elders”), religious intolerance, poverty, gross human rights violations by governments and 
multi-national corporations, institutionalized racial exclusion, unfair distribution of resources 
and infrastructure, leadership tussle, forced evictions by the government, failure of 
governments and the international community to react to early warning signals, denial of 
                                                
105 Ibid., 64/65. 
106 DONALD L. HOROWITZ. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985. 227. 
107 WOLFF, Ethnic Conflict, 63. 
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internal self-determination, lack of social services and social security, unfair justice system, 
inferiority of the minority language, and fighting for group identity.108  
Violence does not spontaneously erupt between peacefully co-existing groups. Power 
struggles, the opportunity for material gains, and other factors contribute to the escalation of 
tensions into violent conflict.109 When ethnicity is linked with acute social uncertainty, a 
history of conflict, and fear of the future, ethnic conflict is possible. Collective fears of the 
future arise when the state looses its ability to arbitrate between groups and provide credible 
guarantees of protection for minorities.110 Ethnic minorities in some cases decide to wage a 
violent struggle to assure that there is some engagement by the international community, 
which will help them to achieve their goal.111 Thus, the reason for the use of violence is not 
the belief that violence will settle the dispute as such, but the hope of political gains and 
international support. This strategy assumes the willingness of the international community 
to react and to provide a political forum to support negotiation, arbitration, and the 
settlement of disputes. The assumption of intervention by the international community can, 
in the worst case, cause the very tragedies international engagement in ethnic conflict tries to 
prevent. By counting the international community’s promise to intervene, ethnic groups 
decide to provoke attacks on civilians and start a cycle of tremendous human suffering.112 
 
Focusing on internal conflict, MICHAEL BROWN distinguishes between underlying and 
proximate causes. Underlying causes include structural factors, political factors, 
                                                
108 Report on the Workshop on Minorities and Conflict Prevention and Resolution. 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/minorities/seminar.htm  
109  See for an overview ERIKSSON, WALLENSTEEN, and SOLLENBERG, Armed Conflict, 1989-2003, 625-636. 
110 DAVID A. LAKE and DONALD ROTHCHILD. “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic 
Conflict.” International Security 21/2 (Fall 1996): 41-75. 43. 
111 See Ruth WEDGWOOD. “Limiting the Use of Force in Civil Disputes.” In International Law and Ethnic Conflict, 
ed. David Wippman, 242-255. Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 1998. 251. 
112 This happened for example in Kosovo: The Kosovar Albanian rebel forces were convinced that if they 
could provoke the Serbs to attack ethnic Albanians, the international community would intervene on their 
behalf and thus facilitate their goal of independence. The plan seemed to work out fine: the rebels began 
shooting large numbers of Serbian police and civilians in 1997, the Serbs responded by bloody 
counterinsurgency in 1998, NATO bombed the Serbs in 1999, occupying the province and thereby 
establishing Kosovo’s de facto independence. However, both the Serb counterinsurgency and the Albanian 
attacks on Serbs after Serbia’s defeat caused the death and displacement of thousands of people on both 
sides, thereby leading to the tragedy that could have been prevented. These deaths were a direct 
consequence of the promise of humanitarian intervention. See ALAN J. KUPERMAN. “Humanitarian Hazard: 
Revisiting Doctrines of Intervention.” Harvard International Review 26/1 (Spring 2004): 
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1219/. 
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economic/social factors, and cultural/perceptual factors. Proximate causes embrace four 
levels of triggering conflict: by internal, mass-level factors (bad domestic problems); by 
external, mass-level factors (bad neighborhoods); by external-elite level factors (bad 
neighbors); and by internal, elite-level factors (bad leaders).113 
The four categories of underlying causes can be further divided into several sub-topics, 
listed in the table below. 
 
Table 1: Underlying causes of ethnic conflicts114 
Structural Factors Political Factors Economic/Social 
Factors 
Cultural/Perceptual 
Factors 
• Weak states 
• Intra-security 
concerns 
• Ethnic geography 
• Discriminatory 
political institutions 
• Exclusionary national 
ideologies 
• Inter-group politics 
• Elite politics 
• Economic problems 
• Discriminatory 
economic systems 
• Economic 
development and 
modernization 
• Patterns of cultural 
discrimination 
• Problematic group 
histories 
 
Structural factors. Weak states or failed states are often a starting point for ethnic conflict. 
Most of these states are artificial products (e.g., former colonies) and lack political legitimacy, 
ethnically sensible borders, and effective political and legal institutions that are in control of 
the territory under their jurisdiction. External developments such as the reduction of foreign 
aid as well as internal problems such as corruption, administrative incompetence, and the 
inability to promote economic development contribute to state failure and start a process of 
economic decline. If this process is associated with the deterioration of the political situation 
in the country, these developments can, in the worst case, lead to violent conflict.  
Second, violent ethnic conflict is often accompanied by massive human rights 
violations, refugee flows, and spillover effects that can destabilize the whole region. Ethnic 
minority groups are especially vulnerable in uncertain and unstable conditions, which may 
compel them to provide for their own defense. Furthermore, group rivalry can lead to 
military mobilization, which leads to general armament of all ethnic groups within the state. 
This causes a security dilemma; by taking steps to defend themselves, ethnic groups often 
                                                
113 BROWN, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts, 214-218.  
114 Adapted from MICHAEL E. BROWN. “The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview.” In Nationalism and 
Ethnic Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown et al., 3-25. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001. 5. 
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threaten the security of others (see below).115 Against this background, ethnic movements 
and nationalism are driven by the need to supply recruits for armies, and are thus more 
extreme in newer and poorer countries which lack the capacity to establish high-technology 
forces and rely on manpower-intensive forces.116 Furthermore, military capability acquired 
for defense can also be used for offensive attacks.117 
Ethnic geography, meaning the geographic distribution and territorial concentration of 
ethnic groups in pluralistic states, is a third factor that contributes to violent ethnic conflict. 
A country is especially prone to ethnic conflict if groups are territorially concentrated, 
located near a border, and/or have ethnic kin in an adjacent state.118 It is easier for the group 
to mobilize for ethnopolitical action if most of the group shares a common homeland that 
serves as a territorial base and provides the group with the resources needed for the struggle. 
Contacts with other groups located in adjacent countries are facilitated by geographical 
proximity.119 
 
Political factors. First, the occurrence of violent conflict depends to some degree on the 
type and fairness of the political system. Closed, authoritarian regimes, which do not take 
into account the interests of ethnic minorities, are likely to be resented and protested against. 
Even in more democratic settings, resentment and protest can occur if ethnic groups are 
inadequately represented in the government, the courts, the police, the military, political 
parties, and other public and political institutions. The legitimacy of these types of regimes is 
questionable. The use of violence against protesters in time of political transition is often 
employed by states, which results in the further deterioration of the situation.120  
Exclusionary national ideologies are a second reason for violent conflict. Nationalism 
and, in an increased form, citizenship based on ethnic distinctions are especially dangerous 
                                                
115 BARRY A. POSEN. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” In Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. 
Michael E. Brown, 103-124. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. See also ESMAN, Ethnic Politics, 
244-245. 
116 POSEN, Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, 106/107. 
117 Ibid., 108/111. POSEN argues that the breakup of multi-ethnic states usually leaves one group with the 
opportunity to possess most of the state’s military assets, while other groups, which were initially 
defenseless, feel threatened and as a consequence rapidly mobilize their own military abilities. 
118 See more detailed BROWN, Causes of Internal Conflict, 5-8. 
119 See GURR, Minorities and Nationalists, 171-173. 
120 See TED ROBERT GURR and BARBARA HARFF, Ethnic Conflict and World Politics.Boulder, CO: Westview, 
20032. 95-116.  
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because such ideologies “predominate when institutions collapse, when existing institutions 
are not fulfilling people’s basic needs, and when satisfactory alternative structures are not 
readily available.”121 Exclusionary national ideologies must not be based on ethnicity. 
Religious fundamentalism is another phenomenon leading to exclusionary nationalist 
ideologies.122 
Third, the occurrence of violent ethnic conflict depends on domestic, inter-group 
relations.123 The potential for violence is increased with a heightened sense of identity, 
ambitious claims, and highly provoking group strategies. Conflict is especially likely if the 
claims are incompatible, groups are strong and organized, action is possible, success is 
achievable, and the fear of suppression and discrimination is tangible.124 Changes in inter-
group balance can be especially destabilizing.  
Finally, the tactics employed by leaders and elites during political turmoil can influence 
the behavior of ethnic groups. Ethnic bashing and scapegoating, hate speech, and 
instrumentalization of the mass media are means that are used to further aggravate ethnic 
tensions.125 
 
Economic and social factors. Economic problems can contribute to intra-state tensions. 
Transitions from centrally-planned to market economies, as were the case in countries in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, have created many economic problems, 
ranging from very high levels of unemployment to resource competition and massive 
inflation.126 Many developing countries are in a semi-permanent state of economic failure. 
Economic slowdowns, stagnation, deterioration, and collapse are a source for destabilization 
of the state and can lead to increased tensions.  
As a second cause, discriminatory economic systems on the basis of ethnicity can 
generate resentment and contribute to ethnic tensions. Discriminatory economic 
                                                
121 JACK SNYDER. “Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State.” Survival 35/1 (Spring 1993): 5-26. 11. 
122 See BROWN, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts, 16. 
123 See HOROWITZ, Ethnic Groups in Conflict and GURR/HARFF, Ethnic Conflict and World Politics. 
124 BROWN, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts, 17. 
125 BROWN, Causes of Internal Conflict, 8-10. The case of Milosevic strikingly illustrates this statement: By 
using national media, Milosevic fueled nationalist movements and hate towards non-Serbian groups. He 
relied on extremists in his government, which further complicated the situation.  
126 For a general discussion and several case studies see SHALE A. HOROWITZ. From Ethnic Conflict to Stillborn 
Reform: The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2005.  
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opportunities, unequal access to land and resources, and vast differences in the standard of 
living can aggravate the situation.  
Third, economic development and modernization are roots for instability and conflict 
as they bring about a variety of social changes. Migration into cities, and consequently 
urbanization, better education, higher literacy rates, and improved access to mass media raise 
awareness of where people stand in society. These changes also raise economic and political 
expectations that can provoke frustration if these expectations are not met.127 
 
Cultural/perceptual factors. Cultural discrimination of minorities, including unequal 
educational opportunities, legal and political limitations for using the minority language, and 
constraints on religious and cultural practices, is a factor for ethnic conflict. Attempts to 
force minorities to assimilate to the majority culture and the denial of the existence of the 
minority are among the most common practices of states.128  
Second, problematic group histories, stereotypical perceptions, and grievances can lead 
to conflict. Groups tend to whitewash and glorify their own history while at the same time 
demonizing the actions of other groups and creating enemy images. What starts out as a 
story or a rumor can become distorted and exaggerated over time, and finally be treated as 
“truth” by members of the group.129  
 
Regarding proximate causes, BROWN categorizes internal conflict according to (1) 
whether they are triggered by elite-level or mass-level factors, and (2) whether they are 
triggered by internal or external developments. He identifies four main types of internal 
conflict, summarized in the table below. 
Table 2: Proximate causes of ethnic conflict130 
 Internally-driven Externally-driven 
Elite-triggered • Bad leaders • Bad neighbors 
Mass-triggered • Bad domestic problems • Bad neighborhoods 
 
                                                
127 BROWN, Causes of Internal Conflict, 10-12. 
128 This is in extreme cases referred to as “cultural genocide”. 
129 BROWN, Causes of Internal Conflict, 12/13. 
130 Ibid., 15. 
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Internal mass-level factors create bad domestic problems such as rapid economic 
development, modernization, patterns of political or economic discrimination, and internal 
migration (urbanization). Refugees or fighters from neighboring countries who cross the 
border often bring violence and turmoil with them. Radicalized politics can cross borders 
(contagion, diffusion, spillover effects) and create “bad neighborhoods” (external mass-level 
causes). For instance, the Hutu refugee camps in Zaire became a base for recruitment of 
Hutu for rebel operations in Tutsi-controlled Rwanda. External elite-level factors are the 
results of decisions by governments to trigger conflicts in weak neighboring states for 
political, economic, security, or ideological reasons, for example Russian involvement in 
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia). Internal elite-level aspects include power struggles by 
leaders of different groups, ideological contests on how a country should be organized (Peru, 
Algeria), and criminal assaults (Colombia).131  
 
Security dilemmas and the rational choice of individuals, weighing the costs and benefits 
for their actions, shape strategic interactions among elites. Strategic interaction between 
groups can cause three strategic dilemmas leading to violence: information failures, problems 
of credible commitment, and incentives to use force preemptively (security dilemma). As for 
within-group strategic interactions, ethnic activists and political extremists try to outbid 
moderate politicians, thereby mobilizing members, polarizing society, and increasing the 
strategic inter-group dilemmas.132 What may have started in the private and social sphere may 
spread to the economic and political spheres and thus create discriminatory systems in all 
parts of daily life.133 Ethnic conflict occurs if the incentive for the use of violence is 
sufficiently large relative to its costs.134 
                                                
131 BROWN, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts, 218-220. 
132 TIMUR KURAN. “Ethnic Dissimilation and Its International Diffusion.” In The International Spread of Ethnic 
Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, 35-60. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1998. 
133 WOLFF, Ethnic Conflict, 83. 
134 See for an overview PAUL COLLIER and ANKE HOEFFLER. “On economic causes of civil war.” Oxford 
Economic Papers 50 (1998): 563-573; PAUL COLLIER and ANKE HOEFFLER. “Greed and Grievance in Civil 
War.” World Bank Research Paper 2001, 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedgrievance_23oct.pdf.; and KAREN BALLENTINE 
and JAKE SHERMAN. The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001. 
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Information failures arise when two or more ethnic groups compete in the political 
arena. Groups often have in-group information and incentives to misrepresent these facts to 
exaggerate their strengths, minimize their weaknesses, and misstate their preferences in order 
to get a more favorable deal from inter-group negotiations. Information failures about the 
intentions of the other group and the spreading of wrong information can lead to dangerous 
decisions by group leaders. Spirals of fear can occur in both majorities and minorities and 
can possibly have destructive consequences such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and 
expulsion.135  
Credible commitment-dilemmas arise when groups cannot effectively reassure the other 
group that it will stick with the provisions of the agreement and it will not try to renegotiate 
or misinterpret the content. Such problems arise if the balance of ethnic power shifts as an 
agreement cannot be successfully implemented. Even if the more powerful group promises 
not to exploit its situation, the declining side might choose to fight to protect itself against 
potential exploitation in the future.136  
The most significant strategic dilemma is the security dilemma, which is often increased 
by proximate factors such as primordial identities, economic decline, regime changes, bad 
leaders, and the involvement of external forces. Similar to the “traditional” interstate security 
dilemma in international relations, the ethnic security dilemma is based on the notion of 
comprehensive security. The intentions of the other community cannot be known with 
certainty, because “what one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the 
end, can make one less secure.”137 The ethnic security dilemma involves aspects of physical 
security (threats to the existence of the group), political security (oppressive regimes, 
exclusion from political participation), economic and social security (no equal opportunities 
of economic and social advancement of the group), cultural security (forced assimilation), 
and environmental security (destruction of a minority’s land and resources).138 Incentives to 
                                                
135 LAKE and ROTHCHILD, Containing Fear, 46-48. 
136 See JAMES FEARON. “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict.” In The International Spread 
of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, 107-126. Princeton, 
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preempt arise when offensive military technologies and strategies dominate more defensive 
postures, meaning that a first strike might lead to a military advantage.139 
The conditions in which security dilemmas emerge usually involve at least one of five 
factors: government breakdown; geographical isolation or vulnerability of a minority within a 
larger group; shifts in the balance of power between groups; changes in access to, or control 
over, economic resources; and forced or voluntary demobilization of paramilitary groups.140 
STEFAN WOLFF adds a sixth category: Changes in the patronage of a group or in the balance 
of power between rival patrons. Patron states do not necessarily have ethnic ties with the 
groups they protect or lobby for, but they may have a strategic interest in doing so.141 If such 
patron states intervene unilaterally rather then seeking agreement with the host state, 
solutions are unlikely to be permanent and mostly result in stalemates.142 A settlement 
becomes feasible only if all states concerned agree on a possible solution.143 
 
Ethnic conflicts have, as we have seen, multiple causes ranging from structural, political, 
economic, social, to cultural-psychological issues, or in most cases, a combination of these. It 
is important to point out that ethnic identity as such does not lead to conflict. For ethnic 
disputes to emerge, especially violent ones, several catalysts have to be involved. Bad leaders, 
ethnic activists, neighboring states, and other external actors play an important role in 
determining if a dispute between ethnic groups is to become violent.  
 
 
                                                
139 This argumentation was first introduced by ROBERT JERVIS. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” 
World Politics 30/2 (January 1978): 167-213. 
140 BARBARA F. WALTER. “Introduction.” In Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention, ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack 
Snyder, 1-14. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999. 4-8. 
141 As for example Russia lobbies for Abkhaz minorities in Georgia. 
142 WOLFF, Ethnic Conflict, 74/75. 
143 A point vividly illustrated by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. The 1985 Anglo-Irish 
Agreement was the first agreement between the UK and the Republic of Ireland. It did not, however, 
involve any of the political parties in Northern Ireland and did not seek dialogue with paramilitary groups. 
See for a detailed analysis TINA KEMPIN. Ready for Peace? The Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement in 
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1.2.2 The Character of Ethnic Conflict 
Ethnic conflicts can be extremely cruel and involve tremendous human suffering. 
Violence, rape, torture, and mass killings are among the most used means in ethnic warfare. 
Their purpose is to terrorize, intimidate, and expel members of the group. Genocide, as the 
most cruel atrocity of these, has the goal to exterminate the group completely. WOLFF writes: 
“People are prepared to kill or die because they see themselves as different from others, 
because they are told that this is a difference of life and death, and because they often only 
too willingly accept such ‘explanations’.”144 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF compares the conditions 
that prevail in an ethnic conflict to a Hobbesian state of nature, based on the assumption 
that human beings are “radically insecure, mistrustful of other men, and afraid for his life.”145  
Ethnic conflicts often involve irregular and poorly equipped armed groups, frequently 
entailing civilians and thus increasing civilian casualties. At the beginning of the 20th century, 
only about 10 percent of fatalities were civilians. In the Second World War, civilian death 
tolls rose to about two-thirds of all people killed. By the beginning of the 21st century, more 
than 90 percent of all victims of violent conflict were civilians.146 Apart from technological 
reasons such as the improvement of long-distance missiles and weapons of mass distruction, 
the major reason for the increase in civilian deaths is the changing nature of war away from 
battlefields between regular armed forces towards wars affecting the whole society with non-
state actors as major players. These wars are fought among and against civilians. This general 
acceptance of innocent victims, the consequential brutalization of the conflict, and the long-
term traumatic effects on the affected societies are some of the most worrying features of 
this kind of “new war”.147  
Moreover, ethnic violence includes the disruption of humanitarian assistance and 
widespread destruction of enemy property and territory, which indirectly threatens the 
                                                
144 WOLFF, Ethnic Conflict, 23. 
145 He refers to the Balkan wars: “By 1990, post-Titoist Yugoslavia had become a Hobbesian world, a state of 
nature in which the means of violence were too widely distributed to afford anyone safety, especially those 
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national elements, since these alone appeared to promise the Hobbesian minimum of security.”  
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existence of ethnic groups.148 In many cases, ethnic conflict cannot be treated separately 
from social, political, and economic instability, terrorism, and organized crime. These 
challenges often become so closely linked and mutually reinforcing that it is difficult to 
establish a clear causal relationship. As a result, ethnic conflicts take various forms, involving 
various actors and factors. Not all cases involve the use of massive violence. The types of 
action a group can employ range from conventional politics, collective action (strikes, 
demonstrations, and other non-violent means) to violent acts (terrorism, armed uprisings, 
guerilla, and civil wars).149 
 
Group mobilization for political goals depends on several factors such as the size of the 
group, its strength, and its distribution; the extent to which competing groups are 
interdependent; the resources available to them; the history of interactions; the depth of 
grievances or the extent of the demands made; the role and structure of the state; the 
presence or absence of reinforcing cleavages along class, religious, cultural, or other lines; 
and the attitude of outside states.150 Three factors contribute to the nature, intensity and 
persistence of ethnic conflict: incentives of the group to engage in ethnic conflict, the 
capacity for political action, and the probability to reach the group’s political aims through 
the use of violent or non-violent means.  
First, incentives to engage in ethnopolitical action can originate from resentment about 
past disadvantages, fears about future losses, and hopes for relative gains.151 Members of 
ethnic minorities are often victims of human rights violations. These include attacks and 
other forms of ill-treatment, systematic discriminations, exclusion from national and 
local political decision-making, appropriation of their traditional homelands, and national 
development policies and practices that seriously affect the social and economic survival 
of minority communities.152 Furthermore, ethnic groups with a story of independence, 
such as the Tibetans in China, will lead to persistent grievances and hopes for 
restoration. The greater the loss of autonomy and the more recently it occurred, the 
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greater are the incentives to fight to regain past advantages. Attributing injustices to 
others and proposing solutions are central activities of ethnic movements.153  
Second, the greater the cohesion and mobilization of the group, the more frequent and 
sustained is its participation in political action. Three characteristics particularly influence the 
capacity of a group for political action: regional concentration, the degree of organization 
within the group, and leadership.154 Regionally concentrated groups have a territorial base 
that can be used for recruitment, funding, and retreat. MONCIA DUFFY TOFT argues “if an 
ethnic group is a majority concentrated in a region of a state, and is located in its homeland, 
then it is most likely to see control over a particular territory as indivisible, demand 
independence, and therefore end up in violence.”155 The same arguments are made by 
FEARON and LAITIN, who also show that groups in urban areas are the least likely to rebel.156 
Cohesion is dependent on high levels of organization and interaction. Preexisting 
organization and regional concentration strengthen group ties. Established political 
institutions are usually more cohesive than new ones and can mobilize members at lower 
cost. Furthermore, the presence of a common language, religion, economic niches, or 
political establishments facilitate organization and group identity.157 Leadership, as we have 
seen in the last chapter, can determine if an ethnic dispute is fought using violent or non-
violent means, the degree to which members of the group can be mobilized, and the 
outcome of negotiations and efforts of dispute settlement.  
Third, the opportunities available to an ethnic group to achieve its goals through 
political action are influenced by the political and social context. The structure of the state 
and its openness to ethnic claims often determine the political action of the ethnic group 
(rebellion, protest or participation). Generally, in democracies, the potential for gains is 
substantial for an ethnic group, especially if the group employs non-violent tactics.158 
Deliberative democratic state structures based on the ideals of inclusion, political debate, and 
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on the attempt to reach consensus among all participants in the political process facilitate 
non-violent ethnopolitical action and thus prevent rebellion or uprisings.159 A second factor 
is the presence of transnational links: they affect mobilization and the opportunities of the 
group. Political, material, and military support especially can influence the course of an 
ethnic conflict.160 
 
Even if fought on a low level of intensity, protracted ethnic conflicts have a great 
impact on the affected society. Most influences are negative and include a lack of functioning 
or legitimate political institutions, weak economic performance, non-existent or polarized 
structure of civil society, and antagonized elites.161 Furthermore, human suffering and the 
trauma of civil war leave long-term traces, which are very difficult to erase. Polarization and 
separation as well as the erosion of cross-cutting cleavages leave societies deeply divided and 
prone to further ethnic strife. 
 
1.2.3 The Regional and International Context of Ethnic Conflict 
Ethnic conflicts have very direct effects far beyond their epicenters. These involve 
refugees flows, internal displacement, regional instability, economic failures, environmental 
disasters, diffusion effects, and establishing the conditions for organized crime and 
terrorism.162 Neighboring countries are often overwhelmed and get drawn into the 
downward spiral following ethnic turmoil. However, neighboring states, regional and 
international powers as well as international organizations, which pursue their own interests, 
directly influence the outcome and dynamics of ethnic conflict. Neighboring states and the 
international community can thus be the victims of the troubles in the region or active 
contributors – sometimes deliberately, in other cases unintentionally – by providing 
military, economic, or political support of ethnic groups or engaging in negotiation and 
peace implementation. 
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Many ethnic conflicts start out as intrastate disputes and then become regional or 
international crises when foreign powers get involved. Regional instability is as much a 
source as a consequence of ethnic conflict. Extensive refugee flows caused by ethnic conflict 
can destabilize the ethnic demographics in a neighboring country and thus lead to another 
conflict with ethnic dimensions.163 Furthermore, legal uncertainty and political chaos benefit 
the growth of organized crime. Human trafficking, forced prostitution, illegal immigration, 
drug smuggling, and the proliferation of small arms are among the most common criminal 
issues following ethnic conflict. Organized crime is one of the major sources of financing 
ethnic conflict.164 
In some cases, trouble spills over into neighboring countries. Ethnic conflicts spread in 
two ways: Diffusion occurs when an ethnic conflict in one state stimulates conflict in 
another state with similar conditions. Successful movements provide images and moral 
incentives resulting in the motivation and mobilization of other ethnic movements. This is 
particularly true for communities with more or less the same economic and political 
conditions.165  
Escalation or contagion effects occur when a conflict in one country spreads across 
borders into neighboring countries in which an ethnic minority has its kinfolk. This usually 
involves the engagement of new foreign fighters that are employed by local elites. Many of 
the fighters in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are combatants from 
neighboring countries, many of the rebels in Chechnya have fought in Abkhazia before, and 
different armed groups in Sudan are pursuing their goals with violence after having learned 
that a favorable peace deal can be brought about by using violent means. 
 
                                                
163 This happened for example in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) after the Rwandan genocide. 
Millions of Hutus fled to the DRC (former Zaire) in fear of revenge, thereby turning the already fragile and 
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On the other side, international actors and neighboring countries are not only passive 
victims. International organizations, neighboring states, and regional as well as world powers 
all have their own interests in particular conflicts. Foreign sympathizers can contribute 
substantially to the group’s cohesion and mobilization by providing financial, military, 
political, and moral support. If the state is weak, it often seeks outside help to meet the 
challenges – in many cases, it asks for military support. A real problem arises if two states 
support two different ethnic groups in a conflict. These conflicts are often very violent and 
can only be ended if and when it is in the interest of the external powers.166 Not only states 
but also rebels or rioting groups search for outside help. We know of several examples of 
connections between paramilitary organizations or between paramilitaries and so-called 
“rogue states”.167  
Furthermore, diasporas are a significant and growing source of external support for 
ethnonationalists.168 Irish-American organizations in the United States or the Kurdish 
Worker’s Party in Europe have substantially contributed to the conflicts in their homelands. 
The same is true for the Palestinians who are dispersed throughout the Arab world and seek 
support from their own kin and other Arabs for their national interests.  
 
The international community or neighboring states can choose to intervene in ethnic 
conflicts. Outside intervention can have various motivations: humanitarian interventions to 
relieve suffering and restore peace and stability;169 defensive interventions to uphold national 
security interests; protective interventions in aid of ethnic kinfolk who are being persecuted; 
opportunistic intervention to gain military, economic or political benefits; or opportunistic 
invasions that take advantage of a conflict-affected state.170 Many external actions are driven 
by a combination of considerations. International actors have many different policy 
                                                
166 Before the peace talks in Northern Ireland, the British and Irish government worked against each other. 
With the beginning of the peace talks and especially after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 
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instruments for interfering in ethnic conflicts: humanitarian assistance, fact-finding, 
mediation, confidence-building measures, peacekeeping operations, military and economic 
assistance, arms embargos and economic sanctions, and the norms of international law as 
well as conflict-resolution tools.171  
International involvement can be crucial in organizing and supervising ceasefires, 
implementing the provisions of peace settlements, and in providing mechanisms to arbitrate 
future disputes with peaceful means. The UN role is traditionally limited to the maintenance 
of international peace and security, with “international” meaning a cross-border element, 
e.g., border transgression, external support for intrastate warfare, refugee flows, and political 
and economic spillover effects.172  
Foreign governments or even individuals as neutral mediators can also have a great 
effect on conflict resolution. The mediation by the Clinton administration in the Palestine-
Israeli conflict or the role of former US-Senator GEORGE MITCHELL in Northern Ireland 
helped to broker an agreement between the parties.173  
International actors have many incentives to prevent ethnic conflicts or to seek 
resolution of a conflict at an early stage. One is to avoid the external effects of ethnic 
conflicts as described above. The experiences in the Balkan region illustrate this motivation 
quite clearly. A second reason for the international community to become involved in ethnic 
conflict management is an economic one: international trade and investments in a globalized 
economy are dependent on political stability. Third, the lobbying of NGOs or other activists 
puts international actors under pressure to act. And finally, processes like the European 
integration can accelerate peace processes because of the development of new identities and 
the erosion of the significance of borders.174  
                                                
171 For a detailed discussion of these policy instruments, see MICHAEL E. BROWN and CHANTAL DE JONGE 
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1.3 Conclusion 
Ethnic conflict is a very complex phenomenon that touches upon a wide range of issues 
in international law. Human rights, state sovereignty, and the question about what rights 
ethnic groups are entitled to are only the most important matters. Two main issues have 
been discussed in this chapter: the problems of defining ethnic groups and the origin, 
character, and international context of ethnic conflict. 
 
Regarding the definition of ethnic groups and minorities, no internationally accepted or 
interdisciplinary definition has been found. However, both political and social scientists as 
well as international lawyers agree on the most important points. The combination of 
objective criteria, self-identification, and recognition by the other members of the group is 
widely acknowledged.  
The absence of clear definition has considerable consequences for research. Concerning 
ethnic conflict research, the lack of a clear definition leads to differences in the examination 
and interpretation of empirical data. Depending on the criteria used by researchers, results 
vary widely. Taking for example estimations of how many ethnic minorities exist worldwide, 
numbers lie between three thousand and nine thousand ethnic groups.175  
In international law, the lack of a definition has even graver consequences. It is 
impossible to clearly determine in all cases who benefits from protection. This leads to 
uncertainty, arbitrary outcomes, randomness in the application of minority rights, and in the 
worst case misuse. It is not enough to define the existence of a minority as a matter of fact, 
which is often done in practice. There is a need to establish legal implications involving the 
concept of “minorities” and “ethnic groups”.  
 
Several distinct types of ethnic conflicts exist, varying in the composition and 
proportions of minorities involved and the underlying and proximate causes that led to the 
conflict. As a result, there is no single factor, set of factors, or a certain constellation that 
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explains the emergence and course of an ethnic conflict. Furthermore, ethnic conflict can 
take different forms, ranging from political action to violence and gross human rights 
violations, including mass killing and genocide. The consequences especially of violent and 
high intensity ethnic conflicts include tremendous human suffering and can affect a society 
for generations.   
In the context of today’s interdependent world, ethnic conflicts have gained significance 
because they can no longer be treated as a domestic problem of a state since they affect the 
regional and, in some cases, the international level. Furthermore, instability, refugee flows, 
the fact that conflict zones provide safe havens for international terrorist networks, and 
other international consequences guarantee that ethnic conflict remains an issue on the 
international agenda.  
 
Given the complexity of ethnic conflicts there is no “silver bullet solution” to ethnic 
conflict. The international community will have to rethink the foundations for international 
responses, especially regarding preventive strategies (as distinct from reactive or corrective) 
and the organizational reform within the UN. Given the fact that it is the broader purpose of 
the UN “to maintain international peace and security” and “to reaffirm faith in human 
rights”176, it is the task of the UN to deal with ethnic conflict, its consequences, and the 
protection of ethnic minorities.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                
176 Article 1 of the UN Charter.  
 
  
 
2.  The International Legal Context of  Ethnic Conflict: 
A Human Rights Approach 
 
 Ethnic conflict per se does not necessarily violate international law or, more specifically, 
human rights or the rights of ethnic minority groups. A number of international instruments 
provide the possibility of derogation from certain rights in times of emergency and 
international human rights instruments do not include the goal of ending all wars. In the 
same way, international humanitarian law is about the rules of warfare and not about the 
legality of the war itself. While human rights norms do not prohibit war, they continue to 
apply during conflicts, whether it is an armed conflict, guerilla warfare, ethnic conflict, or 
terrorist attack. Thus, the existence of a conflict does not lessen the need of protection of 
human rights for ethnic minorities, but on the contrary, as UN Secretary-General (UNSG) 
KOFI ANNAN stated in his commencement address at Harvard University in June 2004: “It is 
in times of fear and anger, even more than in times of peace and tranquility, that you need 
universal human rights, and a spirit of mutual respect.”177  
 
To understand how ethnic conflict is addressed by international law and why there is 
still a lack of mechanisms for protection and dealing with conflict, it is essential to introduce 
some of the basic concepts shaping international law. The following chapter analyzes the 
conflict between the international law of states, the rights of individuals, the rights of groups, 
and the justification of minority protection under international law.  
 
2.1  The Justification of the Protection of Ethnic Groups in 
International Law 
The most important aim of protection of ethnic groups is stated in the PCIJ advisory 
opinion in the Minority Schools in Albania178 case (1935). The court states: 
The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to secure for certain 
elements incorporated in a State, the population of which differs from them in race, language 
                                                 
177 Three Crises – Collective Security, Global Security, Intolerance – Test UN System, US Leadership, Says 
Secretary-General at Harvard Commencement, UN Press Release SG/SM/9357, 10 June 2004. 
178 PCIJ Advisory Opinion, Minority Schools in Albania (1935), PCIJ Series A/B, No. 64, 1935. 
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or religion, the possibility of living peaceably alongside that populations and co-operating amicably 
with it, while at the same time preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the 
majority, and satisfying the ensuing special needs.179 (Author’s emphasis) 
 
The Human Rights Committee, reviewing the implementation of the ICCPR, confirmed 
this view in its General Comment No. 23 on Article 27 of the ICCPR regarding minority 
rights: 
The protection of these rights [under Article 27] is directed towards ensuring the survival and 
continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities 
concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole.180 
 
In general, the emphasis of minority protection is on the recognition of the typically 
vulnerable position of ethnic minority groups vis-à-vis the dominant population. As 
described above, suppression, denial of rights, and ethnic conflict can have severe 
consequences for ethnic groups as well as in the regional and international context. Special 
protection for a group is needed when the group is subject to injustice, namely when the 
rights of the whole group and each member’s individual human rights are violated. The 
justification of the protection of ethnic minorities is thus based on three concepts: the 
maintenance of peace and security, respect of human dignity, and the preservation of 
culture.181 
First, ethnic conflict poses a threat to peace and security on the regional and 
international level. It is thus not surprising that the origin of minority protection is in peace 
treaties. Recent UN practice confirms the importance of minority protection for peace and 
security.182 Furthermore, the provisions in the UN Charter regarding the prohibition of the 
use of force, equality and non-discrimination provisions, human rights, and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes are all relevant for the issue of minority protection and for dealing 
with ethnic conflict. Former UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in his Agenda for Peace: 
“One requirement for solutions to these problems [maintaining peace and security] lies in 
                                                 
179 Ibid., 17. 
180 HRC General Comment No. 23, paragraph 9. 
181 See for an overview ATHANASIA SPILIOPOULOU ÅKERMARK. Justifications of Minority Protection in International 
Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997. Especially chapter 4, 68-85. 
182 See for example UNSC Resolution 688 (1991) concerning the Kurds in Iraq, UNSC Resolution 751 (1992) 
creating a mission in order to end starvation and conflict in Somalia, UNSC Resolution 918 (1994) 
expanding the mandate of the operation in Rwanda to include peace enforcement, and UNSC Resolution 
1244 (1999) regarding the establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo. 
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the commitment to human rights with a special sensitivity to those of minorities, whether 
ethnic, religious, social or linguistic.”183 He continued that democracy does not only require 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also “a deeper understanding and 
respect for the rights of minorities.”184  
The second reason justifying the protection of minorities is the respect of human 
dignity. The preamble of the UN Charter refers to the reaffirmation of “faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person” and thus connects human 
dignity directly with human rights. The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) speaks of the “inherent dignity … of all members of the human family” and 
that all human beings are born free and equal “in dignity and rights” (Article 1). Autonomy, 
integrity, and freedom of human beings as well as individual well-being lie at the core of the 
concept of human dignity, which permits a dynamic treatment of rights.185 The protection of 
minorities and human rights guarantees the individual dignity and well-being of people. 
Individual well-being in the context of ethnicity is strongly connected with the preservation 
of ethnic identity and the group’s cultural attributes. Granting ethnic groups minority rights 
promotes human dignity.186 
The third reason for justification of the protection of ethnic groups is the preservation 
of culture. Protection of culture is a fundamental value in itself.187  
 
2.2 International Human Rights Law and Ethnic Conflict 
The realization that minority protection is central to ethnic conflict prevention and 
justifiable under international law led to the development of a range of norms, instruments, 
and institutions addressing ethnic conflict and the rights of ethnic groups. Much literature in 
                                                 
183 An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, Report of the Secretary-
General of 17 June 1992, UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111, paragraph 18. 
184 Agenda for Peace, paragraph 81. 
185 See CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO. The Ethics of Human Rights. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994. 178-180. 
186 See also KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship, 75-91, 121-130. He argues that culture provides individuals 
with “meaningful options” (p. 83), which in turn promotes the individual freedom of human beings and thus 
human dignity.  
187 See on the preservation of culture in international law A.J.M MILNE. Human Rights and Human Diversity. 
London: Macmillan, 1986. 83. See more general about the relationship of culture and international law 
MARTIN PHILLIP WYSS. Kultur als eine Dimension der Völkerrechtsordnung: Vom Kulturgüterschutz zur internationalen 
kulturellen Kooperation. Schweizer Studien zum Internationalen Recht, Bd. 79. Zürich: Schulthess, 1992. 
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politics, philosophy, and law focused on the question of whether priority in terms of 
recognition and protection through international law should be given to the individual or the 
community. Communitarians emphasize the social dimension of the individual and describe 
the rights of a person in relation to other individuals and groups. Darlene Johnston, for 
example, is of the opinion that the existence of “collective wrongs such as apartheid and 
genocide demonstrate the need for collective rights.”188  
In legal terms, group rights are assigned to a group of people and can only be invoked 
by the group as a whole or its authorized agents.189 Some international scholars reject the 
notion of group rights because group rights might pose a threat to the territorial integrity of 
states or to individual rights. Others accept group rights on empirical grounds, namely that 
both national and international law recognize certain groups in specific situations. Given the 
fact that minority and peoples’ rights are part of the bigger human rights complex, it is 
undeniable that collective rights do not fit well into the individualistic and egalitarian human 
rights framework. Consequently, only few rights can be viewed as group rights. The right to 
self-determination falls in this category (see below) as well as the right to be protected 
against genocide. The HRC confirmed in the case of Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand 
that, unlike minority rights, self-determination under Article 1 of the ICCPR is not a right 
recognizable under the First Optional Protocol (individual complaints procedure).190 In 
recent years, rights concerning indigenous peoples have become increasingly recognized as 
group rights. So-called “third generation rights” or “solidarity rights”, such as the right of 
peoples to peace or development, are often seen as group rights that do not constitute a 
threat to either territorial integrity of states or individual rights.191  
                                                 
188 DARLENE JOHNSTON. “Native Rights and Collective Rights: A Question of Self-Preservation.” Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2 (1989): 19-34. 
189 FERNANDO R. TÉSON. “Ethnicity, Human Rights and Self-Determination.” In International Law and Ethnic 
Conflict, ed. David Wippman, 86-111. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998. 101. 
190 The HRC states “that the Committee has no jurisdiction to consider claims regarding the rights contained in 
Article 1. Those rights have long been recognised as collective rights. Therefore, they fall outside the 
Committee's mandate to consider complaints by individuals, and it is not within the ambit of the Optional 
Protocol procedures for individuals purporting to represent Maori to raise alleged violations of the collective 
rights contained in Article 1.” Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 
(2000), paragraph 7.6. 
191 ALAN ROSAS and MARTIN SCHEININ. “Categories and Beneficiaries of Human Rights.” In An Introduction to 
the International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook, ed. Raija Hanski and Markku Suski, 49-60. Abo: 
Institute for Human Rights, 19992. 55/56. 
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The discussion about individual and collective rights is important on a philosophical 
level, but it provides little assistance if the question is about which rights for whom. The 
crucial question is not if a right is a collective or individual right, but whether the provided 
rights are sufficient to be applied to ethnic groups and minorities. It is more important to 
develop a legal definition of what constitutes a minority and the rights they are entitled to. 
 
The UN Charter provides for human rights in several provisions and articles.192 The 
UDHR sets a common standard for human rights and fundamental freedoms on the basis of 
equality of all individuals and the respect for human dignity. The International Covenants193 
emphasize that “the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can 
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political 
rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights.”194 Rights of ethnic groups are 
addressed in the common Article 1 (right of peoples to self-determination) of the Covenants 
and in Article 27 of the ICCPR (rights of persons belonging to minorities) as well as in the 
numerous provisions for equality and non-discrimination.195 
 
2.2.1 State Sovereignty and the Right to Self-Determination 
The question of what rights ethnic groups enjoy is closely linked to the right of states to 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. As seen above, ethnic conflict can in some cases severely 
threaten a state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The notion of state sovereignty is one 
of the fundamental principles in international law. Historically, sovereignty is linked to the 
role of the sovereign, usually the monarch or regional ruler, who had “absolute power” over 
                                                 
192 UN Charter: Article 1, preamble (UN because “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights”), Article 13 
(promotion and observance as one general objective of the UNGA), Article 55 and 56 (observance of HR as 
a specific obligation of the UN and its member states); Article 10 (UNGA has an open-ended mandate to 
discuss and recommend on human rights matters); Chapters V, VI and VII (UNSC can also address issues 
evolving around human rights violations if they constitute a threat to international peace and security.  
193 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ISESCR).  
194 Preamble of the ICCPR. The preamble of the ICESCR mentions the rights in different order, emphasizing 
the economic, social, and cultural rights. 
195 For example Article 1, paragraph 3 and Article 55 of the UN Charter, Article 2 of the UDHR, and Article 2, 
25, and 26 of the ICCPR, and Article 2 ICESCR. 
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his territory.196 The Treaty of Westphalia, ending the Thirty Years War between Protestants 
and Catholics in Europe in 1648, is usually considered the beginning of the modern era of 
the international political order. The treaty is based on the concept of equal and sovereign 
states; each legally entitled to govern its own territory and its population free from external 
influence.  Sovereignty meant that each state could choose its own religion without outside 
intervention; but the Treaty of Westphalia also included provisions calling for the protection 
of Catholics in Protestant states and vice versa.197 
The principle of state sovereignty is stipulated in Article 2, paragraph 1 of the UN 
Charter. Sovereignty of states is linked with independence from outside interference 
(“domestic jurisdiction” principle, Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter) and the 
possibility to determine one’s destiny. International law has increasingly imposed limitations 
on the sovereign actions of states both on the internal and domestic level, for example by 
prohibiting the use of force (Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter). Furthermore, the 
development of international human rights law led to a gradual erosion of the “domestic 
jurisdiction” principle. As JAMES S. ANAYA noted: “Notions of state sovereignty, although 
still very much alive in international law, are ever more yielding to an overarching normative 
trend defined by visions of world peace, stability, and human rights.”198 
 
The concept of self-determination originated from the French and American 
revolutions in the late 18th century and embraced the notions of sovereignty of the citizens, 
individual freedom, and a representative government. It also included the idea of the “nation 
state”, namely that the state should consist of a homogenous ethnic community, an idea that 
significantly influenced state-building in Europe during the 19th century. After the First 
World War, the principle of self-determination was seen as the basis for democracy within a 
nationalist framework, which was understood as a regime based on the general consent of 
the governed. The meaning of self-determination as the right of peoples to freely choose 
their destiny did not play a major role in the Versailles Peace Treaties or in the context of the 
                                                 
196 For a more detailed discussion see PENTASSUGLIA, State Sovereignty, 304-307.  
197 See RANDALL LESAFFER. “Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia.” In Peace Treaties and International Law in 
European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One, ed. Randall Lesaffer, 9-44. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
198 See JAMES S. ANAYA. Indigenous Peoples in International Law. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
20042. 42. 
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League of Nations, as admission to the League’s bodies required “full self-government” of 
applicants.  
However, this notion of linking self-determination to a ethnically homogenous nation 
state soon caused problems as less than 20 percent of all states are ethnically homogenous.199 
As a consequence, a large number of ethnic groups were not satisfied with self-
determination. The establishment of minority protection under the League of Nations 
regimes was basically a way to handle this impasse. As a consequence, the concept of self-
determination had only limited impact in practice and did not become part of customary 
law.200 
Self-determination became a legal right only after the Second World War. In the context 
of universal peace requiring friendly relations between states, the principle of self-
determination of peoples became an integral part of the UN Charter (Article 1, paragraph 2). 
In this context, “self-determination of peoples” meant that the rights of peoples of one state 
were to be protected from interference by other states, with self-determination being a right 
of states, not individuals or substate groups. However, nothing in the UN Charter actually 
prohibited the emergence of a norm that went beyond non-interference and that included 
the right for peoples to determine their own destiny even on the substate level.201 
The right to self-determination gained importance during decolonization struggles in 
the 1950s and 1960s. In this context, self-determination did not only refer to the right of 
states to determine their domestic affairs without external interference, but also to the right 
to independence for colonial peoples and to integrate or associate with an established state. 
The recognition of the right to self-determination as a legal right in the context of 
decolonization was confirmed by important UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions202 
                                                 
199 WELSH, Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict,  45. 
200 The League of Nations Commission of Jurists did not consider the principle of self-determination “as 
sufficient to put upon the same footing as a positive rule of the Law of Nations.” See the Commission of 
Jurists decision on the position of the Swedish-speaking population on the Åland Islands. In League of 
Nations Official Journal 1 (1920): Special Supplement 3, 5.  
201 ROSALYN HIGGINS. Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
112-114. 
202 UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and 
peoples, UN Doc. A/RES/1514 (XV), and UNGA Resolution 1541 (XV), Principles which should Guide 
Members in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for 
under Article 73 e of the Charter, UN Doc. A/RES/1541 (XV), both 1960. 
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as well as by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinions on Namibia (1971),203 
Western Sahara (1975),204 and in its judgment concerning the East Timor case (1995).205 
These developments laid the basis for the recognition of the right to self-determination 
outside the colonial context. The UN Friendly Relations Declaration states that “subjection 
of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the 
principle.” The declaration does not distinguish between colonial peoples and peoples in 
other context. Also the common Article 1 of the 1966 international human rights covenants 
states  
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.  
 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, 
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people 
be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization 
of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
For the first time, self-determination was recognized as a free standing right in a human 
rights instrument. It was quickly included in other international documents dealing with 
minorities and human rights. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act by the Conference for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) identifies the right of peoples to self-determination in 
Principle VIII and the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Article 20, 
both also including non-colonial situations. At the end of the Cold War, new instruments 
acknowledged the importance of self-determination and confirmed its standing among 
fundamental human rights instruments.206 The Vienna Declaration and Programme for 
                                                 
203 ICJ Advisory Opinion, Namibia (1971), ICJ Reports 1971, p. 31-32, paragraphs 52-53.  
204 ICJ Advisory Opinion, Western Sahara (1975), ICJ Reports 1975, p. 31-33, paragraphs 54-59. 
205 ICJ Judgment in the case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (1995), ICJ Reports 1995, p. 102, 
paragraph 29. 
206 Examples include the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 
(1993), Part I.2; the 1990 CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and the 1995 COE Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, European Treaty Series No. 157. 
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Action, the final statement of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, states in Article 
2:  
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. … The 
World Conference on Human Rights considers the denial of the right of self-determination as 
a violation of human rights and underlines the importance of the effective realization of this 
right. 
 
However, the World Conference also confirmed that the right to self-determination 
“shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.”207  
This is confirmed by other international instruments such as the UN Friendly Relations 
Declaration, which states: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus 
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.208 
 
These examples show the immanent tension between the concept of self-determination 
and the principle of state sovereignty. Contemporary debates on self-determination and state 
sovereignty call for a shift from absolute sovereignty (exclusion of any outside authority) to a 
more relative and value-dependent notion that contains the capacity to implement 
international human rights.209 As former UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in his Agenda 
for Peace: 
The foundation-stone of this work [maintaining peace and security] is and must remain the 
State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common 
                                                 
207 Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action, Article 2.  
208 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the so-called “UN Friendly Relations 
Declaration”, UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970). 
209 See for example DANIEL THÜRER. “The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and 
Transnational Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role of the State.” In Non-State Actors as 
New Subjects of International Law: International Law - From the Traditional State Order Towards the Law of the Global 
Community, ed. Rainer Hofmann, 37-58. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999. 38/39. 
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international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its 
theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this 
and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of 
an ever more interdependent world. Commerce, communications and environmental matters 
transcend administrative borders; but inside those borders is where individuals carry out the 
first order of their economic, political and social lives. The United Nations has not closed its 
door. Yet if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no 
limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever 
more difficult to achieve.210 
 
The problems of combining the concept of self-determination with the principle of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states in connection with the uncertainty of who 
constitutes a “people” entitled to self-determination led to the search of new strategies, in 
which self-determination would not automatically be connected to independence. The risk of 
linking the concept of ethnicity to such a potent ideology as that of self-determination and 
then to legitimize this combination by referring to collective human rights increases the 
probability of even greater disorder, especially in developing countries.211 Furthermore, the 
problem is aggravated by the ethnic mixture in most countries. The idea of an ethnically 
homogenous nation is based on political imagination rather than the reality of ethnic 
intermixture. It constitutes a permanent provocation to war.212  
Furthermore, the right to self-determination can be instrumentalized by several actors. 
A good example is the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Self-
determination was the justification for the use of force by the Serbian government to uphold 
the state; for the provinces’ claims to independence, democratic institutions, and the 
protection of minority rights; and for the separatist claims of minorities living within the 
provinces.213 
These developments led to a new notion of self-determination. The post-colonial 
meaning of self-determination includes the right to have a different identity and to enjoy a 
                                                 
210 Agenda for Peace, paragraph 17. 
211 See Mohammed AYOOB. “State Making, State breaking, and State Failure.” In Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of 
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meaningful degree of control over the affairs of the group. Thus, self-determination today 
can be distinguished in external and internal self-determination. While external self-
determination embraces secession and independence, internal self-determination has a more 
domestic focus and is linked to democratic principles of participation. The Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) states:  
In respect of the self-determination of peoples two aspects have to be distinguished. The right 
to self-determination of peoples has an internal aspect, i.e. the rights of all peoples to pursue 
freely their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference. In that 
respect there exists a link with the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs at any  level as referred to in article 5 (c) of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In consequence, governments are to 
represent the whole population without distinction as to race, colour, decent, national, or 
ethnic origins. The external aspect of self-determination implies that all peoples have the right 
to determine freely their political status and their place in the international community based 
upon the principle of equal rights and exemplified by the liberation of peoples from 
colonialism and by the prohibition to subject peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and 
exploitation. 214 
 
The HRC confirmed the internal aspect of self-determination in its General Comment 
No. 12 on Article 1 of the ICCPR (self-determination). Against this background, self-
determination should be viewed as a means to an end with that end being a democratic, 
participatory political and economic system in which the rights of individuals and the identity 
of ethnic communities are protected. In most instances, self-determination does not mean 
statehood or independence, but the assignment of necessary power to ethnic groups for 
them to control and influence matters of direct relevance to them, while at the same time 
bearing in mind the legitimate concerns of other segments of the population and the state 
itself.215 
 
In the view of JAMES S. ANAYA, self-determination is increasingly understood as a 
“configurative principle or framework complemented by the more specific human rights 
norms that in their totality enjoin the governing institutional order.”216 THOMAS FRANCK 
                                                 
214 CERD General Recommendation XXI (48) 1996, paragraph 4. 
215 HURST HANNUM. “Rethinking Self-Determination.” In International Law and the Rise of Nations: The State 
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goes even further by speaking of an emerging “right to democratic governance”.217 This is 
supported by ASBJØRN EIDE who concludes that “democracy is thus clearly a part of the 
right to self-determination. What is less clear is whether groups have a right to some local 
self-government, or autonomy within the state, on the basis of the right to self-
determination.”218 
The primary understanding of the right to self-determination today is based on the 
reconciliation of the principles of state sovereignty with the protection and promotion of 
peace and democracy within and among societies. A CERD General Recommendation of 
1996 explicitly encourages the clarification of the content of self-determination against the 
background of minority rights and the non-discrimination provisions in the ICERD.219 The 
HRC increasingly considers participation and democratic rights as part of self-determination 
under Article 1 of the ICCPR.220 HRC General Comment No. 23 on Article 27 of the ICCPR 
links minority rights to the peaceful use of the territory and its resources.221 Also the 
jurisprudence reflects this opinion: The HRC confirmed in Apirana Mahuika222 and Diegaardt 
et al. v. Namibia223 that while it had no jurisdiction under the individual complaints procedure 
to consider self-determination claims under Article 1, the HRC stated that Article 1 
nevertheless plays an important role when interpreting other rights protected by the ICCPR, 
in particular Article 27. 
 
In conclusion, an advanced understanding of self-determination assumes the 
accommodation of individual and group interests to be less a question of threatening 
sovereignty as a concept than of responding to international and sub-national claims. The 
content of self-determination is in constant evolution, which might be marked by new 
concepts, formulation, and the adoption of new means as a response to the changing 
environment. The inherent conflict between the traditional understanding of the right to 
                                                 
217 THOMAS M. FRANCK. “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance.” American Journal of International 
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218 EIDE, Possible ways and means, paragraph 88. 
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self-determination of peoples, today often understood as applying also to substate groups, 
state sovereignty, and territorial integrity led to the realization that self-determination can be 
difficult to achieve and could lead to conflict. Especially with the increase in ethnic conflicts 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the impasse became more obvious. As a result, the internal 
aspect of self-determination gained increasing importance. A growing number of documents, 
international treaties, and institutions are concerned with the rights of ethnic groups that 
provide an alternative to external self-determination.  
The concept of internal self-determination has many similarities with minority rights, 
which provide an alternative to full self-determination “as a less complete, but less 
destructive means to satisfy the demands of communal affiliation.”224 The Commission of 
Jurists argued in a similar way in the Åaland Islands dispute. It declared that self-
determination and minority rights “both have a common object – to assure to some national 
Group the maintenance of its social, ethnical or religious characteristics.”225 It is hoped that 
by giving the members of ethnic groups the possibility to maintain and express their group 
identity there is no need to give them their own state. 
 
2.2.2 The Concept of Minority Rights 
The first “genuine system” of minority protection was set up under the League of 
Nations.226 The arrangements took four forms: (1) special treaties on minorities,227 (2) special 
chapters in peace treaties,228 (3) special conventions,229 and (4) declarations entered before the 
council of the League of Nations.230 For the first time, the treaty obligations were guaranteed 
through an international organization rather than regional powers.  
                                                 
224 WIPPMAN, Introduction, 14/15. 
225 Report of the International Commission of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with 
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The system was, however, not designed for general application, but only for states in 
which minorities were an issue of particular concern. Unsurprisingly, the approach was 
resented by the affected states from the beginning and was doomed to failure. First, states 
considered the League’s minority protection regime as an attack on their state sovereignty. 
Second, the underlying double standard based on the distinction between Eastern and 
Western European countries – with the Western European states imposing minority treaties 
on Eastern European countries – led to uncooperative behavior by the states concerned. 
Third, the termination of the 1919 treaty by Poland in 1934, for example, stayed largely 
unchallenged by regional powers or the League itself. Fourth, the minorities themselves had 
no possibility to represent their claims before the League as they could appear neither before 
council (no locus standi for minorities) nor before other bodies concerned. And finally, the 
minority question was exploited by some states (notably Germany) for their own purposes, 
which led to general abandonment of minority issues.231 The context of rising dictatorships, 
flourishing hate and intolerance, and passionate nationalism led to the collapse of the League 
of Nations system, making minorities the main victims of the new climate.232 
After the Second World War, the League of Nations regime of minority protection was 
rejected because of its lack of generalization, misuse by powerful states, failed political 
purpose, and limited humanitarian concern.233 A new protection regime had to be 
established, this time based on individual human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Consequently, neither the UN Charter nor the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) contain specific minority provisions. The underlying assumption was that the 
general prescription of equality and non-discrimination would be enough to secure effective 
protection of minorities. 
 
Nevertheless, the subject of minority rights was not completely absent. Non-
discrimination principles of human rights (as stated e.g. Article 1, paragraph 3, and Article 
55, sub-paragraph c of the UN Charter) and the prohibition of genocide by the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (thereafter 
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“Genocide Convention”) clearly benefited minorities. However, it was not until the adoption 
of the ICCPR that minorities got their own provision. Until today, Article 27 of the ICCPR 
is still the most important provision concerning minorities in international law. 
The original draft of Article 27 states that “ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities 
shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language.”234 The word “minorities” was later replaced by 
“persons belonging to minorities” as groups lacked international legal personality. 
Furthermore, there were fears that the recognition of group rights would lead to autonomist 
and secessionist claims and would pose a threat to both sovereignty of states and rights of 
individuals. However, in order to maintain the collective element of the provision, the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (thereafter “Sub-
Commission) proposed the inclusion of the phrase “in community with the other members 
of the group.” The final text of Article 27 of the ICCPR reads as follows:  
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their 
own language. 
 
Article 27 imposes specific obligations on the state parties, namely to protect minority 
rights. These obligations include direct duties of states to protect minority members against 
violations of their rights by private parties, to fulfill non-discrimination provisions, and to 
take positive action to protect a minority’s identity and culture. 235 Article 27 aims to protect 
the identity of the group and to ensure the survival and continued development of the 
cultural, religious, and social identity of minorities.236 Thus, Article 27 recognizes a “right to 
identity”, even if it is not explicitly formulated. The elements of identity can be ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic, or all three. The aim is not the “museumification” of minority 
cultures, but to give those groups the possibility to develop their own ways of life within a 
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human rights framework and to contribute to the society as a whole. Forced assimilation, for 
example, would violate the right to identity.237 
“In those States in which … minorities exist” almost invites states to declare that they 
do not have minorities on their territory.238 Some states such as France and Turkey indeed 
stated that they do not have minorities on their territories and that therefore, Article 27 does 
not apply.239 However, as mentioned above, the existence of a minority does not depend on 
the recognition of the minority by the state.240  
The formulation “persons belonging to” shows that Article 27 provides for individual 
rights, not rights of minorities as a group. However, rights do not benefit every individual, 
only members of minorities. The 1979 Capotorti report states that “[it] is the individual as a 
member of a minority group, and not just any individual, who is destined to benefit from the 
protection granted by Article 27.”241 Some commentators see Article 27 as a “hybrid” 
between individual and group rights.242 CAPOTORTI states against this background: “Article 
27 does not refer to minority groups as the formal holders of the rights described in it, but 
rather stresses the need for a collective exercise of such rights. Therefore it seems justified to 
conclude that a correct construction of this norm must be based on the idea of its double 
effect-protection of the group and its individual members.”243 The same line of reasoning is 
confirmed by the jurisprudence of the HRC under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
and confirmed by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (thereafter “UN Minority Declaration”), which 
again recognizes the rights of “persons belonging to minorities” while at the same time 
obliges states to protect the existence and identity of a minority as a whole (Article 1).244 
Article 27 of the ICCPR situates the issue of minority rights within the wider context of 
human rights law. Nevertheless, minority rights and human rights are not identical notions. 
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Human rights law is designed to protect the rights of all individuals, whereas minority rights 
law is somewhat discriminatory as it only protects the rights of a certain, specified group that 
has to qualify for the status of a minority under international law. From a different 
perspective, minority rights represent some of the implications of the concept of substantive 
equality (equality in fact), as opposed to formal equality (equality in law).245  
 
Apart for Article 27, the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education 
(1960) entitles members of national minorities to carry out their own educational activities, 
including the maintenance of schools and, depending on the educational policy of the state, 
the teaching of their own language (Article 5, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph c). Article 30 of the 
widely ratified UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) combines the rights of 
indigenous and minority children with the rights provided by Article 27 of the ICCPR. The 
1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action reaffirmed the rights of persons 
belonging to ethnic linguistic or religious minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practice their own religion and to use their own language in private and in public, freely 
and without interference or any form of discrimination.246 
The most important contemporary, yet legally non-binding text regarding minorities 
within the UN context, is the 1992 UN Minority Declaration. It is based on Article 27 of the 
ICCPR but goes further in concretizing the rights and is not bound by the limitations of the 
ICCPR. The declaration stresses the continued importance of minority rights against the 
background of human rights within a democratic framework based on the rule of law.  The 
most important changes are the use of positive language (instead of “shall not be denied the 
right” the declaration uses “have the right”) and the inclusion of state duties (see, for 
example, Article 1, paragraph 1). The declaration can be viewed as a benchmark for a 
potential future convention on minority rights. However, a number of issues are not clarified 
by the UN Minority Declaration and require further discussion and analysis: (1) the extent to 
which minorities are entitled to constitutional or legislative recognition; (2) the extent to 
which it is permissible or desirable to identify members of minorities and the question of 
what should constitute the most important criteria for identification; (3) the range of 
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structures developed in order to grant minorities effective political participation and 
autonomy on the local, regional, and national level; (4) the choice between the provision of 
separate institutions for members of minorities and the integration of different groups in a 
multicultural society; (5) the impact of national development plans on minority communities; 
(6) the relationship between rights of minorities and indigenous peoples; and (7) the 
implication of the application of minority rights on conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution.247 
 
The incorporation of minority rights into a human rights framework under the UN 
regime also had significant consequences on the institutional side. The UN realized in the 
late 1940s that it could not remain indifferent to the destiny of minorities. The mandate of 
the Commission of Human Rights (CHR, since March 2006 the Human Rights Council248) 
includes the submission of proposals, recommendations, and reports on the protection of 
minorities to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).249 Resolution 9 (II) 1946 
established the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities (renamed to “Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights” in 1999), a committee of experts with the mandate “to undertake studies … and to 
make recommendations to the Commission concerning the prevention of discrimination of 
any kind relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms and the protection of racial, 
national, religious and linguistic minorities.”250 The Sub-Commission was established to find 
ways in which states and the international community can solve the dual task of preventing 
discrimination and protecting minorities and their identity in a manner that is compatible 
with general human rights. 
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The Sub-Commission played an important role in trying to define the term “minority” 
and in preparing the draft text for Article 27 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, the sub-
commission was engaged under the so-called “ECOSOC 1503 procedure” that allows the 
confidential consideration of complaints concerning alleged human rights violations that 
show a consistent pattern of systematic or gross violations.251 The assessment of country-
specific minority problems, for example the discriminatory practices under the apartheid 
regime in South Africa, or of thematic issues252 in combination with the appointment of 
rapporteurs to study minority issues, made the sub-commission an effective tool in dealing 
with minority issues. Most prominently, the commission appointed FRANCESO CAPOTORTI 
to undertake a study253 on the rights of persons belonging to minorities and the application 
of Article 27 of the ICCPR (concluded in 1978) and ASBJØRN EIDE with the task of carrying 
out a study254 on possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive 
solution of problems involving minorities (concluded in 1993). ASBJØRN EIDE highlighted 
the need for arrangements for minorities based on international human rights standards 
within a broad conflict prevention strategy, which led to the establishment of the UN 
Working Group on Minorities (WGM), another expert committee.  
The WGM was established in 1995 and is the only UN body addressing minority issues 
directly. The WGM plays an important role in fostering dialogue between minorities and 
governments and has provided a detailed and useful interpretation, clarification, and 
development of standards of minority protection by providing a commentary to the 1992 
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UN Minority Declaration.255 Regional workshops and an emerging praxis of country visits 
upon invitation are more recent additions to the activities of the Working Group.256 
However, the Working Group is not a monitoring body as its mandate does not permit it to 
assess crisis situations or to give recommendations. Furthermore, with only five days of 
meetings per year and two permanent staff members, the Working Group is severely under-
resourced and does not present the ideal forum for more than discussion.257 It is not 
equipped to act as an early-warning mechanism or to perform conflict prevention or 
resolution activities. It is not able to visit high-risk countries and monitor special situations. 
The Report of the High Commissioner on Human Rights on minorities stresses “the need 
for the adoption of new solutions, [with] particular emphasis … on establishing an 
international protection mechanism to deal with minority issues that could undertake fact-
finding missions and accept and handle complaints about violations of the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities.”258 
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), a department 
of the UN Secretariat, also deals with minority questions. The mandate does not directly 
speak about minority issues, but minority protection is included in the broader context of the 
promotion and protection of human rights. The mandate includes preventing human rights 
violations, securing respect for all human rights, promoting international cooperation to 
protect human rights, coordinating related activities throughout the UN, and strengthening 
and streamlining the UN system in the field of human rights. In addition to its mandated 
responsibilities, the Office leads efforts to integrate a human rights approach within all work 
carried out by UN agencies. The office also has the ability to undertake preventive human 
rights action and field missions in countries with human rights violations.259 As we will see in 
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Chapter 4 of this study, the enhancement of the OHCHR’s preventive actions and field 
missions would contribute substantially to ethnic conflict resolution and improve the UN 
approach to addressing minority issues.  
The UN human rights treaty-monitoring system offers the most systematic and 
objective approach to the implementation of minority-related standards. These expert 
committees monitor the implementation of the human rights provisions contained in the 
treaty.260 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the Committee on the Elimination of all 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) proved to be most constructive in developing interpretation, 
jurisprudence, and general comments/recommendations of provision related to minority 
protection. Moreover, the CERD has stretched its supervisory role to include early warning 
procedures and urgent reaction mechanisms. Through its decisions and engagement of the 
Secretary General on behalf of the CERD and HRC, issues involving ethnic groups and 
minorities gained the UNSC’s attention, especially regarding systematic gross violations of 
human rights. States are obligated to periodically submit reports about the measures they 
have taken to ensure the enjoyment of the rights provided by the treaties. Both the HRC and 
CERD have established individual complaint procedures, in which individuals can claim to 
be victims of a violation of their rights.261  However, the treaty bodies have some substantial 
weaknesses. First, they only consider state reports every few years. Second, the state party 
concerned decides what to include in the report. Third, their mandate does not include fact-
finding capabilities.262 And finally, most of the measures adopted are not legally binding and 
have the form of recommendations. Dialogue, mediation, reconciliation, expert advice, 
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confidence-building measures, and international conflict resolution contribute to the 
implementation of these recommendations  
 
Even though the scope of this study does not include the analysis of regional 
organizations and efforts dealing with minority issues and ethnic conflicts, it is important to 
give a quick overview of achievements on the European level as they have played an 
important role in developing the modern minority protection framework within UN system 
and influence discussions about reform of UN institutions. The Council of Europe (COE) 
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, former CSCE) have 
both been active in protecting and promoting minority rights. Similar to the UN Charter and 
the UDHR, the COE 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) does not contain any specific minority provisions. It only provides for 
the enjoyment of the rights under the ECHR without discrimination on any ground, 
including “national or social origin, association with a national minority” (Article 14). The 
prohibition of discrimination has been expanded under Protocol No. 12. The European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992) affects the specific position of linguistic 
minorities. The most important document in the COE context and the first multilateral 
treaty on the protection of minorities is the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (1995) (thereafter “Framework Convention”). The Framework 
Convention confirms the inseparable relationship between minority rights and human rights, 
stating that “[t]he protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of 
persons belonging to those minorities form an integral part of the international protection of 
human rights” (Article 1).  
In the context of the CSCE/OSCE, the minority issue was recognized in very limited 
manner as part of Principle VII of the CSCE 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which was basically 
concerned with equality before the law, actual enjoyment of human rights, and protection of 
legitimate interests in this sphere. The document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human 
Dimension of 1990 (thereafter “Copenhagen document”) however, provides for a wide 
range of minority provisions and remains the most important and inclusive OSCE 
document. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) is the major 
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institution dealing with minority issues and plays an important role in preventing ethnic 
conflict and fostering dialogue between ethnic groups and governments.263  
The EU also has some protection mechanisms for minorities in its human rights 
section. The Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) contains references 
to respect of cultural diversity (Article 151, ex Article 128) and an anti-discrimination clause 
covering issues regarding minorities (Article 13, ex Article 6a). The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU contains equality and non-discrimination provisions in Article 20 and 
Article 21, paragraph 1 as well as references to respect for cultural diversity (Article 22).  
 
In sum, minority protection in international law has two pillars: the prohibition of 
discrimination on the one hand, and special measures designed to promote and preserve the 
special identity of minorities on the other.264 The goal of minority rights is to establish 
equality not only in law, but also in fact. The state should be the common home for all parts 
of its resident population under the condition of equality, with opportunity for the 
preservation of different identities, cultures, and traditions for ethnic groups living within the 
country. Priority in minority protection should be given to members of groups which are 
truly vulnerable and subject to discrimination, marginalization, and/or human rights abuses 
by the majority.265 
Minority rights need to be brought into balance with human rights, or more correctly, 
to be seen as part of human rights. Whatever respect must be paid to the rights of groups, 
the stance of modern international law is clear in according the primacy to individual choice; 
respect for group rights does not justify “group determinism” or the overriding of individual 
choice by claims of the group.266 The basis for the consideration of minority rights is the UN 
Charter, which states in its Preamble, Article 1, paragraph 3, and Article 55 that a general 
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objective of the organization is “the universal respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”267 
Human rights and minority rights are inseparably connected and, in the words of 
Patrick Thornberry, “rights of minorities are a particular barometer of human rights in 
general.”268 Any attempts to use an international legal approach to ethnic conflict resolution 
using minority rights have to acknowledge this repationship in order to be valid and 
effective.  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
International law has developed a number of norms, instruments, and institutions to 
deal with ethnic conflict and minority issues. When focusing on the development within the 
UN, these rules and procedures have to be viewed in a broader context of international 
human rights law. The right to self-determination for peoples developed in the context of 
decolonization and thus included the notion of independence. In recent years, the concept of 
internal self-determination gained importance, linking self-determination to democratic 
participation and inclusive governance.  
The importance of minority protection has only been realized in the last few decades. 
Early UN human rights documents do not refer to minority rights on the assumption that 
individualistic notions of equality and non-discrimination would be enough to protect rights 
of ethnic groups. Only when drafting and adopting the ICCPR did the international 
community realize that a prescription providing merely that states should not discriminate 
was insufficient. After the adoption of the ICCPR, whose Article 27 still provides the basis 
for dealing with minorities in international law, more instruments and institutions were 
developed to handle minority issues, culminating in the 1992 UN Minority Declaration and 
the establishment of the Working Group on Minorities.  
                                                 
267 See also JOHN PACKER. “On the Content of Minority Rights.” In Do We Need Minority Rights? Conceptual 
Issues, ed. Juha Räikkä, 121-178. The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996. 122. 
268 See PATRICK THORNBERRY. “The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some 
Remarks on Federalism.” In Modern law of Self-Determination, ed. Christian Tomuschat, 101-137. Dordrecht: 
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In a recent study about “Minority Rights and Ethnic Conflict Prevention”, the Working 
Group identified the human rights of ethnic groups. These include the right:269  
• to maintain and enjoy their culture, religion, and language free from discrimination; 
• to equality and non-discrimination in all areas and levels of education and 
employment; 
• access to health care, housing, and social services; 
• to use their personal names in their own language according to their own language; 
• to use their language in communications with and to obtain services from 
administrative authorities in regions and localities where they are present in 
significant numbers; 
• in areas inhabited by minorities in substantial numbers, if there is sufficient demand, 
to public instruction in, or teaching of, a minority language, as appropriate; 
• to establish and maintain their own private schools and other training and 
educational institutions, and to teach and receive training in their own languages; 
• to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of association; 
• to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life; 
• to enjoy and develop their own culture and language; 
• and to participate in shaping decisions and policies concerning their group and 
community, at the local, national and international levels. 
 
The recognition of ethnic differences can have good and bad effects. On one hand, 
recognizing and underlining the differences can lead to discrimination, exclusion, and in the 
worst case, even to extermination of the ethnic group. The Holocaust, the genocides in 
Rwanda and Darfour, the South African apartheid system, and the ethnic cleansing in the 
Balkan conflicts are only among the cruelest examples on how emphasizing differences can 
be exploited. On the other hand, the recognition of difference can be the first step to 
addressing these distinctions – it is the first step to minority rights, effective participation of 
                                                 
269 See FERNAND DE VARENNES. “Minority Rights and the Prevention of Ethnic Conflicts.” UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/CRP.3. 
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ethnic minority groups, autonomy and federal arrangements, and other forms of peaceful 
coexistence and cooperation between ethnic groups. 
Rights of ethnic groups address diverse issues ranging from the preservation of a 
minority’s culture to non-discrimination in housing. The complex nature of ethnicity and 
ethnic conflict as described above is reflected in the efforts dealing with minorities and 
peoples in international law. Bringing light to this darkness is extremely difficult and 
complex.  
3. Dealing with Claims of  Ethnic Groups in 
International   Law  
 
Claims of ethnic groups can fall in two major categories: demands for protection and 
demands for empowerment. The first category concerns demands for protection against 
extinction and discrimination, as well as claims focusing on the preservation of culture and 
ethnic identity of the group. Claims falling within the second category concern to 
empowering the group to: have the authority to determine their own affairs, actively and 
effectively participate in the state, obtain autonomy (non-territorial (cultural) and territorial), 
and in some cases, be able to secede from the state and gain independence. The claims 
depend on the structure of the ethnic group and its role in the society.270 Regionally 
concentrated groups with a history or myth of independent political existence tend to seek 
secession or autonomy, while minorities integrated in pluralistic societies request for equal 
treatment and access to power within existing political structures.271 
Each of these claims has its own structure and legitimacy, and thus a different response 
in international law. Most group claims involve different elements of both categories. 
However, the formulation of the claim and the legal domain it addresses affects its political 
and legal nature, its justification, and the form of legal response. For instance, a claim to a 
particular piece of land by an ethnic group can be a claim to reestablish historical 
sovereignty; a claim to special measures securing the use of the land and its resources for the 
ethnic group (especially if it is indigenous); a means of obtaining a certain degree of self-
determination, ranging from power sharing and autonomy to secession and independence; a 
claim to protect the group’s minority rights and cultural identity; a claim to participate in 
public affairs on the regional level; a “simple” equality claim; and so on.  
One of the major demands of politically organized groups is the formal recognition of 
the group as such. In most states with two or more major ethnic communities there is a 
general trend to include some reference of this fact in the national constitution.272 This form 
                                                 
270 See CHRISTIAN P. SCHERRER. Ethnicity, Nationalism and Violence: Conflict Management, Human Rights, and 
Multilateral Regimes. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. 113. 
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of recognition provides a basis for most measures of protection of ethnic groups, the 
promotion of their identity, and their participation in the structures of the government. 
However, in societies in which minorities are less established, less numerous, or not 
politically mobilized, explicit constitutional recognition may become less practicable. An 
often practiced alternative approach is the inclusion of a general reference to the multi-ethnic 
character of the population. This might provide a basis for more detailed legislative 
protection and recognition, such as the prohibition of discrimination on ethnic grounds as 
well as the promotion of fair participation and proportional representation on the state 
level.273 
 
3.1 Protection  
As discussed in preceding chapters, the major reasons to protect ethnic groups are the 
maintenance of peace and security, human dignity, and the preservation of the group’s 
identity. Within this protection framework, ethnic groups have different claims, ranging from 
the defense against genocide to non-discrimination and the protection of the group’s culture. 
The current chapter addresses each of these issues and looks at the response of international 
law.  
 
3.1.1 Existence 
The claim of ethnic groups to physical existence is the most fundamental claim. In turn, 
the right to life and the right to existence are the most basic human rights. Thus, among the 
corpus of international standards that are relevant to the protection of minorities is the right 
to be protected against genocide. Genocide targets minorities with the “intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”274 Genocide does not happen 
without warning, but is usually planned, organized, and systematically executed.  
 
                                                 
273 HADDEN, International and National, paragraph 20. 
274 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”), Article 
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GREGORY STANTON distinguishes eight stages of genocide:275 
• Classification. Classification is the distinction between “us and them” by ethnicity, 
race, religion, nationality, and other factors. Societies with clearly distinguishable 
categories of peoples that lack mixed groups are most prone to genocide.  
• Symbolization. Symbolization includes giving names and other symbols to groups of 
peoples, such as “Muslim” or “Gipsy”. Both classification and symbolization are part 
of human nature and do not necessarily result in genocide. However, when 
combined with hatred, symbols may be forced on groups (such as the yellow star on 
Jews under the Nazi regime). 
• Dehumanization. The stage of dehumanization is reached when one group denies the 
humanity of the other group. Dehumanization overcomes the natural human 
revulsion against murder. Hate speech is common in this stage. 
• Organization. Genocide is always organized, usually by the state or with support of the 
state. Special army units are trained and armed in this stage and plans are made for 
the killings.  
• Polarization. Extremists drive groups apart, and extremist terrorism targets moderates 
in their own group, intimidating and silencing the center.  
• Preparation. Victims are identified and marked because of their ethnic identity. They 
are forced to live in ghettoes, camps, or expulsed in a region and starved.  
• Extermination. The killings begin and go on until either the group is “exterminated” 
or until outside action stops the genocide. 
• Denial. The perpetrators dig up the mass graves, burn the bodies and destroy other 
evidence of the genocide. They deny that they committed any crimes and block 
investigations.  
 
In international law, the term “genocide” was first defined in the context of the 
Holocaust. The jurist LEMKIN described genocide in 1944 as: 
a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of 
the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives 
of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, 
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language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the 
destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the 
individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against individuals, not in their 
individual capacity, but as members of the national group.276 
 
LEMKIN identified different forms of genocide. “Political” genocide implies the 
complete destruction of a government and replacement by an ethnically homogenous, 
despotic regime. “Social” genocide involves the weakening of the spiritual resources of the 
state, especially attacks on critical intelligentsia. “Cultural” genocide includes prohibiting the 
use of minority languages, education in the majority culture and language, and the control of 
culture in general, including manifestations of this policy such as book burnings. 
“Economic” genocide means the destruction of the minority’s economic resources, 
including expropriation of land and the prohibition of traditional economic activities. 
“Biological” genocide involves measures to favor lower birthrates in ethnic minorities, such 
as the forcible separation and/or starvation of men and women and measures designed to 
affect the survival capacity of children. “Physical” genocide refers to what is commonly 
referred to as genocide, namely mass killings. “Religious” genocide is the elimination and 
prohibition of a minority’s religion. Finally, “moral” genocide represents an attempt to 
debase a group by, for example, encouraging the consumption of alcohol.277 
 
Genocide entered international criminal law after the Second World War as part of 
“crimes against humanity” in Article 6, paragraph c of the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal for Germany,278 namely “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before or during the war 
or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds.” 
Under the auspices of the UN, genocide emerged later as a separate legal concept. 
UNGA Resolution 96/I (1946), which was adopted unanimously and without debate, 
defined genocide as “a denial of the right to existence of entire human groups”, existence 
referring to physical existence of racial, religious, political, and other groups. The resolution 
                                                 
276 RAPHAEL LEMKIN. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
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adopted genocide as “a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns” 
and refers to the punishability of the crime. For the first time, genocide was treated 
independently from other war crimes. The resolution influenced the 1948 Genocide 
Convention. 
The Genocide Convention defined genocide as a crime under international law (Article 
1). Any regime that commits genocide forfeits its legitimacy and can become subject to 
international intervention. Genocide is defined as (Article 2):  
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
Genocide Watch, an international NGO concerned with prevention and punishment of 
mass murder, specifies these crimes. Killing members of the group includes direct killing and 
actions causing death; causing serious bodily or mental harm includes inflicting trauma on 
members of the group through torturing, rape, sexual violence, forced use of drugs, and 
mutilation; deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy a group includes the 
deprivation of resources needed for the groups physical survival, namely clean water, food, 
clothing, shelter, and medical services; deprivation can be imposed through confiscation of 
harvests, blockade of food transports, detention in camps, forcible relocation or expulsion 
into deserts or similar uninhabitable territories; prevention of births includes involuntary 
sterilization, forced abortion, prohibition of marriage, and long-term separation of men and 
women intended to prevent procreation; and forcible transfer of children may be imposed by 
direct fore or through threats such as violence, detention, and psychological oppression.279 
 
It is not surprising that all acts under Article 2 refer to either “physical genocide” (a-c) 
or “biological genocide” (d), or both (e). The question of “cultural genocide” was excluded 
as the concept was too vague and open to abuse. As a result, the term “genocide” was 
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narrowed down to acts targeting the physical integrity of the group and lost the open 
meaning suggested by LEMKIN. 
Besides the prohibition to intentionally destroy a group (Article 2) and obligations for 
parties to prevent, punish and prosecute the crime of genocide including the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility (Article 4), the Genocide Convention includes a provision 
stating that the states themselves can be held responsible (Article 9). This was confirmed by 
the ICJ in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Preliminary Objections),280 in which the ICJ observed that state 
responsibility does not only apply if a state fails to prevent genocide, but also to acts of 
genocide directly committed by the state (paragraph 32). The ICJ has also noted that the 
rights and obligations enshrined by the Genocide Convention are rights and obligations erga 
omnes, which means that a party’s duty to combat genocide is not limited to the party’s 
territory (paragraph 31).281 
The prohibition of genocide is not only a general international legal norm but also a 
norm of jus cogens under Article 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
which means that “no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”282 Under the UN 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, genocide can entail the international state responsibility 
which is attached to serious breaches of jus cogens norms.283 
 
Other documents and institutions protect the right to existence of ethnic groups.  
Protection for the physical existence of minorities derives from the jurisdiction of the UN 
international tribunals (the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
                                                 
280 ICJ Preliminary Objections in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
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(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)). All three tribunals prosecute persons for serious violations under 
international law, namely the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
(“grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949”).284 “Ethnic cleansing”, which “entails 
deportation and forcible mass removal or expulsion of persons from their homes in flagrant 
violation of their human rights, and which is aimed at the dislocation or destruction of 
national, ethnic, racial or religious groups,”285 is essentially covered by the Statute of the ICC, 
together with other practices seriously affecting the physical integrity of a minority group 
and its members.286 
In a more general way, the right to existence is addressed in human rights documents, 
e.g. Article 20 of the ICCPR or Article 4 of the ICERD, concerning the prohibition of 
propaganda for war and incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence based on 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred. The 1992 Minority Declaration provides in 
Article 1 that states “shall protect the existence” of national or ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic minorities. This refers to a basic right to be protected against genocide.287  The 
prohibition of “cultural genocide”, which is understood as the destruction of a group’s 
specific traits, includes the ban of discrimination on ethnic, racial, national, linguistic, or 
religious ground, of forced assimilation, ethnocide, and specific measures regarding property 
rights and participation in political bodies. These are only some examples that illustrate the 
internationally recognized preconditions for the preservation of a minority’s special traits, 
tradition, and culture.   
Protection of the existence also includes the continued residence in the area where the 
ethnic group lives and the right to freely move somewhere else. Expulsions and 
displacement on the basis of ethnic identity are human rights violations and are part of the 
strategy of ethnic cleansing which is prohibited by the ICC Statute.288  
 
Genocide is the worst atrocity committed against an ethnic group and violates 
minorities’ most fundamental rights. The crime of genocide includes two elements: intention 
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and action designed to physically destroy an ethnic group. Despite the fact that the Genocide 
Convention is one of the strongest international instruments in terms of language, precision, 
and consequences for implementation, the UN has failed to act more than once. The 
genocides in Rwanda, in the Balkans, and most recently in Darfour remind us that ethnic 
conflict is more than just a threat to international peace and security. The Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, named “Responsibility to 
Protect” states: “What is at stake here is not making the world safer for big powers, or 
trampling over the sovereign rights of small ones, but delivering practical protection for 
ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect 
them.”289  
 
3.1.2 Equality and Non-Discrimination 
Discrimination is among the most common offences against members of minorities. 
Claims to not be discriminated against and to have equal rights and opportunities are among 
the most frequently uttered demands of ethnic groups. Comprehensive equality and non-
discrimination provisions contribute to the prevention of ethnic disputes. Violations of 
equality and non-discrimination rights of minority groups are important underlying causes of 
ethnic conflict.  
The right to equality and non-discrimination are well-established principles of 
international human rights law.290 Equality and non-discrimination constitute interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing concepts that are composed of two elements: (1) abstention from 
any kind of differentiation based on arbitrary or unreasonable grounds, and (2) differential 
treatment (“positive” discrimination) with the intention to achieve equality in situations of 
inequality and discrimination.291 
Equality and non-discrimination provisions are part of the UN Charter (Article 1, 
paragraph 3 and Article 55, sub-paragraph c), the UDHR (Article 2) and also the 
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International Covenants contain general and specific clauses. Furthermore, there are other 
specialized and regional instruments that deal with discrimination.292 Non-discrimination and 
the right to equality are widely acknowledged as customary international law.293  
Regarding the definition of discrimination, the HRC stated in its General Comment No. 
18 on non-discrimination under the ICCPR: 
the term “discrimination“ as used in the Covenant should be understood to imply any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and 
freedoms.294 
 
Article 2, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR obliges all state parties “to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 
Whenever “race” is used, it also includes “ethnic group”.295  
 
The non-discrimination clauses in the ICCPR296 not only prohibit discrimination, but 
oblige states “to ensure” that individuals are protected against discrimination by private 
actors.297 The CERD General Recommendation 23 on the rights of indigenous peoples, 
adopted in 1997,298 and the 2001 Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the UN 
World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
                                                 
292 For example the ICERD (1965), the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), 
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Intolerance299 emphasize the importance of equality and non-discrimination for minority 
groups. Minorities are not the only beneficiaries of anti-discrimination and equality norms. 
However, the fact that most provisions include references to race, national or ethnic origin, 
religion, language, social status, and birth, shows the international awareness of 
discrimination against minorities. 
The goal of anti-discrimination clauses is to place members of minorities on a footing 
of equality with the other nationals of the state, to prevent any action which denies to 
individuals or groups of people equality, and to suppress or prevent any conduct which 
denies or restricts a person’s right to equality.300 The protection of one minority, however, 
can lead to the discrimination of other minorities. In Waldman v. Canada, the HRC concluded 
that the public funding of schools of the Roman Catholic minority in Canada, but of no 
schools of any other minority religion, constitutes a violation of Article 26 of the ICCPR.301 
A breach of Article was also found in Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, in which case the HRC 
stated that the authors, speakers of the minority language, were victims of intentional 
discrimination on linguistic grounds.302  
However, not every differentiation of treatment constitutes discrimination if the criteria 
for such differentiation are reasonable and objective, and if the aim is to achieve a purpose 
which is legitimate under the ICCPR.303 Article 1, paragraph 4 of the ICERD states:  
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing  adequate advancement of certain 
racial or ethnic groups or individuals  requiring such protection as may be necessary in order 
to ensure  such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human  rights and 
fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination,  provided, however, that 
such measures do not, as a consequence,  lead to the maintenance of separate rights for 
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different racial  groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives  for which they 
were taken have been achieved. 
 
This principle can also be found in international texts concerning minorities, e.g. in 
Article 4, paragraph 1 of the UN Minority Declaration. Positive discrimination, in the last 
years more commonly known as affirmative action, is “preference for certain groups or 
members of those groups, typically defined by race, ethnic identity or sex, for the purpose of 
securing adequate advancement of such groups or their individual members in order to 
ensure equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”304  
There are “soft” and “strong” versions of affirmative action.305 The “soft” versions are 
basically extensions of the principle of non-discrimination. Stronger affirmative action 
measures are aimed at the accelerated creation of a balanced and equal society, namely 
equality in participation on all levels, in political life, education, economy, and many other 
fields. Typical means of accomplishing this are the establishment of quotas for access to 
higher education, civil service, employment etc. Such measures suspend or modify the 
traditional criteria of merit as a basis for access, but can be justified if past discriminatory 
practices blocked members of those groups from gaining the merits needed.306 
Another method to achieve equality is the implementation of economic, social, and 
cultural rights on the basis of need, not taking into account ethnic, racial or gender 
background. This would not qualify as affirmative action, as it is simply the realization of 
social and economic rights. Furthermore, the redistribution of resources such as land and 
capital can provide possibilities for equality of opportunity. This can take many forms, 
including direct and indirect taxation, free or state-sponsored education, grants etc.307 
 
An important distinction has to be made between the anti-discrimination/equality 
clauses and rights for minorities. The  Sub-Commission defined the difference as follows: 
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1. Prevention of discrimination is the prevention of any action, which denies to individuals or 
groups of people equality of treatment, which they may wish. 
2. Protection of minorities, is the protection of non-dominant groups which, while wishing in 
general for equality of treatment with the majority, wish for a measure of differential 
treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics which they possess and which 
distinguish them from the majority of the population.308 
 
Anti-discrimination clauses prohibit a certain treatment, but do not embrace minority 
rights. The basic aim of the prevention of discrimination is to secure full and equal 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 1, paragraph 4 of the 
ICERD) and to eliminate “barriers between races” (Article 2, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph e 
of the ICERD). Minority rights are a wider notion as they specifically aim at preserving the 
characteristics which distinguish the minority from the majority.309 Article 2 and 26 of the 
ICCPR are available to everyone who feels discriminated against, including persons 
belonging to minorities, women, political groups and others. By contrast, Article 27 provides 
guarantees that are only available to persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities.  
 
Most states have adopted a legislation covering many of the anti-discriminatory 
provisions of the ICCPR, ICESCR, and the ICERD. Effective implementation of these 
provisions is one of the first steps preventing ethnic violence from occurring. The ICERD 
has one of the highest numbers of ratifications,310 which underlines the importance and the 
level of agreement on the matter of equality and non-discrimination. Equality provisions in 
national legislations include the right of individuals to be treated equally before the law, 
enjoyment of civil and political rights, the right to property, the right to personal security, 
freedom from discrimination in employment or housing, discrimination in education, access 
to public service, the prohibition of associations that promote racial discrimination, and the 
prohibition of incitement speech.311 A number of policies have been taken to counteract 
ethnic discrimination. States established institutions monitoring racial equality, human rights 
commissions, an Ombudsman, minority councils etc. 
                                                 
308 Report of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/52 (1947), Section V. 
309 See for example the PCIJ Minority Schools in Albania case, 17. 
310 As of 2004, 169 states have ratified the ICERD.  
311 See for a detailed analysis EIDE, Possible ways and means, paragraphs 136-152.  
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The effectiveness of legislation prohibiting discriminatory practices depends on several 
factors, the most important ones being the general acceptance of the practice by the public, 
the consistent and impartial implementation by the courts, and its unbiased enforcement by 
police and security forces.312 The problem is that these provisions are not very effective in 
time of ethnic conflict. Police and security forces are usually representing the majority. In the 
worst case, there can be attacks on minorities by death squads, the use of torture when 
imprisoned, and random imprisonment on the basis of ethnicity. International monitoring 
bodies have to make sure that basic human rights of minorities are respected.  
 
3.1.3 Identity and Culture 
The core of minority protection lies in special, permanent measures to protect the 
identity of the group.313 The focus is on what makes these groups different from the rest of 
the population, while clearly rejecting any discriminatory regimes such as the policy of 
apartheid. It is now generally accepted that every culture has dignity and value and as a 
consequence, has to be protected and preserved.314  
Article 1 of the 1966 UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural 
Co-operation315 states that “each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and 
preserved” (paragraph 1) and that “all cultures form part of the common heritage belonging 
to all mankind” (paragraph 3). However, no clear definition of culture exists,316 which makes 
the implementation of rights designed to preserve culture difficult. The main elements of 
identity are language and culture – the latter including religious practices. UNESCO 
identifies culture as:  
all that is inherited or transmitted through society, it follows that its individual elements are 
proportionally diverse. They include not only beliefs, knowledge, sentiments and literature …, 
but the language or other systems of symbols that are their vehicles. Other elements are the 
                                                 
312 Ibid., paragraph 150.  
313 See for a general discussion about identity issues Chapter 1.  
314 See for example Article 29 and 30 CRC, Article 32 of the Migrant Workers Convention, Article 2, paragraph 
2, sub-paragraph b of ILO Convention No. 169 regarding indigenous peoples, and Article 1.3 of the 
UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice.  
315 UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation of 4 November 1966, 
UNESCO Doc. 14C/8.I. 
316 See THORNBERRY, International Law and the Rights of Minorities, 187. 
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rules of kinship, methods of education, forms of government and all the fashions followed in 
the social relations …317  
 
LYNDEL V. PROTT distinguishes two meanings of culture: (1) culture in the meaning of 
the highest intellectual achievements such as literary, artistic, and scientific works and (2) 
culture in the broader sense of the totality of all practices and knowledge of all groups in a 
given society.318 RODOLFO STAVENHAGEN introduces the ethnic dimension by adding to the 
two former concepts the meaning of culture as the sum of the material and spiritual activities 
of a group, which distinguishes it from other groups in the society. He accentuates the 
changes in the perception of culture over time and points out that the “emphasis is on the 
way people perceive their culture, on the discourse about culture, rather than on culture 
itself.”319 Special Rapporteur CAPOTORTI points out in his study about the rights of people 
belonging to minorities that cultural issues include the general policy regarding minorities, 
educational policy for children belonging to ethnic groups, development of arts and literature 
of a minority, diffusion of their culture, and measures adopted for the preservation of their 
customs and of their legal traditions.320  
The recognition of culture as a justification for the protection of ethnic groups does not 
imply that all cultures or all cultural practices should be protected and promoted at any 
price.321 The preservation of minority cultures and ethnic identity has to be seen against the 
background of international law recognizing the value of cultural diversity, the equality of all 
cultures, and as a result, the fact that all cultures deserve protection in order to secure their 
survival. This value is conditioned by other interests such that certain cultural practices may 
be limited or prohibited.322 
 
                                                 
317 Race and Culture, ed. UNESCO. Paris: UNESCO, 1951. 21. 
318 LYNDEL V. PROTT. “Cultural Rights as Peoples’ Rights in International Law.” In The Rights of Peoples, ed. 
James Crawford, 93-106. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 94. 
319 See RODOLFO STAVENHAGEN. “Cultural Rights and Universal Human Rights.” In Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights – A Textbook, ed. Asbjørn Eide, 63-77. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995. 67. 
320 CAPOTORTI, Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1., paragraphs 327-385. 
321 SPILIOPOULOU ÅKERMARK speaks of a process similar to “an endangered species theory.” SPILIOPOULOU 
ÅKERMARK, Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law, 83. 
322 For instance, ceremonial female genital mutilation is an unacceptable cultural practice as it violates basic 
human rights of the women affect (e.g., the right to physical integrity).  
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Members of minorities should not only have the possibility to receive their education in 
the minority language, but also receive some knowledge of their culture (also about cultures 
of other groups and the society at large). States should therefore adopt measures in the field 
of education that encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language, and culture of 
their minorities. In this context, the right to use one’s name in a way it is used within the 
minority group and the right to have street names and toponyms in the language of the 
minority as well as the majority constitute significant contributions to the preservation of 
ethnic culture.323 
Identity issues are usually highly politicized and the degree to which identity matters are 
protected or promoted varies substantially between different countries. In Sandra Lovelace v. 
Canada324 the complainant was a Maliseet Indian woman who had lost, under Canadian 
legislation, her status as an Indian as a result of marrying a non-Indian. After the divorce, she 
wanted to go back in the Topique reservation, which is the place where she was born and 
grew up. This was denied by Canadian authorities because of the said change of status. The 
HRC stated that restrictions affecting the right to residence on a reservation must have a 
reasonable and objective justification (paragraph 16). The denial to Sandra Lovelace to live 
on the reservation was not seen as reasonable or necessary to preserve the identity of the 
tribe, and as a result, the HRC concluded that the prevention of her recognition as belonging 
to the group constitutes a violation of her rights under Article 27 of the ICCPR.  
Furthermore, transborder contacts between ethnic groups contribute to the 
preservation of minority cultures. State authorities have sometimes been suspicious of these 
interactions. However, even though there are cases of minorities participating in secessionist 
movements that posed a risk to the state, in general, minorities have fostered economic, 
cultural, and social cooperation across borders and thus supported the normalization of 
relations between states. They play a significant role in creating and determining the 
character of bilateral relations between countries.325 It is thus important for the state to create 
a  balance between its right to preserve its territorial integrity and the right of ethnic groups 
to interact with their kin groups across the border. 
                                                 
323 EIDE, Possible ways and means, paragraphs 202-205. 
324 Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, HRC Communication No. 24/1977, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 83 (1984). 
325 See about transborder contacts between minorities the Minority Rights Group International 
http://www.minorityrights.org/WorkshopReports/work_rep_chapterdetail.asp?ParentID=6&ID=38.  
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3.2 Empowerment  
Claims to empower ethnic groups often involve the right to self-determination. As seen 
in the preceding chapters, this involves tensions with other concepts, especially the principle 
of state sovereignty. As a result, other possibilities such as participation, power-sharing 
arrangements and autonomy play an important role in the settlement of ethnic claims.  
 
3.2.1 Participation  
Among claims of ethnic groups is the demand to effectively participate in the internal 
affairs of a state. HRC General Comment No. 23 on Article 27 provides for “measures to 
ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which 
affect them.”326 Few of the communications based on Article 27 of the ICCPR deal with 
effective participation of minorities.327 Participation is reviewed under Article 25 of the 
ICCPR, but is not minority specific. Article 25 of the ICCPR reads:  
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions 
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:  
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives;  
 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of 
the will of the electors;  
 
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.  
 
The requirement of states to provide full participation to all ethnic groups has two 
aspects: First, the government must be comprised of all ethnic groups, and not just one. 
                                                 
326 HRC General Comment No. 23, paragraph 7.  
327 The only case that touches upon participation is Gobin v. Mauritius which aimed at denouncing a 
constitutional arrangement that was established to ensure the adequate representation of minorities in the 
legislature by forseeing special seats for members of minorities. The author, who got more votes in the 
election than a minority candidate, claimed that his rights under Article 26 ICCPR (non-discrimination) have 
been violated. The communication was found inadmissible because it was submitted five years after the 
elections without an explanation for the reason of this delay. Gobin v. Mauritius, HRC Admissibility Decision, 
no. 787/1997, UN Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/787/1997. 
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Second, the participation of the different groups must be effective.328 It is not enough to 
have formal participation, such as the right to vote for all citizens, if the majority always 
outvotes the minority. States are required to develop appropriate and effective methods of 
participation for persons belonging to minority groups, meaning that minorities have an 
actual voice in the decision-making process. This includes the availability of informational 
materials and voting sheets in minority languages.329 The electoral boundaries and methods 
of allocating votes should not distort the distribution of voters or discriminate against any 
group.330 Securing a balance between giving minorities a vote and avoiding discrimination 
against the majority is an integral element of building a healthy minority-majority 
relationship.331 
 
If a minority is not adequately represented or consulted in the political affairs or in legal 
proceedings of a state, the risk persists that unrepresented bodies will seek to pursue 
objectives or actions that are not supported by or in the interests of the minority or the 
community as a whole. It is therefore desirable to include some formal procedures in 
national legislation to ensure that the full range of opinions and claims are represented in the 
implementation of collective rights and duties. Measures include consultation, participation 
in elected bodies, and involvement in the preparation of national and regional programs. 
The HRC suggested in the Länsman332 and Apirana Mahuika333 cases that meaningful 
forms of direct consultation provide a minimum way to enable minority groups to 
participate in the decision-making process. The way in which participation is granted must be 
determined by the state. In the Marshall et al v. Canada334 case concerning the right to directly 
take part in the conduct of public affairs under Article 25, paragraph (a) of the ICCPR, the 
authors represented an indigenous group that complained about the violation of their right 
to participation in public affairs. They claimed that the Canadian government failed to 
                                                 
328 Article 2, paragraph 3 of the UN Minority Declaration, paragraph 35 of the CSCE Copenhagen Document 
on the Human Dimension, and Article 15 of the Framework Convention. 
329 See HRC General Comment No. 25: Participation (Article 25), UN Doc. A/51 40 (1996), paragraph 12. 
330 Ibid., paragraph 21. 
331 EIDE, Possible ways and means, paragraph 67. 
332 Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, HRC Communication No. 671/1995, UN Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 
(1996), paragraph 10.5. 
333 Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, paragraph 9.6. 
334 Marshall v. Canada, HRC Communication No. 205/l986, UN Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/205/l986 at 40 (1991). 
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consult the group on subjects that directly affect their interests and those of the group as a 
whole because they had not been invited to a constitutional conference on aboriginal 
matters. The Committee concluded that “it cannot be the meaning of article 25(a) of the 
Covenant that every citizen may determine either to take part directly in the conduct of 
public affairs or to leave it to freely chosen representatives” and that “it is for the legal and 
constitutional system of the State party to provide for the modalities of such 
participation.”335 Article 25, paragraph (a) cannot be understood as meaning that any directly 
affected group has the right to choose the modalities of participation in the conduct of 
public affairs. Consequently, the HRC stated that participation at the conference was not 
subjected to unreasonable restrictions and that the complaint does not disclose a violation of 
Article 25 of the ICCPR.336 Most other minority rights instruments link effective 
participation of minorities to their compatibility with “national legislation”337, the “decision-
making procedures”, or “policies”338. 
 
Most cases of the HRC regarding participation deal with the effective involvement of 
minorities in public affairs and political life. There is a tendency to neglect participation of 
ethnic groups in social, economic, and cultural rights. One reason for this lack of attention is 
the fact that the HRC only deals with civil and political rights laid down in the ICCPR.339 
However, the HRC can also deal with economic and social rights through Article 26 (non-
discrimination).340 Other cases based on Article 25 deal with language rights,341 rights of 
indigenous peoples,342 and the influence of citizenship on participation rights.343 
 
                                                 
335 Ibid, paragraph 5.4. 
336 Ibid, paragraph 6. See also PENTASSUGLIA, State Sovereignty, 318/319. 
337 See Article 2, paragraph 3 of the UN Minority Declaration. 
338 See paragraphs 33 and 35 of the CSCE Copenhagen document. 
339 See VERSTICHEL, Recent Developments, 26. 
340 See for example Zwaan-De Vries v. Netherlands, HRC Communication No. 182/1984, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984 (1987) or Mümtaz Karakurt v. Austria, HRC Communication No. 965/2000, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/965/2000 (2002).  
341 See Ignatane v. Latvia, HRC Communication No. 884/1999, UN Doc. CCPR/C/72/884/1999 (2001). 
342 See for example J.G.A. Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia; Länsman et al. v. Finland, HRC Communication No. 
511/1992, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994); and Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand.  
343 See Gillot v. France, HRC Communication No. 932/2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/932/2000 (2002).  
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3.2.2 Autonomy and Power-Sharing 
Claims by ethnic groups to determine their own affairs often involve demands to 
autonomy and power-sharing. This implies the devolution of power to various degrees to the 
benefit of one or more minority groups, ranging from complex government systems of 
power-sharing to territorial autonomy and regimes of segmental or “cultural autonomy”. 
Both autonomy and power-sharing can be viewed as a way of enhancing protection for 
minorities under domestic law. The CSCE Copenhagen document states that autonomy is 
one of the appropriate means to protect the identity of minorities and to secure effective 
participation.344 
Different models of autonomy and power-sharing can be used depending on the 
structure of the state and the size and situation of the minority.345 In cases where minorities 
are widely dispersed or not numerous enough to justify the creation of an autonomous 
region, functional or segmental autonomy may constitute an appropriate alternative. This 
may involve the delegation of administrative powers to minorities in respect to issues of 
particular concern, such as education, language, traditional social and economic systems, or 
cultural institutions. To avoid the development of two completely separate cultures in the 
state, it is important to guarantee minorities access and participation right on the state 
level.346 
Territorial autonomy on a local or regional basis is likely to be the most appropriate 
form for regionally concentrated minorities in a well-defined area for which a degree of 
political, cultural and/or economic self-dependency is appropriate. The precise degree of 
autonomy and the extent to which it may be different from that enjoyed by other parts or 
provinces within the state is a matter of political negotiation.  
Several issues have to be taken into account when examining the possibilities for 
territorial autonomy. First, the autonomy given should be entrenched in the constitution or 
an international agreement so that it cannot easily be altered. This provides minorities with a 
                                                 
344 CSCE Copenhagen document, paragraph 35. 
345 See for a more detailed discussion GEOFF GILBERT. “Autonomy and minority groups - a legal right in 
international law?” UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/CRP.5; and ASBJØRN EIDE. “Cultural autonomy 
and territorial democracy: a recipe for harmonious group accommodation.” UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/WP.4. 
346 HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE. “On the legal Understanding of Autonomy.” In Autonomy: Applications and 
Implications, ed. Markku Suksi, 7-32. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998. 21. 
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certain degree of security about their status even if the political context changes.347 Second, 
the scope of autonomy has to be clearly defined, whether it is territorial or segmental 
autonomy. Third, the autonomy arrangement has to ensure that all citizens of the country 
enjoy equal human rights in all parts of the state. In almost every case there will be other 
communities with a different ethnic identity within the autonomous territory. It is thus 
important to ensure that the rights of these sub-minorities are granted and that they are 
protected against non-discrimination, inequality, or exclusion. 
 
In societies with deep ethnic divisions, competition for political power often results in 
the domination of the majority group. Groups that fear marginalization mobilize for action 
that might threaten other groups. In order to avoid ethnic conflict, some countries have 
sought to balance power among different groups and to give groups the right to 
participation through democratic power-sharing. AREND LIJPHART’s consociational model348 
introduces four markers of ethnic power-sharing. These include (1) a grand coalition, namely 
the joint exercise of governmental power, (2) proportionality in representation in 
government, (3) segmental autonomy, e.g. for education or cultural matters, and (4) mutual 
veto rights, which means that the minority can veto on issues important to the group.349  
Power-sharing practices both build on and undermine essential human rights ideals.350 
On the one side, it is important to emphasize the potential of consociational arrangements 
for democracy. Consociation is the preferred model for power-sharing when the 
international community is involved in ethnic conflict resolution, as the examples of the 
power-sharing agreements in Afghanistan, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Northern 
Ireland show.351 All involve all four markers of consociations, but they also include 
international involvement to solve disputes between ethnic communities and in negotiating, 
mediating, arbitrating, and implementing peace settlements. Consociational agreements in 
                                                 
347 If, for example, a less “minority-friendly” government is elected.  
348 AREND LIJPHART. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT/London: Yale 
University Press, 1977. 
349 Ibid. Belgium, Malaysia, Canada, India, and Nigeria are seen as typical examples. A more recent agreement is 
represented by the 1998 Peace Agreement in Northern Ireland. 
350 HENRY STEINER. “Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities.” Notre 
Dame Law Review 66 (1991): 1539-1560. 1545/1546. 
351 BRENDAN O’LEARY. “Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments.” In From 
Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, ed. Sid Noel, 3-43. Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005. 3. 
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these cases address claims to self-determination between ethnic communities by 
institutionally recognizing more than one group and their minority rights, especially to 
determine their own affairs and their participation in public affairs. The establishment of the 
consociation is accompanied by a peace process, involving conflict resolutions measures, 
confidence- and capacity-building, as well as human rights mechanisms. Moreover, the cases 
combine power-sharing arrangements with territorial autonomy. International involvement 
in the making and implementation of power-sharing arrangements include international 
organizations, neighboring countries, regional and global powers, and countries with a 
history of “good offices” such as the U.S., Norway, Switzerland, and Canada.352 The 
arrangements adopted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, or Northern Ireland confirm a 
broad and inclusive approach by the international community, thereby reshaping the concept 
and context of state sovereignty.353 
 
On the other side, human rights advocates point out that consociational solutions to 
ethnic conflict are problematic. The idea of power-sharing contrasts sharply with the static 
absolutism of rights, as it is focused on processes of negotiation and compromise, which 
means winning some and losing some.354 Consociational arrangements violate at least three 
human rights norms: first, similar to other minority protection regimes but to a greater 
extent, they explicitly differentiate among the members of a society on the basis of 
characteristics such as race, religion, and language instead of giving all individuals equal 
rights. Second, ethnic power-sharing models restrict the participation rights of members of 
the majority. And finally, because of the difficult election procedures and allocation of voting 
districts, consociational settlements violate the right to free movement and residence within 
a country.355  
Article 2 of the ICCPR and the ICERD prohibits “any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which 
                                                 
352 See for more details Ibid., 34- 36. 
353 PENTASSUGLIA, State Sovereignty, 324. 
354 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER. “Pushing the Limits of Liberal Peace: Ethnic Conflict and the “Ideal Polity”.” In 
International Law and Ethnic Conflict, ed. David Wippman, 128-144. Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1998. 133. 
355 DAVID WIPPMAN. “Practical and Legal Constraints on Internal Power Sharing.” In International Law and 
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has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, 
on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural or any other field of public life.” The purpose of consociational agreements is 
not to nullify or impair the rights of the majority, but to protect ethnic minorities from 
marginalization. Still, power-sharing models have the effect of favoring one share of the 
population over another on the basis of their membership in an ethnic group, or at least on 
the basis of their residence in an ethnically defined subnational political unit.356  
Consociational practices are acceptable as long as the differential distribution of power 
for the benefit of the ethnic groups does not infringe too much on the rights of the majority. 
According to the HRC, measures have to be “reasonable and objective”, their aim should be 
“to achieve a purpose which is legitimate” under the ICCPR, and the measures employed 
have to be “proportionate” to the goals sought.357 Consociational practices should not be 
seen as discriminatory rights for ethnic minorities, but as an opportunity for empowerment 
of ethnic groups to reach “equality in fact”.  
Consociational arrangements violate the rights of citizens to freely move and take 
residency within the state’s borders as laid down in Article 12, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR. 
Consociational arrangements require some measures to exclude members of other ethnicities 
from residing in the minority region in order to prevent population movements from 
undermining proportions. Provisions for limited residence authorization for members of 
other groups violate international norms guaranteeing citizens the right to freely move within 
the boundaries of the state. However, similar to minority provisions, state practice accepts 
such provisions that are designed to protect ethnic identity of minorities. In general, such 
schemes are considered to be compatible with human rights norms and may be essential for 
the protection of minorities and minority cultures. 
 
A popular way to respond to claims of territorially concentrated groups is the choice of 
federalism as a political system. Federations consist of at least two governmental units – the 
federal and the regional – that both enjoy separate constitutional competencies. There are 
two major ways of establishing federations: by unification or decentralization of existing 
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states. Unification means that separate units join together but retain a reserved domain 
within their unit (examples: Switzerland, U.S.). Decentralization is often a reaction to over-
centralization (examples: Belgium, Spain).  
Both the federal and the regional governments are empowered to deal directly with 
their citizens and are, in turn, elected by the citizens of their territory. The federal 
constitution can only be altered  by the consent of both levels of government. Therefore, a 
federation implies a written constitution that is accompanied by a federal supreme court with 
the task to settle disputes between the federal units and a legislative system with two 
chambers – one representing the population proportionately and one representing the 
federal units (in which smaller units have a disproportionately high vote).358 The distribution 
of competencies among federal units can vary from empowering the lowest constituent units 
to federations in which the regions enjoy less de facto power than those in centralized 
states.359 In ethnically divided societies that choose federations as their system of 
government, boundaries of internal units are usually drawn along ethnic lines.  
 
Power-sharing arrangements and autonomy should be evaluated against the available 
alternatives. Territorial autonomy is only an option for territorially concentrated groups. A 
“winner takes it all”-democracy as such is not enough to ensure fair rights for ethnic 
minorities and equal participation in the state’s public affairs. Consociational arrangements 
may make some compromises on human rights ideals, but they help to avoid greater 
injustices.360  
Many scholars have argued that solutions involving regional autonomy and power-
sharing are effective in dealing with ethnic conflict. TED GURR, for instance, argues that 
“negotiated regional autonomy has proved to be an effective antidote for ethnopolitical wars 
of secession.”361 Likewise, KJELL-ÅKE NORDQUIST observes that creating autonomy “as a 
conflict-solving mechanism in an internal armed conflict is both a theoretical and – very 
                                                 
358 JOHN MCGARRY and BRENDAN O’LEARY. “Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation.” In From 
Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, ed. Sid Noel, 263-296. Montreal 
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359 Ibid., 264. 
360 STEINER, Ideals and Counter-Ideals, 1547/1548. 
361 See TED ROBERT GURR. “Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Changing World System. 
International Studies Quarterly 28 (Fall 1994): 347-377. 366.  
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often – a practical option for the parties in such conflicts.”362 For GUDMUNDUR 
ALFREDSSON, autonomy and power-sharing are the most effective means of protecting a 
minority’s dignity and cultural identity.363 Nevertheless, governments are in many cases 
reluctant to grant autonomy to ethnic groups for several reasons. First, they fear that 
granting autonomy would be the first step toward secession of the region. Second, granting 
autonomy to a group can be discriminatory against other groups in the states. Third, some 
scholars argue that the risk of intervention by an outside powers affiliated with the group is 
increased by granting autonomy.364 This is disputed as outside powers might have an even 
stronger incentive to intervene in a case in which a minority does not enjoy autonomy or 
other minority rights.365  
 
In international law, no general right to autonomy or power-sharing has been 
established, whether or not in connection with internal self-determination.366 The recognition 
of a right for minorities to some form of autonomy and/or power-sharing under 
international law would be desirable. However, states seem to be afraid that the right of 
minorities to have appropriate local or autonomous administrations may promote 
secessionist tendencies. Even those states that have granted a large degree of regional 
autonomy hesitate to accept binding international instruments on the right of minorities to 
certain autonomy. States fear that cultural autonomy leads to administrative autonomy that is 
followed by secession. Multiethnic federations seem to make it easier for groups to secede, 
as federalism provides the minority with institutional and administrative resources that can 
be used for the struggle for independence.367 Multiethnic federations are prone to break 
                                                 
362 KJELL-ÅKE NORDQUIST. “Autonomy as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism – An Overview.” In Autonomy: 
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down, as the cases of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and examples in Africa 
and Asia (with the exception of India) illustrate.368 However, other factors have to be taken 
into account when explaining the breakup of federations. First, some failed multiethnic 
federations were pseudo-federations in which the units had no de facto power. Second, in 
some cases the units were forced together (Soviet Union) or arbitrarily consolidated (former 
colonies). And third, both in the communist and post-colonial cases, the federations had 
economic problems (either regarding the system or regarding the functioning).369 
Nevertheless, special treaties can recognize autonomy for minorities. Most prominently 
this was done in the aftermath of the First World War, but treaties can also be found in 
more recent practice, especially in Europe.370 If a special treaty establishes autonomy for a 
minority, then the legal consequences generated by the treaty stem from the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda and not from international law in general or from human rights law in particular. 
 
In sum, states are not obliged by international law to devolve authority on a territorial 
or non-territorial basis. There is no entitlement to autonomy for a minority as a group, 
regardless of whether it is in the context of self-determination. However, international 
institutions, in particular at the European level, see autonomy as a policy option for states 
within the broader framework of participation rights. For indigenous groups special 
instruments such as the ILO Convention No. 169 provide specific autonomy solutions as 
well as collective rights, which are different from those of minorities and other ethnic 
groups.371  
Within these limits, autonomy regimes can be seen as compatible with the emerging 
view of internal self-determination of the “whole people” (as opposed to the de facto 
majority). Autonomy has several advantages. It constitutes a compromise balancing the 
conflicting claims of ethnic groups for self-determination and the state to keep up its 
territorial integrity. Furthermore, because autonomy is a flexible concept ranging from de 
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facto independence to cultural autonomy, it may be tailored to specific situations in which 
ethnic conflicts evolve. According to GAETANO PENTASSUGLIA, autonomy schemes “stand 
for an inclusive human rights-based, democratic and pluralistic process, which ultimately 
provides the materially disaggregated individuals and groups comprising the ‘whole’ with 
meaningful choices on an occasional and permanent basis.”372 Autonomy should never have 
the aim of building ethnic states, but to “live diversity in unity respecting one another,”373 
thus bringing the institutions of the state closer to ethnic groups.  
 
3.2.3 Secession and Independence 
There are two main forms of ethnic claims to territorial adjustments affecting the 
territorial integrity of states: secessions and irredentism. Secession involves the withdrawal of 
a group and the territory it inhabits from the authority of the state. Irredentism entails the 
annexation of one territory to another state on grounds of ethnic ties.374  
Secession has been treated favorably by international legal institutions only in a limited 
number of cases, which can be broken down into five major categories:375 
(a) Mandated territories, trust territories, and territories treated as non self-governing 
under Chapter XI of the UN Charter; 
(b) Distinct political-geographical entities subject to carence de souveraineté (the only 
case is Bangladesh, although this case is not easy to interpret); 
(c) Other territories in respect of which self-determination is applied by the parties, 
such as holding a referendum to determine the faith of the territory; 
(d) Highest level constituent units of a federal state which are in the process of being 
dissolved by agreement among all or the majority of the units (as was the case in 
the former Yugoslavia); 
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(e) Formerly independent entities reestablishing their independence with the consent 
of the state where its incorporation was illegal or of dubious legality (as it would be 
the case in Tibet). 
Most secessionist entities have received minimal international recognition,376 as it is 
illustrated by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  
 
The question of when secession should be treated favorably by international law leads 
to two major difficulties: first, the questions on how to draw a line when allocating territory, 
and second, if there are any special circumstances in which ethnic groups would have the 
right to secede. 
First, at the core of the legal debate over territory of new states or autonomous regions 
lies the concept of uti possidetis. Originating in Roman law, uti possidetis was an edict that the 
praetor would issue to two parties claiming ownership of the same property, granting 
provisional legal possession to the possessor during the litigation.377 
In modern international law, the principle of uti possidetis provides that states emerging 
from decolonization inherit the colonial administrative borders that they held at the time of 
independence.378 It determined the shape and size of former colonial territories in Latin 
America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.379 The ICJ has stated in the case regarding the Frontier 
Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali) that uti possidetis is not a special rule but a “general principle” 
and a “rule of general scope” in the case of decolonization.380  
There are three reasons to rely upon the principle of uti possidetis.381 First, uti possidetis 
reduces the probability of armed conflict by providing a clear outcome. If there is not a clear 
rule on how to draw borders, all borders would be open to dispute. Second, the conversion 
of internal borders to international borders is as sensible as any other approach, but far more 
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simple. Borders will never fit the structure of society perfectly and some minorities will 
always be left out. Third, uti possidetis is a rule of international law mandating the conversion 
of administrative boundaries into international borders. It still applies to the disintegration of 
states today, which was confirmed by the findings of the Badinter Commission in the case of 
former Yugoslavia.382 
The risk, however, is that a rule on how to break up states creates a hazard regarding 
territorial integrity and finality of states. Ethnic separatists might argue that the world could 
be divided further along more administrative lines.383 Another problem is that uti possidetis 
may bring second best solutions, leaving minorities in unsatisfying conditions “on the wrong 
side of the border”384 with the impossibility of making even small adjustments for the benefit 
of minorities. Furthermore, internal and international borders serve totally different 
purposes. While international borders separate states and peoples from one another, internal 
borders are drawn to more easily administer a country and to unify a polity. International 
borders serve to determine the limits of territorial jurisdiction of a state. Internal borders 
serve to govern a territory as a whole while at the same time devolving some authority to 
subnational levels. As such, the drawing of borders internally and internationally seek 
efficiency and simplicity in both cases, but for opposing purposes.385  
The principle of uti possidetis is not a guarantor for emerging states to keep their borders. 
In a number of cases, new states did not assume their former administrative borders.386 Some 
colonies, such as Rwanda and Burundi, split when gaining independence. Other states 
accepted compromises departing from a strict application of the principle.387 Uti possidetis was 
not applied as a uniform practice, even though the UNGA and the ICJ tried to limit the 
scope of colonial countries allowed to determine their own borders. 
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The application of the principle of uti possidetis today is based on three criteria. First, uti 
possidetis should form a starting point for the disposition of territories, but it should only 
serve as a provisional model and as a first step in a longer process of nation-building. If new 
states cannot agree upon the division of territories, uti possidetis and the respect for existing 
lines of control can give a first indication until an authoritative determination can be reached. 
The principle of uti possidetis cannot lead to a lack of engagement on the issue of how to draw 
borders. The international community and the countries involved must see if there is a 
significantly better option to determine the borders and withhold recognition of new entities 
until agreement is reached. There has to be scrutiny into the suitability of existing borders by 
international actors such as the UN and the ICJ.388  
Second, border provisions must be implemented by peaceful means. The prohibition of 
the use of force as laid down in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter does not apply to 
internal conflicts; but a dispute over a border can become international when the entities 
concerned are recognized internationally. This is confirmed by the EC Declaration on the 
Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
which recognizes the inviolability of all frontiers, can only be changed by peaceful means and 
by common agreement.389 
Third, it is important that the people concerned have a voice in the whole process. 
There needs to be a form of consultation such as a referendum, which does not have to be a 
binding vote.390  
The application of the uti possidetis-principle is the easiest short-term method for 
determining the borders of a state. In the long run however, a legal approach to separatist 
claims of ethnic groups should also include justice, legitimacy, and stability considerations. 
Any alternative will clearly be more difficult to implement than the status quo which may 
lead to the conclusion that uti possidetis should become an international legal rule for the 
breakup of states. However, neglecting the context of a certain situations may lead to greater 
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dissatisfaction of people concerned and as a result, to more conflict and separatism. As 
STEVEN RATNER states: “Only a direct engagement of the territorial question, with all its 
complexities, is likely to control the breakup of states in a manner consistent with human 
dignity.”391 It is thus important to find a balance between the international legal rule and 
common sense in order to prevent conflict from emerging. 
 
An interesting case in this context is the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia along the lines of its six republics (Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia). Kosovo never had the same status and is thus 
not entitled to gain independence under international law, despite an amendment of the 
constitution in 1974 that gave Kosovo de facto the same amount of autonomy. The key 
question that was posed to the international community was whether to follow the principle 
of uti possidetis or to introduce a new concept of “ethnic self-determination.”392  
The Badinter Commission maintained that in states where one or more groups 
constitute “ethnic, religious or language communities, they have the right to recognition of 
their identity under international law.”393 Furthermore, in the context of the collapse of 
Yugoslavia it stated that “every individual has the right to choose to belong to whatever 
ethnic, religious or language community he or she wishes.”394 However,  
The Committee considers that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination 
must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) 
except where the states concerned agree otherwise.395  
 
The Badinter Commission accordingly rejected the separatist claims of groups within Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. This has caused dissatisfaction not only among the peoples living on the 
territory of former Yugoslavia, and also among academic scholars. ALEXANDER DOWES 
comments on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton:  
The DPA [Dayton Peace Agreement] accepted the verdict of war – partition and ethnic 
cleansing – but at the same time sought to reverse it through power sharing and refugee 
return. The result has been gridlock: a large portion of the Croats in Herzegovina have left for 
Croatia; most Bosnian Croats and Serbs do not wish for their region to remain part of Bosnia; 
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nationalist parties dominate the election process; and federal institutions function poorly, with 
Bosnia’s international administrators repeatedly stepping in to dictate contentious decisions.396  
 
He concludes that partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines would be the 
better option.  
 
The question of whether there are any special circumstances in which ethnic groups 
would have the right to secede must again be answered in a contextual way. A priori, 
minorities have no international right to secession. Article 8, paragraph 4, of the UN 
Minority Declaration states that: “Nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as 
permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, 
including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.” 
However, there are two cases in which this denial of a right to secession for ethnic groups 
can be contested: first, if the group is subject to serious suppression and/or human rights 
violation and second, if secession is an expression of the free will of all people concerned. 
 
First, the right for ethnic groups to secession is subject to discussion if gross human 
rights violations are committed against them. The core commitment to the protection of 
human rights and democratic principles leads to the assumption of the right to secession as a 
last resort when these rights are denied to  members of ethnic groups in a systematic and 
discriminatory manner.397 This argument is not entirely new. In the Åland Islands case, the 
League of Nations Commission of Jurists denied that minorities have the right to secession 
except if the state is unable or unwilling to apply and enforce guarantees for them.398 In a 
more recent scholarly debate, THOMAS FRANCK pointed out that if a minority is denied the 
preservation of its cultural identity and the state fails to promote measures for political and 
social equality, then repression can be viewed as a form of colonialism;399 and as seen before, 
colonial peoples have the right to independence. Most advocates of such a secessionist claim 
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base their arguments on the UN Friendly Relations Declaration, which suggests a link 
between territorial integrity and the existence of a government representing all people living 
within the boundaries of the state in compliance with the principle of equal rights and the 
self-determination of peoples.400 The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 
reaffirmed this clause.401 It is stated that an ethnic minority group that is subject to severe 
discrimination and denied access to participation in the government has the right to 
“correctional secession”, meaning that the state looses its entitlement to the protection of its 
territorial integrity.  
However, other scholars and jurisprudence contest this view. DONALD HOROWITZ 
argues that the purpose of secession, namely to create an ethnically homogenous state, is 
undermined as secession does not reduce conflict, violence, or minority oppression because 
there will always be minorities.402 And ANTONIO CASSESE adds that the claim of ethnic 
groups to secession is incompatible with the idea of the state as a territorial and political 
unity; it would destroy order and stability within states and lead to anarchy in the 
international order.403  
A more differentiated view is taken by the Canadian Supreme Court in its opinion 
concerning Reference re Secession of Quebec. The Court referred to “exceptional circumstances” 
in which a right to secession might arise under the international right of peoples to self-
determination.404 However, the Supreme Court stated “it remains unclear whether this 
proposition actually reflects an established international law standard.”405 Even if these 
circumstances were sufficient to create a right to unilateral secession under international law, 
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the Quebec people were not considered to be subject to “oppression”.406  
The “oppression” argument was used by the Katangese peoples to support their claim 
for independent statehood in the Katangese Peoples Congress v. Zaire407 within the context of 
Article 20, paragraph 1 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Banjul 
Charter”). The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights found no violation of 
Article 13 of the Banjul Charter (political participation), but did not argue that oppression 
would constitute a reason for a right to secession of the Katangese peoples under Article 20, 
paragraphs 1 and 2. 
 
A second case questions whether the right to secession exists if it expresses the free will 
of the peoples concerned. The Canadian Supreme Court stated in its advisory opinion 
concerning Reference re Secession of Quebec regarding the question if Quebec had a unilateral 
right to secede that a clear expression of the democratic will of Quebecers to secede, for 
example through a referendum, would confer legitimacy to their request. However, this does 
not stand for a right to secede unilaterally. In the Court’s view, the constitutional 
commitment to federalism and democracy of Canada had implications regarding secessionist 
claims:  
The federalism principle, in conjunction with the democratic principle, dictates that the clear 
repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the clear expression of the desire to pursue 
secession by the population of a province would give rise to a reciprocal obligation on all 
parties to Confederation to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that desire. 408 
 
And the Court went on:  
The corollary of a legitimate attempt by one participant in Confederation to seek an 
amendment to the Constitution is an obligation on all parties to come to the negotiating table. 
The clear repudiation by the people of Quebec of the existing constitutional order would 
confer legitimacy on demands for secession, and place an obligation on the other provinces 
and the federal government to acknowledge and respect that expression of democratic will by 
entering into negotiations and conducting them in accordance with the underlying 
constitutional principles already discussed.409 
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Consequently, the Court denied that Quebec could unilaterally secede and thereby 
dictate the terms of secession to the other parties without negotiations.410 Such negotiations 
ideally include three goals: incentives for mutual accommodation, a minimal risk of deadlock, 
and significant obstacles to secession such as constitutional guarantees protecting 
minorities.411 The institutional design of the negotiations is a key challenge in achieving the 
first two interrelated goals aimed at mutual accepted outcomes. It is important that all sides 
have the same opportunities and strengths. The reason for the third goal lies in the fact that 
political and territorial adjustments usually mount into violent conflict. 412 
 
In sum, the predominant view in international law on the right of any group within a 
state to seceed, regardless of the claimed reasons for secession, is that secession is neither 
authorized nor prohibited by international law. However, the lack of a specific prohibition 
does not mean that secessionist claims are viewed as legitimate, given the emphasis that is 
put on the territorial integrity of states and the concept of the “whole peoples”.413 For that 
reason, the matter of secession is seen as part of the domestic jurisdiction of the affected 
state. If however, an ethnic group is able to create its own state out of political reasons rather 
than a legal right to secession, the international community is open to recognizing the new 
state within the limitations of certain conditions such as uti possidetis and the promotion and 
protection of human and minority rights. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
From an international legal point of view, claims by ethnic groups pose serious 
questions touching upon fundamental principles of international law. The right to existence, 
equality and non-discrimination measures, and the question of the relationship between self-
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determination, autonomy/power-sharing arrangements, and secession are only the most 
important issues that arise. The conclusions that can be drawn are manifold. 
First, the main human rights instruments do not prescribe any particular approach when 
dealing with claims of ethnic groups. Different approaches have been chosen by 
international actors and states depending on the size, history, and location (territorially 
concentrated v. dispersed, location near borders) of the ethnic group concerned. It is 
important to note that minority protection is a human rights concern regardless of its 
conflict potential. There is a lack of focus regarding the standards and guidelines for 
implementation of minority rights at the state level, especially regarding the development of 
procedures and capacity of national courts.414 The international community has yet to 
develop a coherent political and legal approach to ethnic conflict and claims of ethnic 
groups. 
Second, active protection and favorable treatment of minorities raises a set of 
problematic questions. It remains unclear how to define the acceptable level of difference in 
treatment granted to group members in comparison to the rest of the population or other 
minorities, especially regarding participation rights and minority-benefiting power-sharing 
arrangements.415 Furthermore, certain participation regimes (notably autonomy) set obstacles 
to integrating the group into the larger context of the state, thereby working against the 
inclusive aims pursued by participation rights. International institutions, including the UN 
human rights treaty-monitoring bodies, usually concentrate on the right of minorities to 
separate institutions or treatment as opposed to policies to promote inclusion and 
integration. The emphasis on empowerment of ethnic groups should be on fostering 
interethnic accommodation within states rather than partition and secession. Internal self-
determination should be understood as a right of the people to access political and economic 
power. It should be used as a synonym of democratization and power-sharing rather than 
the break-up of existing states.416 This is not to say that secessionist claims should not be 
considered at all – the international community has to be open to special cases such as 
decolonization, the disintegration of multicultural federations, or the break-up of oppressive 
states. UN practice illustrates this argument; where three states in Eastern Europe stood in 
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1989, twenty-two states are now members of the UN. In addition, the international 
community has recognized the independence of Eritrea and East Timor and has intervened 
in Kosovo to protect the Kosovar Albanians and detach the province from Belgrade’s 
control. Ethnic and national calls for – de facto or de jure – independence have been satisfied 
in numerous cases since the early 1990s. Therefore, the most important task is to identify 
issues and scenarios in which either separatist or integrationist approaches may be most 
effective.417  
Third, claims involving territory (territorial autonomy and secession) are especially 
delicate to handle in international law and prone to violent ethnic conflict. Territorial claims 
are usually an all-or-nothing matter and especially problematic; compromise is often looked 
upon as an act of treason.418 The significance of territory lies primarily in its symbolic and 
historical importance for the group’s identity, regardless of the extent to which claims match 
up with historical records.419 The demand to secession and independence is the most difficult 
one to accommodate in international law and the option most prone to violent ethnic 
conflict. Ethnic separation as policy resolving ethnic conflict can encourage the break up of 
states, may transform civil war to an international war, and in the end, does nothing to 
resolve ethnic antagonism.420 Furthermore, international law does not recognize a right to 
secession for ethnic groups.  
Fourth, the default approach for promoting and protecting human rights standards is 
based heavily on Western liberal ideas of judicial enforcement. The effective use of this 
approach requires the existence of functioning political and legal institutions to perform the 
tasks of investigation, prosecution, and punishment. In situations of ethnic conflict, these 
requirements are usually not in place. 
And finally, by implementing minority rights, states and societies will become more 
stable and less prone to violent conflict, to the benefit of both majorities and minorities. 
Political and legal approaches have to be combined, following a pragmatic approach of 
mixed law and politics that focuses on solving the problem at hand.  
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4. Ethnic Conflict Resolution within the International 
Legal System 
 
The fact that ethnic conflict and its consequences are still prevalent in the international 
security arena reflects the failure of states to manage conflict and to create equal 
opportunities for minorities as well as the failure of the international community to 
effectively address and identify causes of ethnic conflict and to establish institutions to 
manage violent civil wars and its consequences.  
Nevertheless, the international community, especially the UN, is an important actor in 
responding and resolving ethnic conflicts. The way in which the international community 
contributes to ethnic conflict resolution can take many forms, ranging from military 
intervention to international mediation and the monitoring of human and minority rights.  
Effective management of ethnic conflict by local elites, governments, other states, and 
international organizations must be based on some fundamental premises. First, in order to 
be able to reassure the physical and cultural security of a threatened ethnic group, any 
measures taken must involve not only the ending of violence, but also confidence-building 
and human rights strengthening measures, which underline the whole process. Second, 
promoting and protecting minority rights during conflicts or immediately afterwards in so-
called “weak” or “failed” states is qualitatively different from promoting and protecting 
human rights in a functioning state (see below).421 And third, the international community 
has to develop the capacity for prevention, peace building, and conflict resolution. The UN 
and other international organizations should encourage states to find solutions for ethnic 
conflicts on the basis of international law.  
The UN acts in four types of situations involving ethnic conflict: (1) activities in 
situations that are not characterized as an open conflict, (2) activities in situations that are 
characterized as an open political conflict, including small-scale violence, (3) activities in 
                                                 
421 See Tonya Putnam’s conclusions. TONYA L. PUTNAM. “Human Rights and Sustainable Peace.” In Ending 
Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, ed. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. 
Cousens, 237-270. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. 
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situations which may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and (4) post-
conflict situations.422 
First, in situations not characterized as open conflicts, a number of institutions and 
mechanisms exist, some preventive and some responsive in character. Key roles have been 
played by UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies, especially the HRC and the CERD. 
The UNESCO’s role on language and education is preeminent, as is UNICEF and the 
Committee on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) regarding rights of children 
in minorities, and the ILO regarding indigenous peoples. Reporting under all these 
convention can have a significant preventive function. The interaction between the states 
and the UN bodies can be a constructive dialogue regarding the legal situation, as well as the 
nature of conflict in a particular situation. Through reviewing reports, the committees are 
able to gain knowledge about particular situations that can be significant for early warning 
purposes. Collaboration with regional organizations such as the COE, OSCE, African 
Union, and Organization of American States may further develop the knowledge and 
opportunities to strengthen human rights protection.  
Second, in situations in which open conflicts occur, human rights mechanisms dealing 
with gross human rights violations become relevant. These include the ECOSOC “1503 
procedure” and country or subject specific rapporteurs. Different parts of the UN have to 
be brought together to work on a solution for the conflict. 
Third, when the conflict has escalated into a threat to international peace and security, 
primary responsibility will be with the UNSC. Nevertheless, human rights bodies still have a 
role to play. 
And finally, the UN also engages in post-conflict situations. Activities include electoral 
assistance, decolonization support, help with transition to democracy and the establishment 
of the rule of law, drafting constitutions, designing administrative and financial reform, 
strengthening domestic human rights laws, enhancing judicial structures, training human 
rights officials and monitors, and helping rebel and paramilitary troops to demobilize and 
transform themselves into democratically competitive political parties.423 
                                                 
422 See for the categories GUDMUNDUR ALFREDSSON and DANILO TÜRK. “International mechanisms for the 
monitoring and protection of minority rights.” In Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing International 
Procedures and Mechanisms, ed. Arie Bloed et al., 169-186. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993. 
423 SCHEFFER, U.N. Engagement in Ethnic Conflicts, 154. 
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Given the broad range of activities, the UN has to consolidate different approaches and 
strategies. The following chapters show that this is not always easy. Human rights 
approaches diverge with conflict resolution approaches, the need for humanitarian 
intervention is contested by the principle of non-interference in domestic matters of states, 
and the coordination among numerous UN agencies and organizations is an immensely 
complex task, further complicated by the involvement of other actors such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), human rights and conflict resolution 
NGOs, and national and local agencies in the field.  
 
4.1 Ethnic Conflict Resolution and Human Rights Activities 
Ethnic conflict resolution comprises a variety of fields. Scholars and practitioners of 
social sciences, especially political science, psychology, and sociology, law, public policy, and 
even health sciences try to find a universal approach towards conflict resolution. However, 
unlike human rights, there is no codified set of norms that govern the field – only a set of 
principles that frame the practice: (1) participation, (2) inclusion, (3) empowerment, (4) 
cultural sensivity, and (5) equity.424 
The first principle is that of participation. The most effective negotiation and decision-
making processes are those in which the parties who have direct stakes in the outcome are 
actively part of the process. Identifying parties and bringing them into some kind of ad hoc or 
institutionalized forum is the most basic goal of conflict resolution.  
The second principle is inclusion, which differs from participation as it does not address 
the manner of participation, but rather who participates. The preferred approach in the 
conflict resolution field is to include as many stakeholders as possible, even those who might 
be disruptive. The reason for an inclusivist approach is to bind as many parties as possible to 
the agreement in order to diminish the probability that the agreement is undermined by 
those left on the side lines. 
                                                 
424 See “Ethnic Conflict, Minority Protection and Conflict Resolution: Human Rights Perspectives, an 
Interdisciplinary Discussion held at the Rockefeller Foundation Conference in Bellagio, Italy, October 
2001.” Harvard Law School Human Rights Program (2004): 1-113. 38/39. 
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The third principle is empowerment. One or more parties’ lack of experience, lack of 
resources, or both can compromise the effectiveness of multi-party dialogue. Thus, conflict 
resolution in practice includes learning, teaching, and coaching parties in conflict to 
maximize the effectiveness of negotiation strategies used by parties and provide a stronger 
basis on which negotiations might proceed. 
Cultural sensitivity, the fourth principle on which conflict resolution is based, takes into 
account that most cultures have existing methods for dealing with conflict. Culturally 
familiar and appropriate approaches will be sustainable long after the negotiation process is 
over. Consequently, it is very important to know these practices and to include them in the 
negotiation process. Furthermore, conflict resolution practices can build upon and enhance 
indigenous methods. 
Finally, the fifth principle is equity. Equity, as opposed to equality, is the notion that the 
mediator should be impartial and treat all parties with equal respect, giving them equal time 
and attention despite differences in power and influence. Impartiality and respect contribute 
to the effectiveness of the negotiation process and to constructive discussion and problem 
solving. 
 
Conflict resolution consists of two parts: conflict management and conflict settlement. 
Conflict management is an attempt to contain the effects of an ongoing conflict, including 
the distribution of humanitarian aid, peace keeping, the monitoring of ceasefires or peace 
agreements, and containment of spillover effects. Conflict settlement, on the other hand, is 
aimed at establishing long-term stability and peaceful coexistence between former enemies. 
Both attempts require significant contributions from the international community. Rarely 
any ethnic conflicts are solved without active third-party intervention.425 It is vital for the 
peace process that the commitment by the international community is convincing. If ethnic 
groups are uncertain whether peacekeeping forces will arrive, whether the forces deployed 
can effectively protect them, or whether forces will stay until the demobilization and 
                                                 
425 See BARBARA F. WALTER’s conclusion in BARBARA F. WALTER. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of 
Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
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compliance with the agreement is reached, the role of international actors is undermined and 
the mission is likely to fail. 426  
Conflict settlement programs are designed to support the transition from war to peace, 
democracy, rule of law, stability, and economic prosperity. The building of credible, 
accountable, and transparent institutions is crucial for this process, especially regarding the 
creation of a civil society in which mutual trust is more common than distrust (see below). 
Ideally, strategic coordination establishes clear lead actors in the mediation and 
implementation of peace agreements. Coordinators should be able to set priorities, ensure 
that those priorities are pursued by all the third-party actors and relief agencies involved, and 
provide consistency across phases of a political process. Lead actors should also be given the 
authority to settle disputes between third parties about the necessary steps.427 
To achieve the resolution of an ethnic conflict, the international community uses on 
different “tracks” of intervention: Track 1, Track 1½, and Track 2.428 At the Track 1 level, 
official interveners such as representatives of governments or international organizations 
work with designated representatives (usually decision-makers) of the conflicting parties to 
assist them in reaching a solution to the conflict. Sometimes these interveners are neutral, 
but often they use their power to press the parties to reach an agreement.  
At Track 1½ level, non-official interveners such as NGOs, religious leaders, scholars, or 
internationally respected political figures meet with official representatives of the parties. 
Track 1½ negotiators do not offer incentives or sanctions to compel the parties to reach 
agreement, but their personal qualities, mediation skills, and reputation for impartiality and 
high ethical standards may bring parties to agree to participate in the resolution process. 
At Track 2 level, non-official interveners facilitate dialogue among non-official, but 
influential members of each of the conflicting parties. The theory behind Track 2 diplomacy 
is that influential individuals, operating in unofficial capacity, have fewer constraints than 
official representatives. Their scope to engage in dialogue with their counterparts and to 
                                                 
426 More detailed BARBARA F. WALTER. “Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, 
Democratization, and Commitments to Peace.” International Security 24/1 (Summer 1999): 127-155. 154. 
427 See more detailed BRUCE D. JONES. “Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and 
Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil War.” International Peace Academy Policy Paper Series on 
Peace Implementation (June 2001): 1-36. 11. 
428 See more detailed ELLEN L. LUTZ, EILEEN F. BABBITT, and HURST HANNUM. “Human Rights and Conflict 
Resolution from the Practitioners’ Perspective.” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 27/1 (Winter/Spring 2003): 
173-194.177/178. 
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explore creative ideas for the resolution of the conflict is broader and may lead to progress. 
At the same time, because Track 2 participants are prominent, they might have the ability to 
influence decision makers or they may be in official decision-making positions in the future.  
 
However, the conflicting parties are not in all cases willing to work for peace and give 
their consent with international involvement. Some instruments depend significantly on the 
consent of parties such as humanitarian aid, mediation and negotiation, peace keeping 
operations, fact-finding and monitoring, and assistance in technical matters (infrastructure, 
economic assistance). Arms embargoes, economic sanctions, judicial enforcement measures, 
and military intervention are used in cases in which parties do not agree to the involvement 
of the international community or in which rapid reaction to gross human rights violations is 
needed.429  
The strategies for managing ethnic conflict are summarized in Table 3430 and explained 
in the following chapters. 
 
                                                 
429 BROWN and DE JONGE OUDRAAT, Internal Conflict and International Action, 163/164. 
430 Adapted from CHESTER A. CROCKER, FEN OSLER HAMPSON, and PAMELA AALL. “Introduction.” In 
Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson 
and Pamela Aall, xv-xxix. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. xxiv-xxvi. 
Table 3: Strategies to manage ethnic conflict 
Sources of conflict Coercive strategies and 
instruments 
Negotiation, mediation, 
other political 
instruments 
Institutions and regimes 
of security and conflict 
management 
Peacebuilding 
Anarchy and changing 
balance of power, break up 
of states 
Power balancing, alliances 
and alignments 
Diplomacy based strategies 
of negotiation 
Collective and cooperative 
security 
“Confederation of 
democratic states or regions” 
(Kantian Model) 
Regional and hegemonic 
rivalries 
Power balancing, alliances 
and alignments, military-
assistance programs, 
sanctions, peace 
enforcement 
Diplomatic engagement or 
isolation, pressures and 
incentives for adherence to 
international norms, UN 
engagement 
Strengthened arms 
embargoes, new security 
institutions 
New or expanded institutions 
for regional cooperation and 
integration, especially on 
economic and political issues 
Weapons proliferation that 
change existing power 
balances between ethnic 
groups and threaten 
international peace and 
security 
New technologies and 
strategies (e.g. missile 
defense, information 
warfare, high-tech 
weaponry), arms 
embargoes, air strikes 
against ammunition depots 
Negotiated understandings 
and agreements, preventive 
diplomacy, inclusion in 
international forums dealing 
proliferation  
Arms control regimes and 
confidence building 
measures 
 
Global non-military security 
threats evolving of ethnic 
conflicts (e.g., international 
criminal networks, 
economic destabilization, 
environmental degradation, 
population pressures) 
Judicial enforcement 
measures through 
international criminal 
tribunals, Interpol, bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation
Negotiated understanding 
and agreements, preventive 
diplomacy  
International good 
governance and 
cooperation on both the 
global and the regional 
levels 
 
Transitional states Peace enforcement, conflict 
suppression, targeted 
sanctions, coercive 
diplomacy 
Mediation, dialogue, Track 
1 and 2 diplomacy, financial 
incentives and aid, 
conditionality  
Collective security 
initiatives, involvement of 
the UNSC and regional 
organizations, membership 
inducements, threats of 
expulsion or non-
membership  
Good governance, 
reconciliation, 
reconstruction, development 
assistance, civil-society 
institution building, human 
rights capacity-building, rule 
of law, accountability, 
preventive diplomacy 
  
State collapse Rapid reaction force, 
military protectorates, 
humanitarian intervention 
Multilateral assistance 
programs, financial aid, 
conditionality  
Temporary multilateral 
governance structures, 
transitional justice and 
interim administrations by 
international actors 
 
Ethnic extremism, including 
the use of genocidal 
strategies 
Rapid reaction force,  
humanitarian intervention, 
coercive diplomacy, 
deterrence, preventive 
diplomacy 
Negotiated settlements, 
cross-cultural and 
multiparty negotiations, 
monitoring of minority 
rights and human rights, 
humanitarian and financial 
aid, conditionality 
Constitutional and electoral 
reforms, power-sharing, 
federalism, consociational 
democracy 
Support for confidence-
building and reconciliation 
measures, strengthening of 
civil society, strengthening of 
minority rights protection, 
monitoring of ceasefires, 
governance structures, and 
human rights  
Lack of compliance with 
international standards and 
negotiated settlements in 
post-conflict situations 
(reemergence of violent 
conflict) 
Coercive intervention and 
diplomacy, targeted 
sanctions, judicial 
enforcement measures 
Support for non-violent 
movements, engagement in 
isolation and 
delegitimization of violent 
parties, diplomacy, 
problem-solving workshops
Denial of membership or 
expulsion from 
international institution, 
multilateral incentives and 
pressures 
Accountability, power-
sharing/autonomy 
arrangements, conflict 
transformation initiatives, 
civil society building 
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Any international approach to minority issues and ethnic conflict must be based on the 
respect for individual human rights and for the principles of international law concerning 
friendly relations and cooperation among states with the UN Charter. However, in some 
cases it is difficult to combine these two approaches because they start from significantly 
different underlying assumptions, have different goals, and use different practices. As a 
result, both groups adopt contradictory or even mutually exclusive approaches.  
 
Assumptions. The greatest tension between the human rights and conflict resolution 
fields lies between the human rights activists’ focus on justice for past crimes and conflict 
resolvers’ desire to promote peace and reconciliation. Or as a human rights activist put it: 
“The two communities [human rights and conflict resolution] have different parents. The 
human rights community believes that people are bad and need laws because there will 
always be war, while the conflict resolution community believes people are good and that 
there is an ideal world without war.”431 In other words: 
[H]uman rights people and conflict resolution people don’t speak the same language. They 
come from different backgrounds and there is a lot of suspicion between them. Human rights 
people are judgmental and tend to come from a legal background, whereas conflict resolution 
people are more interested in stopping hot conflict and are willing to rub hands with bad 
actors.432 
 
Goals. For human rights activists, the most important goals to achieve in a post-conflict 
settlement are the strengthening of local human rights organizations, increasing the public 
awareness of rights, reforming laws to match international human rights standards, and 
monitoring compliance with human rights provisions. In the short-term, human rights 
advocates aim to pressure governments and other parties to end human rights violations and 
to ensure the accountability of the perpetrators. In the long run, human rights activists seek 
to generate worldwide protection of human rights. The approaches adapted to reach long 
term goals include the expansion of international human rights law and enforcement 
                                                 
431 Comment by a human rights activist at a Carnegie Council Workshop. “Bridging Human Rights and 
Conflict Resolution: A Dialogue Between Critical Communities.” Carnegie Council Workshop Report, 16-17 July 
2001. http://www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/prmID/161 (“Carnegie Council Workshop Report”). 
432 BARBARA FREY, former executive director of the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, cited in LUTZ, 
BABBITT, and HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution from the Practitioners’ Perspective, 174. 
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procedures, as well as pressing states to ensure that their domestic laws and judiciary address 
human rights adequately and meet international standards. 433 
Among the conflict resolvers, common goals include creating an atmosphere for 
conflict resolution efforts, encouraging research and education in conflict prevention and 
conflict resolution, introducing cooperative approaches to former adversaries, fostering 
dialogue among conflicting parties, and strengthening civil society prevention mechanisms. 
Short-term goals of peace workers include fostering dialogue, helping the parties to reach a 
settlement, and decreasing levels of violence. In the long term, conflict resolvers facilitate the 
improvement of relations between groups in order to achieve greater inter-personal and 
institutional capacity for the conflicting parties. The prevention of the reoccurrence of 
violence and the changing of behaviors, assumptions, and attitudes of former conflict parties 
are the most important goals in the short-term.434 
 
Practices. Human rights approaches are based on “naming and shaming” – by naming the 
violator, it is hoped to put enough public pressure on the actor to abandon its abusive 
behavior. The political and legal methods include the gathering and publication of 
information about human rights abuses, expressing formal disapproval of the methods used 
by the violator though UN procedures or mechanisms of regional organizations, and 
lobbying “human rights friendly” governments to take corrective action and press the 
violator to comply with international standards. As such, human rights strategies are often 
adversarial and confrontational, based on the belief that human rights work must be 
transparent and public. By contrast, conflict resolvers assist the key stakeholders to engage in 
a process directed at ending violence. They tend to emphasize cooperative approaches in 
their work. These differences in ends can create tensions between practitioners in the field. 
The release of human rights reports that identify the violators at the moment the parties 
agreed to negotiate a peace agreement can be devastating for the whole resolution process.435 
The work of one community can have unintended severe consequences for the other. 
Human rights reporting can be devastating to those trying to mediate the conflict because it 
                                                 
433 LUTZ, BABBITT, and HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution from the Practitioners’ Perspective, 
179. 
434 Carnegie Council Workshop Report.  
435 Ibid. 
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openly identifies the perpetrators, which can have negative consequences on the peace 
process. Even where peace negotiations are not in progress, human rights reporting can have 
unintended effects, e.g., by stimulating anger from the ones identified as violators and misuse 
by representatives of the victims to promote their position. This may lead to increased 
polarization and the unwillingness of a party to participate in the negotiation process at all. 
Most human rights groups are aware of these risks and they try to minimize them by 
maintaining a reputation for accuracy, impartial reporting, and measuring abuses against 
widely accepted legal norms.436 The problem is not only what message is delivered, but also 
how and when.  
On the other side, conflict resolution work may hinder human rights organizations to 
meet their goals. The issue of amnesty, for example, may help the peace process in the short 
term, but lets the perpetrators go unpunished and thus counters international human rights 
law. More generally, because mediators see peace as the most important goal, they might 
make compromises on human rights issues by e.g. not addressing the behavior of armed 
groups and security personnel.437  
 
However, conflict resolution and human rights can have mutually reinforcing 
relationships. Conflicts are often fueled by human rights abuses, and addressing them can 
become an integral part of the peace process. Human rights work is also a tool of policy 
analysis and strategy formulation, as abuses can be an early warning for escalating conflict. 
Mediators can address human rights issues while negotiating agreements. The respect for 
human rights is a necessary condition for lasting peace, and conflict resolution creates the 
environment in which human rights abuses usually decrease.  
Furthermore, human rights education, promotion, and monitoring can play an 
important role in the reconciliation process and in preventing conflict from reoccurring. The 
emphasis on individual accountability rather than collective guilt can be critical in order for 
the peace process to move forward.438 Moreover, both approaches rely on the same 
premises: impartiality and neutrality. This is also the approach pursued by the UN. The 
                                                 
436 LUTZ, BABBITT, and HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution from the Practitioners’ Perspective, 
188/189. 
437 Ibid. 
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Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (so-called “Brahimi Report”) states 
regarding peace operations:  
Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the 
Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such 
impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, 
which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist not of 
moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be 
operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so.439 
 
Conflict resolution scholars are not neutral about human rights. While most take the 
view that reaching an agreement that stops violence is the first priority, many question 
whether it is acceptable to focus only on achieving a settlement while human rights abuses 
are still occurring. Raising human rights issues during the negotiation process and pointing 
out that the protection of human rights and sustainable peace are intertwined may help a 
broader understanding of past abuses and overcoming of the post-conflict situation.440 
Preventing wars and massive human rights violations, rebuilding of societies after a conflict, 
and establishing functioning institutions requires an approach that incorporates the 
experience of both human rights and conflict resolution research and practice. Coordination 
between human rights and conflict resolution activities is thus vital for the peace process. In 
the short run, both communities seek to end violence and limit suffering and the loss of 
lives. In the long run, both communities assist the war-affected population in becoming 
stable and non-violent societies in which human rights are respected.441 
 
The UN pursues a human rights-oriented approach to conflict resolution. The 
internationalization of ethnic conflict resolution has resulted in a higher awareness of and 
concern with human rights aspects of peace implementation. As a result, the tension 
between conflict resolution and human rights is less significant than in the past. However, 
neither approach is coherent when dealing with ethnic conflicts. The two main actors, 
namely the OHCHR whose primary concern are human rights and the Department of 
                                                 
439 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (“Brahimi Report”), UN Doc. A/55/305-
S/2000/809, paragraph 50. 
440 LUTZ, BABBITT, and HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution from the Practitioners’ Perspective, 
190. 
441 LUTZ, BABBITT, and HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution from the Practitioners’ Perspective, 
173. 
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Political Affairs (DPA) whose focus is politics and diplomacy, have yet to find a strategy that 
addresses ethnic conflict in an inclusive approach. Human rights and development need to 
be seen as core elements of peace building from the beginning and not just as “add-ons” to 
security in the long run. Conflict resolution is only successful if it goes hand in hand with 
advocating respect for human rights.442 Conflict resolution, economic development, good 
governance, post-conflict reconstruction, and human rights are intertwined and mutually 
reinforcing.  
 
4.2 UN Institutions and Instruments Dealing with Ethnic 
Conflict 
The international community has a vast range of possibilities for dealing with ethnic 
conflict. These options vary according to the status, form, and level of violence of the 
conflict and the character of the society in which the conflict occurs, namely if its institutions 
are democratic or authoritarian in nature and if there is some basic infrastructure the 
international community can build upon.443 The opportunities for engagement also depend 
on the character of potential third parties – for example on their capabilities, leverage, 
linkage to the conflicting parties, their interest, and the sustainability of their commitment.444 
Any policy addressing ethnic conflict depends on whether: (1) objectives are well articulated, 
clear, consistent, and underlined by an adequate causal theory; (2) the policy is legally 
structured to enhance compliance of implementers and conflicting parties; (3) implementers 
are committed, well resourced, and skillful; (4) the policy is supported by all actors involved, 
including the conflicting parties, the state, the peoples, and the international community; (5) 
                                                 
442 HURST HANNUM. “Human Rights and Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and Peacebuilding.” Human Rights Quarterly 28/1 
(2006): 1-85. 23/24. 
443 An engagement of the international community can be very different when intervening in a conflict taking 
place in a Western country (e.g. Northern Ireland) than intervening in a Sub-Saharan African conflict  (e.g. 
DRC), especially regarding financial aid needed and the efforts to establish basic infrastructure and 
democratic institutions.  
444 CROCKER, CHESTER A. “Intervention: Towards Best Practices and a Holistic View.” In Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of  Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, 229-
248. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. 233. 
 
Ethnic Conflict and International Law: Group Claims and Conflict Resolution within the International Legal System
 
 
 126
the socioeconomic and political environment is relatively stable; and (6) the target of the 
policy is highly vulnerable.445 
 
The UN role of establishing and maintaining peace and security rapidly expanded  in the 
early 1990s. The Agenda for Peace identifies five interconnected field of action for the UN: 
• Preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy “is action to prevent disputes from arising 
between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to 
limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”446 It includes confidence-building 
measures, fact-finding, early warning, and the preventive deployment of UN 
authorized forces. Preventive diplomacy seeks to reduce the danger of violence and 
increase the prospects for a peaceful settlement of conflict.447 
• Peace making. Peacemaking is designed “to bring hostile parties to agreement, 
essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the 
Charter of the United Nations.”448 Drawing upon judicial settlement, mediation, 
international negotiation, and other forms of dispute settlement, UN peace making 
initiatives are aimed at persuading conflicting parties to engage in a peace process 
and settle the differences in a peaceful way.449 
• Peacekeeping. Peacekeeping “is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the 
field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned.”450 Confidence and 
capacity building are the focus of peacekeeping operations. This involves both 
monitoring of ceasefires by UN troops as well as diplomatic efforts to mediate and 
implement peace agreements.451  
• Peace enforcement. Peace enforcement goes beyond peace making and peace keeping as 
actions can be taken with or without consent of the conflicting parties. Acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC can authorize military forces to ensure 
                                                 
445 See STEPHEN J. STEDMAN. “Policy Implications.” In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, 
ed. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, 663-671. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2002. 663. 
446 Agenda for Peace, paragraph 20. 
447 Ibid., paragraphs 23-33. 
448 Ibid., paragraph 20. 
449 Ibid., paragraphs 34-41. 
450 Ibid., paragraph 20. 
451 Ibid., paragraphs 46-54. 
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compliance with a ceasefire and/or a peace agreement. Under the direction of the 
UNSG, peace enforcement missions would have a mandate that includes the use of 
force to implement peace.452 
• Post-conflict reconstruction. Post-conflict reconstruction is designed to foster economic, 
political, and social cooperation among parties, to establish confidence, to develop 
the necessary infrastructure and institutions to prevent further violence, and to lay 
down the foundations for a stable and durable peace.453 
 
The following chapter will analyze UN involvement in ethnic conflict resolution, 
following a “chronological” approach: starting with UN engagement in ethnic conflict 
prevention, the study then analyzes how the UN deals with ethnic violence, acts as a 
mediator, becomes involved in post-conflict reconstruction, and establishes institutions of 
accountability.  
 
4.2.1 Prevention of Violent Ethnic Conflict 
Despite the fact that the UN has recognized that “prevention is better than cure,”454 
there has been little engagement in preventive action. Institutions equipped with the tools, 
procedures, and means to interpret early warning signs of conflict and to engage in early 
action in situations involving minorities remain largely absent.  
 
An inclusive conflict prevention strategy involves two tracks: structural and operational 
prevention. Structural conflict prevention deals with the causes of the conflict such as social, 
political, and economic inequality, poverty, and weak or failed governance. It aims at the 
long-term prevention of conflict and seeks to strengthen human rights, the rule of law, and 
democracy. Thus structural conflict prevention is more than just a response to an outbreak 
                                                 
452 Ibid., paragraphs 42-45. 
453 Ibid., paragraphs 55-59. 
454 KOFI A. ANNAN. “We the Peoples”: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. New York, NY: United 
Nations, 2000. 44. 
 
Ethnic Conflict and International Law: Group Claims and Conflict Resolution within the International Legal System
 
 
 128
of conflict or an increase in ethnic tensions.455 As UNSG KOFI ANNAN states:  “Every step 
taken towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth is a step 
towards conflict prevention.”456  
Operational prevention457 is designed to stop a conflict from becoming violent, to de-
escalate an existing conflict, and/or to prevent the resumption of violent hostilities in a post-
conflict situation. Operational conflict prevention includes early warning, preventive 
diplomacy, disarmament, and preventive deployment. It addresses the “symptoms” and 
short-term outcomes of a conflict.  
 
The UN engages in both structural and operational prevention. This chapter focuses 
more on operational prevention because it is more directly connected with the emergence, 
dealing with, and ending of ethnic conflict.  
A strategy of non-coercive action that proved to be very successful – especially in the 
European context – is preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy can be defined as the 
actions, policies, and institutions used to keep states or groups from threatening or using 
organized violence, armed force, or other forms of coercion as the way to settle their 
interstate or internal political disputes, especially where and when existing means cannot 
peacefully manage the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international 
change.458 Measures include negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and 
judicial settlement. These can be very different, depending on the case. In the words of 
UNSG KOFI ANNAN: “Just as the root causes of armed conflict may vary widely, the nature 
of appropriate preventive actions and the resources needed to implement them cover a 
broad spectrum.”459 
Preventive diplomatic measures are most likely to be successful in cases where the 
positions of the conflicting parties are not yet fully consolidated. Once a situation explodes 
                                                 
455 See more detailed RENATA DWAN. “Consensus: a challenge for conflict prevention.” In Preventing Violent 
Conflict: The Search for Political Will, ed. SIPRI, 9-16. Stockholm: SIPRI, 2000. 11/12. 
456 ANNAN, We the Peoples, 45. 
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458 See MICHAEL S. LUND. Preventing Violent Conflicts. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
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into a violent conflict, the chances of successful diplomatic engagement are substantially 
reduced. The strengthening of regional and global institutions for diplomatic engagement 
through assistance-based, problem-solving approaches has thus to be accompanied by 
measures for coercive intervention, through sanctions and military force if necessary, in case 
diplomatic efforts prove insufficient. Given the vast human and economic costs of a 
coercive intervention, the increasing reluctance of states to contribute to military measures, 
and the uncertainty of outcomes of coercive action, it is important to direct more attention 
and resources towards diplomatic engagement and identification of stages where non-
coercive measures can make a difference. 
Preventive diplomacy missions should be informal, low-profile, non-binding, non-
judgmental, non-coercive, and confidential.460 The emphasis is on the process and on the 
outcome, in particular on the political arrangements that might accommodate claims of 
different groups. 
In 2001, ANNAN proposed to rename “preventive diplomacy” as “preventive action”: 
Conflict Prevention is particularly favoured by Member States as a means of preventing 
human suffering and as an alternative to costly politico-military operations to resolve conflicts 
after they have broken out. Although Preventive Diplomacy is a well-tried means of 
preventing conflict, and is still the primary political measure preventing and resolving conflicts, 
United Nations’ experience in recent years has shown that there are several other forms of 
action that can have a useful preventive effect, including: preventive deployment; preventive 
disarmament; preventive humanitarian action; and peace-building undertaken in preventive 
context. These can involve, with the consent of the Government or Governments concerned, 
a wide range of actions in the fields of good governance, human rights and economic and 
social development. For this reason, the Secretary-General has used the concept preventive 
action rather than “preventive diplomacy” when addressing the root causes of conflict.461 
 
Preventive diplomacy is successful when “things do not happen”. As a result, its 
successes are quiet and do not get much media attention. This might be a reason why the 
UN devotes relatively few resources to preventive diplomacy.  
 
Early warning and conflict prevention should be regarded as useful management tools 
as well as an ongoing learning process in developing responses to economic, social, and 
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humanitarian crises.462 They have to be strengthened within the UN context. Efforts to 
establish an effective preventive diplomacy strategy include the establishment of a position 
similar to the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in the context of the 
OSCE. The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change specifically recommended 
that the UN, “should build on the experience of regional organizations in developing 
frameworks for minority rights.”463 The UN Secretary-General has commended the HCNM 
for his work and called upon other inter-governmental organizations, including the UN, to 
consider establishing a similar institution.464 The Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty on the topic “Responsibility to Protect” includes a whole 
chapter on the responsibility to prevent. The report states:  
Without a genuine commitment to conflict prevention at all levels – without new energy and 
momentum being devoted to the task – the world will continue to witness the needless 
slaughter of our fellow human beings, and the reckless waste of precious resources on conflict 
rather than social and economic development. The time has come for all of us to take practical 
responsibility to prevent the needless loss of human life, and to be ready to act in the cause of 
prevention and not just in the aftermath of disaster.465 
 
The link between human rights and prevention of armed conflict is indirect. Human 
rights norms and actions do not have the goal of preventing armed conflict. However, they 
have important early warning functions; the deterioration of the human rights situation 
might be a first sign for growing tensions, especially in a situation in which ethnicity matters. 
Reports of the Special Rapporteurs, the OHCHR, and NGOs can contribute to the political 
analysis of situations in danger of ethnic conflict. 
 
                                                 
462 See overall NYGREN KRUG, Genocide in Rwanda, 165-213. 
463 See “A more secure world: Our shared responsibility” - Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations (“High-Level Panel Report”), UN Doc. A/59/565 
(2004). 
464 Speech by the UN Secretary-General to the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, 18 November 1999. See also 
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4.2.2  Dealing with Ethnic Violence and Violations of Human and 
Minority Rights  
As seen in Chapter 1, ethnic conflict poses a threat to international peace and security. 
The UNSC has under Article 24 of the UN-Charter the responsibility to maintain 
international peace and security. Threats to peace under the terms of Article 39 of the UN 
Charter are increasingly associated with internal conflicts and non-military sources of conflict 
where human rights issues are at stake.466 Furthermore, the UNSC acted under Chapter VII 
in a number of ethnic conflicts such as Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (1991). Depending on the 
case, the UNSC has condemned gross human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing, 
demanded ceasefires and the peaceful settlement of ethnic conflicts, appealed to the UN 
member states to contribute to the relief efforts, called for the supervision of peace and the 
implementation of the provisions of peace settlements by UN missions, and decided on 
economic sanctions and coercive measures.   
The UN can take two approaches to address ethnic conflicts that pose a threat to 
international peace and security: non-coercive and coercive intervention. The term 
“intervention” describes a whole range of methods and tools which include different actors 
who use different instruments to intervene in a variety of societies at various times in the life 
cycle of a conflict. Whether or not non-coercive measures or coercive intervention are 
chosen depends on several factors: the stage of conflict, character of the society and nature 
of the conflicting parties, character of third parties (capabilities, linkage to the parties, 
interests), and the instruments and means of intervention (military or non-military 
intervention, for example diplomatic intervention).467 
 
Non-coercive interventions can be helpful in shaping behaviors of group leaders in 
order to comply with international norms for the purpose of recognition, acceptance, and 
inclusion of their group in the international community. Protest, pressure, and assertions of 
international norms are important as they raise the costs of unacceptable behavior, especially 
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when other alternatives are offered.468 State behavior can be connected to inclusion or 
exclusion in a regional or international community (conditionality of membership). This 
strategy, most prominently adopted by the EU, proves to be very successful, as it sets 
positive incentives for states to improve their human rights legislation. However, when 
conflicts are intense and gross human rights violations are committed, naming and shaming, 
international pressure, and exclusion from international and regional organizations might not 
be enough to prevent further abuses and dissuade determined leaders from their course. In 
this case, coercive interventions might be more successful. 
Coercive external interventions have two primary effects. On the one side, they can alter 
the balance of power between ethnic groups and may lead groups to moderate their 
demands. Interventions always have political implications as they typically favor the weaker 
side in any conflict. This reduces the stronger side’s chances for success which restrains its 
demands. On the other side, the weaker side is likely to increase its demands and ask for 
more in negotiations with international involvement than it would have without external 
intervention.469  
The objective of coercive sanctions imposed by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter is to “maintain or restore international peace and security” (Article 39). 
According to Article 41, the UNSC:  
may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give 
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such 
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance 
of diplomatic relations. 
 
If the UNSC decides to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
all UN member states are required to carry out these measures. In the context of “the 
responsibility to protect”, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty states that “when preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the situation and 
when a state is unable or unwilling to redress the situation, then interventionary measures by 
                                                 
468 See EDMOND J. KELLER. “Transnational Ethnic Conflict in Africa.” In The International Spread of Ethnic 
Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, 275-292. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1998. 288/289. 
469 See DONALD WITTMAN. “How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 23/4 
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other members of the broader community of states may be required. These coercive 
measures may include political, economic or judicial measures, and in extreme cases – but 
only extreme cases – they may also include military action.”470 The most important coercive 
measures are political and economic sanctions and military interventions. 
 
Sanctions are coercive non-military measures that restrict or arrest normal international 
economic exchange with a state or a non-governmental group, with the purpose of changing 
the political or military behavior of the government or group in question.471 They are 
political, not legal in character. Underlying the theory of sanctions is the expectation that 
economic pressures transform into political effects. Economic sanctions can affect the trade 
of the country as a whole or only part of its goods, such as oil (comprehensive v. partial 
sanctions). They may limit or ban exports (embargoes) or imports (boycott).472 Arms 
embargoes are imposed to restrict military capabilities and induce military stalemates that 
prevent conflicts from escalating. 
Sanctions are attractive for policy makers, as they are a good way to express concern 
while at the same time seemingly minimizing risks and costs. Sanction regimes are not as 
disputed as military measures. However, some sanctions, especially economic measures, 
harm civilians, including the ones whose rights the international community tries to 
protect.473  
Sanctions need to be part of a comprehensive strategy addressing the conflict as a 
whole. The potential of sanctions is strengthened when combined with the threat to use 
military enforcement measures, signaling that the international community is serious. 
Second, third parties need to implement sanctions and grant compliance with the imposed 
regime. Broad international consensus facilitates this task. To ensure that neighboring 
countries, which might be partially dependent on the economic exchange with the target 
                                                 
470 Responsibility to Protect, paragraph 4.1. 
471 See CHANTAL DE JONGE OUDRAAT. “UN Sanction Regimes and Violent Conflict.” In Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, 323-
352. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. 324. 
472 Ibid. 
473 The sanctions imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War led to starvation and decreasing living standards among 
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country, comply with sanction regimes, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms as well as 
compensation and assistance need to be established. Third, sanctions are only a short-term 
measure as they have serious economic and social effects on an already conflict-affected 
society.474 If a change of behavior of the target state cannot be achieved thorough economic 
sanctions, other measures have to be taken into account.  
The track record of UN sanction regimes has been mixed. One reason for this is the 
fact that most of the sanction regimes were isolated measures and not part of an overall 
strategy to stop violence. In addition, little attention was given by third parties to the 
implementation of sanctions and to compliance.475 
 
States have a long history of intervening militarily in the ethnic affairs of other states.476 
Military action can take the form of unilateral action (UK in Sierra Leone in 2000); of an ad 
hoc “coalition of the willing” (U.S., UK, and allied forces in Iraq); a UN-authorized 
multilateral action (intervention in Gulf War 1991); UN peace keeping operations (UN 
mission in Mozambique 1992-1994); regional peacekeeping or peace enforcement (NATO in 
Kosovo); and UN-mandated actions led by a global or regional power (Australian-led 
mission in East Timor). 
Peace operations with UNSC authorization can be established in two ways. First, if 
peace operations are established by the UNSC under Chapter VI UN Charter, they emerge 
from the negotiated consent of the parties and through a series of “status of forces” 
agreements that specify the legal terms of the presence of foreign forces. Second, peace 
operations can be established by the UNSC under Chapter VII authorizing intervention 
without the consent of the parties. Troop-contributing countries negotiate the terms of the 
participation of their forces under UN command (e.g. El Salvador and Cambodia), under the 
command of a regional organization (delegated authorization as provided by Chapter VIII 
UN Charter), or under the leadership of a multinational “coalition of the willing” (such as 
the U.S.-led intervention in Somalia or the Australian-led intervention in East Timor).477 
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The immediate objective of UN action in ethnic conflicts is to prevent the conflict from 
spreading by monitoring a ceasefire, establishing a “buffer zone”, or stopping an aggressor in 
case of peace enforcement.478 The UNSC authorizes an intervention in order to stabilize the 
situation and end violence through negotiations aiming at a peace settlement and/or a 
ceasefire, prevent further atrocities and human suffering, facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, prevent the reoccurrence of conflict, and support the reconstruction 
of post-conflict society and institutions. In the words of former UNSG BOUTROS BOUTROS-
GHALI, peace operations seek “to identify and support structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”479 This is a 
tremendous task. As LAKHDAR BRAHIMI observes, peace operations have become more 
difficult because:  
our expectations and agendas are not getting any more realistic. Instead, they have become 
more ambiguous and multifaceted, seeking to promote justice, national reconciliation, human 
rights, gender equality, the rule of law, sustainable economic development and democracy—all 
at the same time, from day one, now, immediately, even in the midst of conflict.480 
 
UN peace operations today usually include a human rights component, mostly under 
the institutional leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in 
the field. Human rights advisors and a human rights unit need to form an integral part of the 
mission structure and feed into overall policy formulation.481 The human rights component is 
particularly important when dealing with ethnic groups. Minority rights provisions in 
combination with relevant political arrangements form a pillar for sustainable and durable 
peace in divided societies. The failure to ensure a meaningful presence of criminal justice and 
human rights experts during the creation of policy and drafting of legislation can result in 
irregular policy decisions and unlawful regulations. The United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) have 
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demonstrated a disregard for international human rights and as a result, have severely 
damaged the development of these principles in Kosovo.482  
 
Military or humanitarian intervention is probably the most significant action the UN can 
undertake in response to ethnic conflicts. Humanitarian intervention “is the threat or use of 
force across state borders by a state (or a group of states) aimed at preventing or ending of 
widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than 
its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is 
applied.”483 Few can argue against the moral imperative of humanitarian interventions, but 
there is a debate about the legality of humanitarian interventions and whether it is the best 
means to bring relief to civilians.484 The question whether and under what circumstances 
humanitarian intervention should be permitted is part of a current, polarizing debate.485 The 
complexity of the matter has resulted in little scholarly consent.486 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the understanding of humanitarian intervention has 
changed. The defining moment was the Gulf-War in 1991. The Security Council responded 
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to the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi military with a military intervention based on the right 
of Kuwait to self-defense and the role of the Security Council in case of aggression. When 
Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, the reason for the intervention disappeared. The Security 
Council then turned to a radically new interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter: it 
authorized the intervention in the name of the protection of ethnic and religious minorities 
within Iraq itself. Resolution 688 (1991) provided the legal background for the military 
intervention as well as the economic embargo.487 The precedent it established led to a range 
of other initiatives, which previously had been unthinkable, in other parts of the world: in 
Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, and possibly in the 
future in Darfour.488  
What was different about these new interventions was the UN involvement and the fact 
that issues such as ethnic tensions, which were formerly regarded as domestic affairs, became 
a matter for the UNSC. The Council took the view that internal developments, especially 
refugee flows, could threaten international security. Massive human rights violations and 
ethnic persecution became, in themselves, reasons for applying Chapter VII.  
However, the use of humanitarian intervention to protect ethnic groups today depends 
on the fulfillment of several criteria. In order for the UN to take action, (1) not just any 
human right but the most basic rights, especially the right to life, must be under threat; (2) 
there is no prospect that the government will do anything to relieve the suffering or resolve 
the situation; (3) non-military options have been considered and tried where appropriate; (4) 
a report from a third impartial and neutral source, such as the ICRC, has confirmed that the 
humanitarian crisis can not be managed without outside intervention; (5) widespread expert 
consultation has shown that there is no other solution; (6) consultation with the parties of 
the conflict have taken place; (7) consensus on the matter between developed and 
developing countries (in the UNGA for example) has been reached; and (8) it must be 
ensured that there are attempts not only to intervene in the short-term, but also to support 
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the war-affected state in its reconstruction, monitoring of human rights and economic 
development.489 
 
Even if most or all of these criteria are fulfilled, the legality and necessity of 
humanitarian intervention is disputed by politicians and international lawyers. The most 
controversial case is the intervention by NATO in Kosovo. The 1999 NATO intervention in 
Kosovo was a response to the massive violations committed by the Serb authorities against 
Kosovo Albanians. The intervention was accomplished after attempts to reach a peaceful 
solution had failed. It raised the question of whether the use of force without UNSC 
authorization should be permitted if it aims at protecting populations from large-scale 
human rights violations. The classical scholarly and jurisprudential view is that the threat and 
use of force is prohibited under international law (as stated in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the 
UN Charter).490 Under the UN Charter, a state can only use force for individual or collective 
self-defense (Article 51) or when military action has been decided by the UNSC to address 
threats or breaches of international peace and security. In the case concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,491 the ICJ denied that any kind of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention can serve as a justification for the use of force. Some experts 
argue that a new customary rule might emerge permitting the unilateral use of force for the 
purpose of ending gross human rights violations constituting a threat to international peace, 
especially in the case of the UNSC’s inability to act and if there is a lack of other 
possibilities.492 The matter of “pro-human rights” military intervention was supposed to be 
reviewed by the ICJ in the case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. a 
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number of Western countries)493, but the court dismissed the case on the basis of lack of 
jurisdiction.  
Furthermore, if defined very strictly, intervention involves unauthorized coercive 
interference in the domestic affairs of another state.494 However, as we have seen, there is no 
clear border between internal and international affairs between domestic and international 
jurisdiction where ethnic conflict is concerned. A relative approach driven by law and politics 
has to be decided for a given case in a given time. Thus, what has been regarded as 
prohibited at one time can become permissible international action another time in a 
different situation. The PCIJ stated as early as 1923 that “[t]he question of whether a certain 
matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question; it 
depends on the development of international relations.”495  
As a result, the legality of the NATO actions in Kosovo is uncertain at best. Some 
authors argue that unilateral action should not be legalized in any situation as the intervening 
state often pursues its own interest.496 On the other side, the broad participation of regional 
organizations, combined with the fact that no major international actor, like the UNGA, 
condemned the action of NATO, suggests the permissibility of the practice.497 Other 
scholars argue that the multilateral use of force to protect persons from gross and systematic 
human rights violations should be legal even without UNSC authorization.498 They consider 
the cause of the UN charter to be more important than its procedure. DANIEL THÜRER, for 
example, regards unilateral intervention as permissible whenever the fundamental values of 
the international society are threatened, the intervention is proportional, and the measures 
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are authorized by a “legitimate organ”. He adds that measures have to be brought back as 
soon as possible to the procedures laid down in the UN Charter.499 
This underscores the shift in international law away from claims of absolute sovereignty 
of states to a conditional sovereignty based on an adherence to the bare minimum of human 
rights standards. However, these recent cases and developments show that a modern 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention and clear legal criteria is needed as a better guide for 
the international community in responding to humanitarian challenges.500  
 
Aside from the question of the legality of the use of force, humanitarian intervention in 
ethnic conflicts raises several political, economic, and social issues. First, the success of 
international intervention depends on a number of factors: a developed institutional 
framework and a set of policies that enable decisions to be made quickly, adequate funds and 
personnel, and the cooperation of all different parties and actors involved. Intervention is an 
unusual event.501 Weak commitments produce ambiguous policies that may, in the end, 
contribute to rather than solve the conflict.502 Humanitarian interventions must have a 
reasonable chance of success. A reasonable chance of success requires the willingness by the 
states to bear certain costs and to launch an effort that is sufficient to be successful.503 The 
international community has had no such willingness in Rwanda, and more recently in 
Darfour, and many other places that are considered strategically less important by major 
powers of the world today. 
Second, raising domestic support for expensive UN operations in other parts of the 
world that do not directly affect the national interests of the country presents another 
problem. This is not only a problem regarding financial but also human resources. The fear 
of casualties among their own troops leads to reluctant commitment by states.  
                                                 
499 See THÜRER, Der Kosovo-Konflikt im Lichte des Völkerrechts, 8. See also W. MICHAEL REISMAN. “Criteria 
for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law.” Yale Journal of International Law 10 (1985): 279-285; 
FERNANDO R. TÉSON. Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality. New York, NY: 
Transnational Publishers, 19972. 157-162; and DAVID M. KRESOCK. “Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: The 
Legal Foundations of Foreign Intervention.” Cornell International Law Journal 27 (1994): 203-239. 234-237. 
500 DAVID J. SCHEFFER. “Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention.” The University of Toledo 
Law Review 23 (1992): 253-293.  
501 See MARC TRACHTENBERG. “Intervention in historical perspective.” In EMERGING NORMS OF JUSTIFIED 
INTERVENTION, ed. Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, 15-36. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, 1993. 
502 See LAKE and ROTHCHILD, Containing Fear, 151-155. 
503 HOFFMANN, Debate about Intervention, 277. 
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Third, humanitarian intervention presupposes a clear distinction between oppressors 
and victims, which is usually not the case in reality.504 Perpetrators and victims are often 
intermingled and, especially for outsiders, not clearly distinguishable.505  
Fourth, the issue of proper authority creates a dilemma: in order to have a “reasonable 
chance of success”, interventions have to be quick and strong. UN authorization usually 
involves bureaucratic inefficiencies as well as political, economic, and legal obstacles such as 
states opposing the action (especially if veto powers oppose each other), the decision on the 
mandate for a particular mission (peace keeping v. peace enforcement), and the problem of 
financial constraints and scarce resources.  
Fifth, critics also question if humanitarian interventions respect the principle of 
proportionality. Interventions often impose high costs on the beneficiaries – regarding both 
human suffering and economic costs.506  
Sixth, there is the problem of humanitarian intervention being a means of “last resort”. 
Waiting too long in the hope that diplomatic efforts will work can cause delays and allow the 
suppressor to carry out its genocidal action.507  
Finally, the most important criticism is again concerned with the “reasonable chance of 
success”. In ethnic conflicts, success is the ending of violence and the (re-)construction of a 
peaceful, multiethnic society, namely the organized coexistence of ethnic groups that have 
just gone through traumatic violence. Thus, success requires outsiders to make some 
extremely difficult choices: how and when to intervene, to implement reconstruction efforts, 
and to decide between reconciliation efforts and punishment of the guilty (see below).508 The 
fact that much ethnic violence is carried out more quickly than intervention forces can be 
deployed is in itself no excuse for UN failure to intervene – some lives can even be saved by 
                                                 
504 There is little doubt that Kosovars were mistreated and more often the victims of Serbs than contrary, but 
there were some abuses against Serbs by Kosovar Albanians. Charges against members of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army by the ICTY emphasize this point. 
505 In Rwanda, for instance, it was only recently discovered that a large part of killed people were moderate 
Hutu, not Tutsi. See the study by CHRISTIAN DAVENPORT and ALLAN STAM. “Mass Killing and the  
Oases of Humanity: Understanding Rwandan Genocide and Resistance.” Published on 
http://www.genodynamics.com/.  
506 The immediate response to the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo was the massive expulsion of 
Kosovar Albanians.  
507 A very good example is the Rwandan case: the strategy of the UN – transparency, diplomacy, and non-
intervention – helped the Hutu extremists to plan and execute the genocide. 
508 See also HOFFMANN, Debate about Intervention, 277-281. 
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a belated intervention.509 However, this means that the benefits of humanitarian intervention 
might be much smaller than realized. 
 
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the states and international 
organizations concerned should prepare adequately for intervention in situations that qualify 
as genocide or gross human rights violations. The UN should be equipped with a rapid 
reaction force in order to eliminate problems of command and commitment that have 
plagued previous efforts. 
Furthermore, the question of when a situation qualifies as a “gross human rights 
violation” or “genocide” in which the international community is obligated to react is 
difficult to define.  Neither the UN Charter nor general international norms, treaties, and 
other documents provide a clear answer to this question. 
 
4.2.3 Negotiations and Written Agreements 
As seen above, human rights should be part of the concerns of negotiators. Sustainable 
and long-term prevention of armed conflict must include a focus on strengthening respect 
for human rights and addressing core issues of human rights violations, wherever these 
occur. However, the negotiator’s priority must be to end violence and suggest solutions such 
as power-sharing to the conflict. Post-conflict objectives have to be met: (1) stopping 
violence and ending human rights violations so that the victims can feel physically safe; (2) 
coming to terms with the past accurately and completely; (3) bringing justice; (4) creating 
conditions that make it possible for the society to move forward; (5) and achieving 
reconciliation and coexistence between former perpetrators and those with whom they were 
in conflict.510  
 
The key aspect of the negotiation process is characterized by bargaining, a process 
consisting of six steps: (1) each party makes an initial offer to the other party; (2) 
                                                 
509 ALAN KUPERMAN speaks of “Killers are quicker than interveners.” See ALAN J. KUPERMAN. “Humanitarian 
Hazard: Revisiting Doctrines of Intervention.” Harvard International Review 26/1 (Spring 2004): 
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1219/.  
510 See ELLEN LUTZ. “Troubleshooting Differences.” Human Rights Dialogue 2/7 (Winter 2002): 23/24. 
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commitments are made to a certain extent addressing specific problems to keep the process 
going; (3) promises of rewards and threats of sanctions are issued to induce the other party 
to make concessions; (4) concessions are made if the parties’ views move closer together; (5) 
retractions of previous offers and concessions are made if parties if the parties draw apart; 
and finally, (6) if the dynamics of making concessions outweigh the dynamics to find 
unilateral solutions, parties move towards an agreement that is located somewhere between 
their opening offers.511 
A very successful tactic in this context is mediation, the purpose of which is to bring a 
settlement to a conflict that is acceptable for both sides and consistent with the third party’s 
interests. It is a political process in which parties do not commit to accept the third party’s 
ideas (contrary to arbitration, for example). Rather, it is a form of negotiation in which a 
third party assists the conflicting parties in finding a solution for the issues at stake. 
Mediation facilitates the settlement of disputes that parties would not have otherwise been 
able to accomplish on their own.512 Parties have a three way choice: they can accept the 
agreement, continue to bargain in the hope to obtain better terms, or break off 
negotiations.513 
Negotiation outcomes can be evaluated according to four criteria:514  
• Agreement: The first and most obvious criterion is if parties reach agreement or not.  
• Efficiency: The second factor looks at the extent to which parties were able to reach 
the best possible agreement at the lowest costs (end of violence and human 
suffering, time, financial costs, reputation etc.) for a given situation.  
• Equity: Equity refers to the degree to which the parties consider an agreement to be 
“fair” and “equitable”. Fairness is a subjective concept, but some objective factors 
                                                 
511 See P. TERRENCE HOPMANN. “Bargaining and Problem Solving: Two Perspectives on International 
Negotiation.” In Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of  Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen 
Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 445-468. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. 
446. 
512 See for an overview of mediation practice by states and international actors SAADIA TOUVAL and I. 
WILLIAM ZARTMAN. “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era.” In Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of  
Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 427-443. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. 
513 See more detailed CHARLES IKLÉ. How Nations Negotiate. New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. 59-61.  
514 Adapted from P. TERRENCE HOPMANN. The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflict. 
Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1996. 28-30. 
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can be specified; the agreement should be non-discriminatory and equitable and 
reciprocal in the sense that all parties benefit/loose equally from the agreement. 
• Stability: This refers to the durability of the agreement over time. An agreement is 
most stable if the parties have an interest in the full implementation of the terms of 
the agreement. This can be achieved if the agreement is to the benefit of all parties, if 
appropriate incentives for the parties are offered (e.g., suspension of sanction 
regimes or membership in an international or regional organization515), and if 
international actors or mediators involved in the negotiation process are supervising 
and guaranteeing the implementation process.   
 
The involvement of all parties in negotiations thus induces a complex, multiparty 
negotiation process that is very significant for the stability and long-term outcome of the 
peace process. Such negotiations are complicated and depend on the capacity of community 
leaders to collaborate, recognize opportunities, and avoid “traps” of polarization and 
unilateral ways. Enduring peace needs skills, talents, and commitment not only from the 
conflicting parties themselves, but also from international players and states, mediators, 
officials, and humanitarian actors.516 Persuasion, backed by diplomatic, economic, and even 
military “carrots and sticks” available to the international community, can be a powerful 
weapon.517 
 
Peace and confidence building require that human rights and the rule of law be 
implemented in order for the settlement to survive. The difficulty is to find a balance 
between promoting peace and implementing human rights. ROLAND PARIS writes: “What is 
needed in the immediate post-conflict period is not quick elections, democratic ferment, or 
economic ‘shock therapy’ but a more gradual approach to liberalization, combined with the 
                                                 
515 Like it is done by the EU: prospective member states have to fulfill a set of basic democratic, economic, and 
human rights and rule of law-related standards before the EU considers negotiations for membership. 
516 See the analysis by CHESTER A. CROCKER, FEN OSLER HAMPSON, and PAMELA AALL. “Is More Better? The 
Pros and Cons of Multiparty Negotiations.” In Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of  Managing International Conflict, 
ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 497-513. Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2001. 
517 HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, 50. 
 
Ethnic Conflict Resolution within the International Legal System
 
 
 145
immediate building of governmental institutions that can manage these political and 
economic reforms.”518 STEPHEN J. STEDMAN states: 
[P]riority should be given to the demobilization of soldiers and the demilitarization of politics; 
that is, the transformation of soldiers into civilians and warring armies into political parties. 
The achievement of important normative goals such as the protection of human rights and 
creation of accountability and democracy depend on these transformations.519 
 
This means that political change and the implementation of human rights are 
interdependent. In facilitating a peace agreement, UN negotiators should be sure not to 
undermine human rights norms. In the best case, they should consider the recommendations 
of the UN treaty bodies to address specific practices and make sure that human rights norms 
are interpreted the same way throughout the UN.520 In countries where the violation of 
human rights is central to the conflict itself, the correction of those violations may lead the 
way to the resolution of the conflict. Peace agreements that address immediate post-conflict 
situations (including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants) should 
include funding for human rights-capacity building. These capacity-building efforts must be 
directed towards the (transitional) government as well as the civil society. Even if the 
implementation is imperfect, UN mediators must inform officials in any post-conflict 
power-sharing government that their responsibilities extend beyond adopting some form of 
democracy, and that it is the international obligation of the state to promote human rights.521 
Implementation of human rights standards does not mean looking only at violations; it 
means improving the human rights situation of all people living in the country. A country in 
which UN human rights standards have not been met before a violent conflict cannot be 
expected to achieve the standards right after the signing of a peace agreement. In almost 
every country emerging from violence, the degree to which human rights are protected 
depends on the post-conflict situation and international assistance. Compliance with human 
and minority rights standards does not need to be implemented immediately, but can be 
                                                 
518 ROLAND PARIS. At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 7/8. 
519 See STEPHEN J. STEDMAN. “Introduction.” In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, ed. 
Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, 1-40. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. 
3. 
520 See Negotiating Justice? Human Rights and Peace Agreements, ed. International Council on Human Rights Policy. 
Vernier: ATAR, 2006. 
521 HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, 52/53. 
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viewed as part of the peace process as a whole. The Council of Europe, for example, did not 
demand immediate compliance of post-Soviet states to become parties to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
A survey conducted by HURST HANNUM522 examined the role of human rights in peace 
agreements after intrastate warfare. The study included 70 peace agreements in 29 
countries.523 19 of these agreements were comprehensive settlements as opposed to more 
narrow settlements dealing with disarmament or other technical issues in which no reference 
to human rights would be expected.524 Of these, 18 include references to human rights, with 
varying degrees of commitments, specificity, and different institutional structures.525 There 
was substantial involvement of the UN in approximately half of the negotiations that led to 
the agreements.526 However, there seems to be no correlation between UN involvement and 
the inclusion of human rights clauses in the agreement. Furthermore, there is only a weak 
correlation between the inclusion of human rights norms and the success of the peace 
agreement. TONYA PUTNAM, who considers 16 peace agreements,527 observes that only three 
of the six successful cases included human rights provisions. She concludes: 
The absence of explicit human rights provisions in a peace settlement in no way inhibits their 
incorporation into subsequent laws or constitutions. Therefore, the positive utility of pressing 
to include such provisions in a settlement instrument should be approached in each new 
context as an open question – not as a starting assumption.528 
 
                                                 
522 Ibid., 43-50. 
523 The states include Angola, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Mozambique, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo), Macedonia, United Kingdom (Northern Ireland), Mexico (Chiapas), 
Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Iraq, Indonesia (Aceh), Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), 
Cambodia, Georgia, Philippines (Mindanao), Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan.  
524 The nineteen agreements include in chronological order: Cambodia (1991), El Salvador (1991), Mozambique 
(1992), Angola (1994), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Croatia (1995), Guatemala (1994-96), Mexico (1996), 
Tajikistan (1997), Northern Ireland (1998), Philippines (1998), Sierra Leone (1999), Macedonia (1999), 
Burundi (2000), Bougainville (2001),  Afghanistan (2001), Sudan (2002 and 2004), Côte d’Ivoire (2003), and 
Liberia (2003). 
525 The only exception is the agreement reached in Tajikistan, which did include references to refugees and 
elections. 
526 Afghanistan, Angola, Bougainville, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Guatemala, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra 
Leone, Sudan, and Tajikistan. 
527 The agreements include Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Cambodia, Guatemala, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. See 
PUTNAM, Human Rights and Sustainable Peace, 261/262. 
528 Ibid., 260. 
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Nevertheless, a study that examined civil wars between 1940 and 1992 found that 
“negotiated settlements that appear to have all elements of success – a ceasefire agreement, 
specific arrangements for future governance, resolution of underlying issues – still fail if they 
lack the guarantees necessary to reassure groups to proceed with implementation.”529 Human 
rights provisions play an important role in reassuring groups. An OHCHR official identifies 
at least three contributions that human rights provisions might make to sustainable peace.530  
First, public recognition of human rights can contribute to an important symbolic 
“sense of justice” in the population at large. This might facilitate discussion of human rights-
related post-conflict matters such as accountability, reconciliation, and the establishment of 
war crimes tribunals on the national or international level.  
Second, human rights provisions that are specifically directed towards the inclusion or 
integration of ethnic groups and minorities into any new political structure can contribute to 
more stable and successful agreements, especially if ethnicity was the most important factor 
in the conflict.  
Third, such provisions may serve as vehicles for other parts of the society that may not 
have taken part in the hostilities to participate in the peace process. This is especially true for 
women whose participation can lead to a more congenial atmosphere for reconciliation than 
would be found among the former, mostly male adversaries.531 Human rights provisions may 
also encourage the development of civil society by stimulating discussion among the 
population.  
In sum, research demonstrates that there is no evidence that including human rights 
provisions in peace agreements makes it more difficult to reach or implement an agreement. 
However, there is little evidence that human rights provisions per se, meaning without 
significant international contribution to monitoring and capacity building or institutional 
change, make an agreement or its implementation easier or more successful in the short 
term.532 Even if the positive value of including human rights provisions in peace agreements 
                                                 
529 WALTER, Committing to Peace, 166. 
530 Cited in HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, 46. 
531 See for example “Women and Armed Conflict.” Fact Sheet No. 5, UN Conference on Gender Equality, 
Development and Peace for the 21st Century, New York, 2000. See also the Reports of the Secretary-
General on “Women and Peace and Security, UN Doc. S/2004/814, and “Women, Peace and Security”, 
UN Doc. S/2002/1154.  
532 See HANNUM, Rethinking Self-Determination, 46/47. 
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cannot be proved, it is clear that human rights are one of the most important pillars of the 
United Nation’s quest for a just and peaceful world.533  
 
Given the fact that the promotion of human rights is one of the UN’s goals, it seems 
logical to conclude that human rights should be integrated in negotiations, written 
agreements, and constitutions fostered by the UN. In the words of UNSG KOFI ANNAN: 
“We will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without 
development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.”534 
 
4.2.4 Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Some of the issues addressed in previous chapters already touched upon  basic concepts 
of post-conflict reconstruction. The term “post-conflict” is in some ways misleading, 
because a conflict does not end with the signing of a peace agreement. In the best case, 
peace agreements provide the framework for negotiation, bargaining, and the 
accommodation of claims by other than violent means. “Reconstruction” is also misleading 
as its aim is to create new institutions and preclude the re-building of old structures that led 
to violent conflict in the first place. Nevertheless, the term “post-conflict reconstruction” 
will be used here as it is the most commonly used term to describe the process of building a 
society, institutions, and a legal framework after violent ethnic conflict. In contrast to 
conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction is aimed at creating institutions and 
procedures necessary to permanently settle the conflict and implement the provision of a 
peace agreement. Post-conflict reconstruction is thus seen increasingly as an integral part of 
the conflict resolution processes.  
 
Protracted ethnic conflicts shape societies in many ways, often resulting in a lack of 
functioning and legitimate institutions, weak economic performance, non-existent or 
                                                 
533 Strengthening of the United Nations System: An Agenda for Further Change, Report of the Secretary-General, UN 
Doc. A/57/387 (2002), paragraph 45: “The promotion and protection of human rights is a bedrock 
requirement for the realization of the Charter’s vision of a just and peaceful world.” 
534 See In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General, 
UN Doc. A/59/2005. 
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polarized structures of civil society, and antagonized elites. Once a peace agreement has been 
signed and a ceasefire has been established, projects should be started aiming at the 
transition from war to peace, democracy, an open market economy, and a system based on 
the rule of law. This involves building accountable, credible, and transparent institutions, 
generating self-sustaining economies, and creating a civil society in which people learn to live 
with their troubled past in order to maintain peace. 535 Post-conflict reconstruction is a 
tremendous task, posing many difficulties and problems.  
The dilemma faced by international post-conflict reconstruction efforts is that in the 
short run, it is easiest and most cost-effective for the international community to bring in 
outside expertise and set up the new structures of the war-affected country. In the long run 
however, this approach fails to create local capacity to hold up the new structures and makes 
the communities dependent on outside supervision. In the worst case, this can lead to the 
reemergence of conflict. In addition, it is almost as impossible to build a democratic society 
by authoritarian means, as it is to build a sustainable economy by humanitarian aid alone.536 
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina with its continued dependency on the EUFOR (and 
former SFOR) and the EU High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates this 
dilemma of an “artificial” peace. Despite high level international efforts, economic aid, and 
assistance with the transformation of government, many post-conflict reconstruction 
processes lead to peace that is dependent on the presence of foreign troops, an economy 
relying on foreign aid, and segregated societies in which former enemies are not reconciled. 
Sustainable success in post-conflict reconstruction depends on the establishment of stable 
and effective institutions before elections can be held or economic activity can become self-
sustaining.537 
 
GEORGE DOWNS and STEPHEN J. STEDMAN538 developed eight factors that can make 
the implementation of peace agreements more difficult: 
                                                 
535 See for a more detailed argument WOLFF, 157/158. 
536 Ibid., 162. 
537 See BENJAMIN REILLY. Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 3-26. 
538 See GEORGE DOWNS and STEPHEN J. STEDMAN. “Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation.” In Ending 
Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, ed. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. 
Cousens, 43-69. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. 55-57. 
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• Number of conflicting parties. The difficulty of implementing an agreement increases if 
there are more than two conflicting parties as strategies become less predictable, 
balances of power more fragile, and alliances more fluid. One of the major issues in 
situations involving more than two parties is the difficulty of addressing all concerns 
of all conflicting fractions. However, in cases in which not all parties were included 
in negotiations, the peace agreement was more likely to fail and the use of violence 
by excluded parties was common.539 
• The absence of a peace agreement signed by all parties in the conflict before intervention. UN 
involvement in post-conflict situations usually requires a detailed peace agreement 
and consent to a peace mission among the factions of the conflict. However, there 
have been some cases since the early 1990s in which the UN and/or regional 
organizations intervened in ongoing wars in the hope of using force to compel a 
peace agreement.540 In some cases, intervention in the absence of a peace agreement 
can lead to violent opposition by the parties and thus contribute to the escalation of 
conflict. Furthermore, a situation without a peace agreement implies a lack of 
possibilities to implement means accompanying mediation and negotiation efforts 
such as confidence-building and problem solving.  
• The likelihood of spoilers. The presence of spoilers who disturb the peace process poses 
huge challenges to implementation. The problem with spoilers is that they are usually 
only identified after the implementation process is completed. As a result, the 
prevention of spoilers or action against spoilers during the implementation process 
are extremely difficult. The extent to which an actor actually engages in spoiling 
behavior depends on the existence of opportunities.541  
• Collapsed states. The lack of some basic political, economic, and social infrastructure 
and institutions complicate the implementation of peace agreements. The 
implementers, in most cases the international community under the leadership of the 
                                                 
539 See for example the conflict in Northern Ireland: Only the 1998 Good Friday Agreement was successful in 
securing an enduring peace. See KEMPIN, Ready for Peace.  
540 Examples include the UN mission in Somalia, ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, India in Sri Lanka, 
Syria in Lebanon, and the NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
541 On spoiler problems see STEPHEN J. STEDMAN. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International Security 
22/2 (Fall 1997): 5-53. 
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UN, do not only have to put an end to violence, but also build up governing capacity 
in order for peace to have a sustainable chance. 
• Number of soldiers. Higher number of soldiers or rebels pose greater demands for 
verification and monitoring and require more personnel and resources to supervise 
the monitoring and demobilization processes.  
• Disposable natural resources. If the conflicting parties have access to disposable 
resources such as gems, minerals, oil, or timber, the implementation processes 
become more difficult as they provide armies with the means for continued fighting. 
• Hostile neighboring states or networks. Civil wars usually take place in unstable domestic 
and regional conditions with neighboring states being affected and accordingly 
playing a key role in undermining or supporting the opportunities for peace. Ethnic 
kin, diasporas, and national interests of neighboring states are complicating factors in 
peace processes.542 
• Secessionist movements. If the issue at stake is secession and independence, negotiated 
settlements aiming at keeping the state together are more difficult to negotiate and 
implement. As seen above, secessionist conflicts involve all or nothing-struggles that 
are not open for compromises. 
 
The more these indicators are present, the more difficult the ending of violence and the 
implementation of a peace agreement becomes. Furthermore, international commitment is 
crucial; low degrees of interest and willingness lead to a lack of intervention or interventions 
with constrained resources, limited mandates, and weak effects. If a UN peace mission is 
supported by large, powerful states, an intervention is more likely to be successful. The level 
of interest also affects the supply of resources and soldiers assigned to a given mission.543 
 
On the political level, the most important task is to restore law and order, to establish an 
independent judiciary, and to hold elections. Especially in situations involving ethnic issues, 
it is crucial that the institutions established are appropriate for the particular conflict and do 
                                                 
542 The influence of spoilers to a peace process is stronger if they can rely on neighboring states for resources 
(guns, capital, fuel etc.) and sanctuary. Ibid., 51. 
543 See for a detailed analysis DOWNS and STEDMAN, Evaluating Issues in Peace Implementation, 58-65. 
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not deepen the polarization between communities (e.g., by allowing “ethnic” voting or the 
lack of provisions for power-sharing etc.).  
The UN is one of the major actors, usually coordinating efforts by different UN 
agencies and departments, NGOs, and national efforts. The UN plays an important role in 
post-conflict situations, especially in promoting democracy. The UNGA has adopted several 
pro-democracy resolutions, especially in the mid-1990s.544 In the long run, democracy will be 
a more effective guard against ethnic conflict than the presence of foreign troops.545 The 
problem is however, that post-conflict situations do not usually provide for the basic 
conditions of a democratic society, namely legitimate institutions, a strong civil society and a 
political culture for dealing peacefully with problems, and the economic conditions to sustain 
both institutions and civil society. 
A domestic order, established on the basis of democratic principles and the rule of law, 
must fulfill some minimum standards. These include: a representative elected government 
that is acting in compliance with the constitution and the law, a clear separation between the 
state and political parties, accountability of security forces to civilian authorities, 
consideration and adoption of legislation by public procedure, an independent judiciary, 
compensation for victims of crimes committed during the conflict, free and fair elections at 
regular intervals, and comprehensive and effective rights for participation of all citizens of 
the state.546 
UN election assistance has become an essential preventive and reconstructive measure 
to diminish the risk for ethnic conflict and to manage the claims of ethnic minorities. 
Electoral assistance is thus a part of most mandates for peacekeeping operations. The UN 
Electoral Assistance Division, established in April 1992 as a division of the DPA, is 
responsible for the coordination of the activities of the United Nations system in the field of 
electoral assistance. It provides for monitoring of elections, technical assistance, and the 
supervision of the organization of the elections.  
                                                 
544 See for example UNGA Resolution 46/137 (1991), Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic 
and Genuine Elections, UN Doc. A/RES/46/137 (1991). 
545 WOLFF, Ethnic Conflict, 175. 
546 See more detailed NEIL J. KRITZ. “The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase.” In Turbulent Peace: The 
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Elections in post-conflict situations carry a tremendous burden. They are called upon to 
settle the issues of internal and external legitimacy and must be organized under the difficult 
circumstances of societal disorder, general insecurity, and institutional breakdown – 
conditions that seldom favor the transition to democracy. Furthermore, they are sometimes 
designed to advance contradictory goals, including the establishment of a peaceful society, 
democratization, and compliance with internationally monitored peace agreements.  If the 
major goal of the election is democratization, for example, the necessary institutions have to 
be in place as described above. In other cases, the nature of the conflict and the peace 
agreement require quick elections in an atmosphere in which leaders continue to gain power 
through the use of military force or if the international community is not willing or able to 
provide troops for a long-term peace mission.547  
The organization of free and fair elections as a means to introduce democracy is not 
enough and reliance on it can be self-defeating. They should be accompanied by other 
efforts of peace implementation such as putting an end to violence, demobilization, 
establishing the rule of law, institution and capacity building, refugee repatriation, the 
promotion of human rights, and the implementation of the provisions of a peace agreement. 
Ethnic groups that recently fought in conflict fear that the winner of elections will set up 
authoritarian rule, exclude opposition and minorities, and imprison members who took part 
in the armed attacks. As a result, they refuse to participate in negotiations and may choose to 
continue to accomplish their claims using violent means.548 International actors have to 
understand that liberal democracy cannot be coerced on a society and that the onset of a 
democratic process in a war torn society needs some form of transition or interim solution. 
 
More comprehensively, UN missions can be provided with post-conflict reconstruction 
mandates that take over government functions. Cases include East Timor, Kosovo, and 
Eastern Slavonia. 
In the case of East Timor, after years of external rule (Portuguese colony until 1974, 
Indonesian province 1975-1999) and struggle for self-determination, the people in East 
                                                 
547 See TERRENCE LYONS. “The Role of Postsettlement Elections.”  In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of 
Peace Agreements, ed. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, 215-235. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. 215-217. 
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Timor voted for independence in a referendum held on August 30, 1999. The process was 
accompanied by serious violence and human rights violations that could only be stopped by 
an Australian-led and UNSC authorized international intervention. In the aftermath, the 
UNSC set up the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)549 to assist the 
country in the process of implementing its independence. The transitional government was 
established for three years and had all functions of a government. These included the tasks 
of providing security and maintaining law and order, administrative functions, the creation of 
local capacity for self-government and civil services, providing humanitarian and 
development assistance, and laying the basis for a self-sustaining economy.550 
The UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES)551 was a relatively 
short-lived mission between 1996 and 1998, aiming at the reintegration of three Serbian-
dominated regions into Croatia. 
The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established in 1999 
by UNSC Resolution 1244552 and had the task of performing basic civilian administrative 
functions, promoting the establishment of autonomy and self-government, facilitating a 
process to determine Kosovo’s future status, coordinating international relief efforts, 
supporting the reconstruction of infrastructure, maintaining law and order, promoting 
human rights, and assuring the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons.553 To 
perform these tasks, the mission combined civilian and military elements and involved 
several international organizations under the leadership of the UN, the OSCE, and the 
EU.554 
These examples illustrate that the essential aim of post-conflict reconstruction is to 
create a set of political and social structures that allow the country, in accordance with the 
agreed settlement, to start a transformation process in which peaceful and non-violent 
political institutions are established. The task is multi-dimensional and needs short-term as 
                                                 
549 UNSC Resolution 1272 (1999), UN Doc S/RES/1272 of 22 October 1999. 
550  See the mandate of UNTAET: http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetM.htm. 
551 Established by the UNSC Resolution 1145 (1997), UN Doc. S/RES/1145 of 19 December 1997. 
552 UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999), UN Doc S/Res/1244 of 10 June 1999. 
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well as long-term approaches. In the short run, ceasefire agreements are usually the first step, 
as they end violence and establish the necessary conditions for negotiating a peace 
agreement. Building on these preliminary conditions, post-conflict reconstruction efforts aim 
at maintaining basic security. Without these preconditions of basic security, it is very difficult 
to implement any follow-up tasks.555 In the long run, the task is the establishment of 
legitimate, stable, and effective political institutions, creating conditions for economic 
sustainability, and transforming the war-affected society into a functioning civil society with 
respect for human rights and peaceful co-existence.  
 
Peace implementation in post-conflict societies with a focus on human rights is a great 
challenge and so far, has not been very successful. PUTNAM writes: “The heart of the 
problem is the apparent failure of many international human rights organizations … to 
recognize that effective promotion and protection of human rights early in post-conflict 
settings requires different tactics than those typically applied in response to human rights 
abuses occurring in stable societies.”556 
In stable societies, human rights organizations have been successful by calling 
international attention to violations of human rights (“naming and shaming”) and pushing 
governments to act against the violator. In cases of relatively stable societies, individual 
accountability and redress for violations has been advocated by human rights 
organizations.557 However, in post-conflict situations the required features such as an 
independent judiciary, a civilian controlled police force, and necessary political institutions 
are mostly absent or in a very early stage of development. As a result, human rights 
protection in conflict situations needs a different approach. Standardized action, as it is taken 
in countries with stable societies, is not sufficient to deal with a post-conflict situation. It can 
endanger the peace process as a whole, as it does not take into account the sensitivity of 
peace negotiation.558 Furthermore, the failures of international human rights organizations to 
take into account other tasks and priorities in peace negotiations can lead to isolation and 
abandonment of the human rights approach in the implementation process. A case by case 
                                                 
555 As it is illustrated by the example of the conflict in Iraq: the deteriorating security situation makes it difficult 
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approach when promoting, monitoring, and protecting human rights is thus needed in post-
conflict situations, an approach determined for the overall goal of achieving peace.559  
 
4.2.5 Accountability and Transitional Justice 
Since the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
“transitional justice” has received significant attention. The relationship between 
international responses to conflict and judicial mechanisms goes back to the 1899 Hague 
Conference. The conference established the Permanent Court of Arbitration to settle dispute 
between states, a precedent for the PCIJ after World War One and the ICJ after World War 
Two. Individual accountability was established for the first time after the Second World War 
with the Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals. In the early 1990s, the UN established the 
ad hoc tribunals for prosecuting crimes in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. The 
development towards accountability for individuals under international criminal law was 
topped by the establishment of the ICC in 2002. International human rights courts such as 
the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights play 
a role in dealing with ethnic conflict.  
The establishment of accountability for past crimes is “one of the most difficult issues 
facing OHCHR and the broader human rights community,” writes the deputy force 
commander of UNTAET in East Timor.560 With the creation of the ICC and its 
investigations into crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and 
in Darfour (Sudan), some responsibility for accountability may shift from the UN human 
rights bodies to the ICC. Until now 100 states have ratified the ICC statute, including states 
that have recently been subjected to wars such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and 
Tajikistan.561 The ICC can only deal with crimes that occurred after its statute entered into 
force on 1 July, 2002, and it is a complementary institution, meaning that national judicial 
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ways have to be exhausted or inoperable before the ICC obtains jurisdiction. The ICC issued 
its first indictment against five members of the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in October 2005.562 There is the hope that existing 
international and mixed criminal tribunals and the ICC have a deterrent effect. 
 
Many UN mediators equate a human rights approach with “transitional justice”.563 A 
UN report of 2004 defines “transitional justice”:  
as the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to 
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice 
and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with 
differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, 
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination 
thereof.564 
 
According to the International Center for Transitional Justice “approaches to 
transitional justice comprise five key elements: prosecuting perpetrators, documenting and 
acknowledging violations through non-judicial means such as truth commissions, reforming 
abusive institutions, providing reparations to victims, and facilitating reconciliation 
processes.”565  
One aspect of transitional justice is the establishment of the rule of law. The UNSG 
defines rule of law: 
The rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with 
international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure 
adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law, equality before the law, accountability to 
the law, fairness and application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-
making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitraries and procedural and legal transparency.566 
 
Human rights capacity-building is an integral part of the rule of law. Among the rule of law 
issues that should be addressed by the UN human rights bodies and especially by the 
                                                 
562 See Warrant of Arrest Unsealed against Five LRA Commanders, ICC Press Release, 14 October 2005, ICC-
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563 See the statements in HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, 36. 
564 Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
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OHCHR are standards for the independence of the judiciary, fair trial norms, access to 
justice for all parts of the population, including members of minority groups, and the 
protection of human rights defenders. The UN human rights bodies might also provide 
advice on law reform projects, such as removing discriminatory provisions from existing 
statutes and ensuring that transitional regulations are consistent with international human 
rights norms. 567 The broad scope of transitional justice requires cooperation between 
different UN bodies. 
 
The question of whether accountability is the best strategy to address atrocities 
committed in an ethnic conflict has led to much debate. Particularly when all sides of the 
conflicting parties have committed human and minority rights violations, amnesty seems to 
be an obvious solution. However, public exposure of human rights violations and 
“threatening” government officials with later prosecution for international crimes if human 
rights are not respected may reassure the public in a war-torn society that there will be justice 
for the crimes committed and may be a way of influencing government behavior. 
Until recently, no consistent UN approach to accountability could be established. 
Becoming more and more uncomfortable with the situation of impunity for even the most 
horrific crimes, the UN developed guidelines in 1999 as an informal document. The most 
important guideline reads: “United Nations-endorsed peace agreements can never promise 
amnesties for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or gross violations of human 
rights.”568 Thus, the UN will not lend its approval to impunity for international crimes, even 
if the parties of the conflict wish to do so. It is on the basis of these guidelines that the UN 
rejected the amnesty included in the 1999 Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone.569 In other 
words, “[t]he question … can never be whether to pursue justice and accountability, but 
rather when and how.”570  
In some cases, accountability can be an obstacle to peace and reconciliation. In the 
words of the UN Secretary-General: 
                                                 
567 See HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, 42. 
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Ending the climate of impunity is vital to restoring public confidence and building 
international support to implement peace agreements. … We know that there cannot be real 
peace without justice. Yet the relentless pursuit of justice may sometimes be an obstacle to 
peace. If we insist, at all times, and in all places, on punishing those who are guilty of extreme 
violations of human rights, it may be difficult, or even impossible, to stop the bloodshed and 
save innocent civilians. If we always and everywhere insist on uncompromising standards of 
justice, a delicate peace may not survive.  
 
But equally, if we ignore the demands of justice simply to secure agreement, the foundations 
of that agreement will be fragile, and we will set bad precedents. 571 
 
There are no easy answers to such moral, legal and philosophical dilemmas. 
 
It is doubtful that sustainable peace can be established without addressing 
accountability, past crimes, and human rights issues in general. The issue of transitional 
justice and the establishment of democracy and the rule of law are strongly connected with 
human rights norms, such as the right to political participation, economic, social, and 
cultural rights as well as the prohibition of discrimination. But protecting human rights goes 
beyond merely punishing perpetrators. Suppression of minorities, discrimination, and even 
politically motivated detention are not internationally punishable crimes, but their 
continuation in a post-settlement situation will undermine the chances for a stable peace. 
The Report of the UNSG on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice states: 
Our experience in the past decade has demonstrated clearly that the consolidation of peace in 
the imminent post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of peace in the long term, 
cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for grievances can be 
obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the fair 
administration for justice.572 
 
Moreover, it would be dangerous to unite the international responsibility of states to 
protect human rights with the criminal liability of individuals who committed crimes under 
international law.573 
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4.3 Conclusion 
The UN combines two great strengths when addressing conflict resolution and human 
rights. One is its unique legitimacy as authorizer of actions in the name of the international 
community. The second is its network of agencies, which provide it with the knowledge and 
institutional capacity to cope with humanitarian, political, and economic tasks. However, 
there are also limits to UN capacity, especially in cases in which the UN pursues coercive 
strategies and/or comprehensive peace operations.574 The proliferation of mediators, NGOs, 
humanitarian agencies, regional and local actors, the prevalence of political competition 
among major powers in the UNSC, and the weakened authority of the UN have constrained 
the UN in taking over the role it was build for – to restore and maintain international peace 
and security and secure respect and promotion of human rights. UN engagement shows two 
major problems: organizational weaknesses and insufficient commitments.  
First, the UN’s structural organization affects its preventive policies and the ability for 
effective action in ethnic conflict. The bureaucratic structure of many organizations is a 
serious impediment to rapid and flexible responses. Inter-agency rivalry results in 
preoccupation with carving out territories and resistance to effective policy coordination. A 
further problem is the fact that the emphasis on generally applicable rules makes 
international organizations unsuited to developing policies for specific situations.575 
As seen above, its reaction mechanisms are slow and complicated, while UN peace 
operations are ill-equipped with badly trained and slow-moving troops. Furthermore, UNSC 
resolutions are often formulated in an imprecise and weak manner and lack clear objectives 
and rules of engagement. Problems of communication between the UNSC, the Secretariat, 
the UNGA, other UN agencies, the governments of troop-contributing countries, and other 
actors such as NGOs in the field have led to major impasses in the past.  
Second, the lack of political will has led to weak commitments, thus sending ambiguous 
messages to the parties in conflict. The UN makes “paper-threats” while lacking the ability 
or will to carry them out. Moreover, a culture of “no blame” exists in larger organizations 
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like the UN, meaning that responsibility is not assigned to the bodies and states involved. 
This results in a lack of post-case assessment and a failure to review policies and actions, 
which are particularly important for the development of effective conflict prevention 
strategies. Records of action taken and the assessment of successes and failures are crucial to 
the development of such strategies.576 The UN is eroding its own credibility. 
 
Although many criticisms are justified, most responsibility rests not with the UN as an 
institution but with the failure of the member states to provide the political will and the 
resources to react effectively to challenges. It is hardly reasonable for states to deny UN 
funding and then blame the UN for the failures due to the lack of resources. Nor is it 
reasonable to blame the UN as an institution for the failures of the member states of the 
UNSC to provide decisive leadership. However, some criticism is justified. There is a need 
for: a higher profile within the UN system for reaction mechanisms to ethnic conflict, better 
coordination of the different actors (the UN agencies, the states, NGOs as well as regional 
efforts), and an efficient and effective body dealing with minority issues and ethnic conflict. 
 
Reaction mechanisms and the lack of a human rights focus. Conflict prevention strategies are 
relatively weak within the UN. Despite the fact that the costs of preventive approaches are 
low compared to other strategies such as peacekeeping missions or coercive measures 
requiring military means, and despite major successes on the regional level, especially within 
the OSCE framework, the UN devotes relatively few means to conflict prevention. 
Preventive diplomacy and mediation/negotiation are fields that hold great potential for UN 
action. As seen above, the UN has established great expertise in this area and possesses high 
credibility. There is a need for the UN to upgrade its capacity to offer preventive diplomacy 
and “good offices”, especially within the UN Secretariat. 
Peace operations lie at the intersection of the UN’s political, security-related agenda, its 
efforts in economic, social, and cultural development, and its human rights activities. This 
gives the UN the opportunity to play a role in both fields and to draw from knowledge that 
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originate from different backgrounds.577 The risk is however, that these operations are too 
large in their scope. To combine all these activities, peace operations cannot clearly be 
assigned to one UN department and need to have inputs from various departments. This 
leads to a complication of the operation’s organization and makes the communication 
between the different bodies more difficult. As a result, deployment becomes more complex 
and reaction slow. Furthermore, UN peace operations are in many cases provided with a 
limited or vague mandate, which lead to further deadlocks in the field. Clearer coordination 
and a more focused formulation of goals, scopes, and strategy of peace operations might 
help to overcome these impasses. 
From a human rights point of view, human rights should play a more important role in 
the UN reaction mechanisms to conflict. As shown above, long lasting and stable peace can 
only be achieved if there is sufficient respect for human rights. Human rights play thus a 
major role in establishing stable and long-lasting peace, the most important goal of UN 
peace operations.  However, on the human rights side, there is a lack of field experience 
among its activists in handling ethnic conflict. Many people working at the OCHCR have 
never been on a field mission and have no practical experience.578 The same is more or less 
true for the UN treaty monitoring bodies – these are expert committees, which play an 
important role in developing international human rights law, but lack expertise in handling 
conflict situations. Given the fact that human rights and human rights violations are often at 
stake in conflicts, a rights-based approach in conflict situations should be strengthened.  
Even though a human rights approach is mainly law-based, political analysis is essential. 
Human rights reports need to deal not only with violations of human rights but also with the 
social and political context of the abuses. Reports should include political analysis and policy 
recommendations. 
 
Organizational dilemmas. The UN system is currently organized in a manner that does not 
effectively use information from its numerous human rights mechanisms to provide early 
warning to UN security and political organs. UN activities in the field of human rights are 
centered on norms and procedures that seldom reach all the relevant areas of policy making. 
                                                 
577 See also EVANS, Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict, 13. 
578 See the statements in HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, 1-85. 
 
Ethnic Conflict Resolution within the International Legal System
 
 
 163
For instance, the political bodies of the UN do not include the concluding observations of 
the treaty bodies in their actions. Even the Secretary General remarked that “the benefit of 
the current system [of human rights treaty bodies] is not always clear.”579 Furthermore, the 
concluding observations of the treaty bodies are not regularly submitted to the political 
bodies nor are the meetings observed by representatives from New York. Most of the time, 
even the OHCHR does not attend the meetings of the HCR.580 Moreover, there is a 
geographical gap: the information gathered by the various UN human rights bodies in 
Geneva is not brought together in a focused way or transferred to the executive bodies 
based in New York.581 
The problem is not only the coordination of information, but also the distribution of 
competencies among UN bodies and the quality of human rights reports. If reports are to 
play a greater role in decision-making within the UN in general, the conclusions and 
recommendations in reports must pay more attention to the political and social context of 
human rights violations.582 
To overcome the information and coordination gaps, the UN formed the 
Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination Team, which includes members from 
different UN departments and agencies.583 However, this team only operates at the lower 
level and hardly addresses coordination issues between the leadership and management level 
of UN bodies. To improve coordination and the effectiveness of the UN human rights and 
conflict resolution mechanisms, there needs to be coordination on the highest level to 
develop the best strategies for successful dealing with ethnic conflict and human rights 
issues.  
 
No specific UN body is dealing with ethnic conflict and minority issues. Existing UN bodies and 
mandates have not yet appropriately covered important challenges facing ethnic groups and 
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minorities. Most international regimes dealing with minority protection are part of non-
minority-specific regional and international instruments and mechanisms, including the 
quasi-judicial UN human rights treaty-monitoring bodies. While several human rights 
mechanisms indirectly cover issues of minority concern, there is no mechanism established 
that is dedicated to addressing violations of the rights of persons belonging to minorities and 
handling individual or group communication. No UN body’s tasks includes following up on 
minority issues in a specialized and systematic way through fact finding missions and 
contacts with governments and society. This leaves the UN with a limited capacity to 
effectively assist in preventing ethnic or minority-related conflicts.584 
The annual sessions of the Working Group on Minorities (WGM) are not the right 
forum to promote dialogue between minorities and governments and effectively address 
ethnic disputes. The weak mandate and resources of the WGM does not allow for the 
committee to issue recommendations, pursue investigations, or visit countries. Visits by the 
WGM were limited to cases where governments invited the Working Group to review 
examples of good practice. Furthermore, while minority representatives are allowed to take 
part in the sessions, insufficient participation by governments in the WGM does not allow 
for the WGM to take an active role as a mediator in ethnic conflicts. Active mediating roles 
as well as visits to countries with unresolved issues or the potential for conflict are equally 
necessary. This could be achieved by the expansion of the mandate of the WGM, the 
creation of a pro-active unit within the OHCHR, or the appointment of a special 
rapporteur/representative.585 At its seventh session in 2001, the WGM called for a Special 
Representative on Minorities at UN headquarters to assist in identifying situations that could 
lead to conflict and to provide the necessary assistance to states.586 This request is strongly 
supported by the NGO Minority Rights Group International.587 
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The major problem of UN approaches is that they are based on the presumption that 
“one size fits all”.588 As seen in Chapter 1 of this study, ethnic conflict can have several 
causes and vary in character. Consequently, approaches to solving ethnic conflicts need to be 
multidimensional and context-specific. Generalized approaches are problematic because 
each case reveals different levels of conflict intensity, duration, and actors involved. 
Implementation of a peace agreement requires addressing grievances, fears, and confidence-
building.  
Involvement by the international community whether before, during, or after the 
conflict, and by coercive, non-coercive, or mediatory means, can substantially contribute to 
the resolution of an ethnic conflict. However, the underlying causes and strategic dilemmas 
that produced the conflict in the first place might not be resolved. The UN thus failed so far 
to develop a realistic, effective, and meaningful plan or strategy to address human rights 
abuses in conflict situations.589  
 
                                                 
588 HANNUM, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, 21/22. 
589 See also KENNETH L. CAIN. “The Rape of Dinah: Human Rights, Civil War in Liberia, and Evil 
Triumphant.” Human Rights Quarterly 21/2 (1999): 265-307. 294. 
 
  
5. Toward Dealing Effectively with Ethnic Conflict 
through International Legal Instruments and 
Institutions 
 
As seen in the previous chapters, international law and international institutions adopt a 
variety of measures and instruments to address ethnic conflict. Human rights law and 
organizations, especially those dealing with the right of peoples to self-determination and 
minority rights, play a particularly significant role in addressing ethnic issues.  
The UN pursues a comprehensive approach combining a variety of human rights and 
conflict resolution strategies. However, as seen in the preceding chapter, the UN system of 
addressing ethnic conflict has several weaknesses that has led to massive failures and 
damaged its credibility. For a long time, human rights issues and violations have not been on 
the agenda of the top level UN institutions, with the exemption of the ECOSOC and the 
specific human rights bodies. In the past 10 years, however, there have been some signs of 
change. UNSG KOFI ANNAN strongly promoted human rights throughout the UN, which 
raised the awareness of the importance of human rights protection and its connection with 
conflict resolution and peace implementation. In its Resolution 1366 (2001), the UNSC 
invited the UNSG:  
to refer to the Council information and analyses from within the United Nations system on 
cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and 
human rights law and on potential conflict situations arising, inter alia, from ethnic, religious 
and territorial disputes, poverty and lack of development and expresses its determination to 
give serious consideration to such information and analyses regarding situations which it 
deems to represent a threat to international peace and security.590 
 
 
The UN has to react promptly to conflict situations to avoid the loss of its credibility. In 
the first place, human suffering and violence have to be terminated by mediation and 
negotiations as well as non-coercive and coercive measures. In post-conflict situations, it is 
crucial that the international community is keeping control over political, security, and legal 
matters until an agreement between the parties can be reached that ensures the prospects of 
durable and stable peace. The absence of adequate law enforcement and the failure to 
                                                 
590 UNSC Resolution 1366 (2001), UN Doc. S/RES/1366 of 30 August 2001. 
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remove criminal offenders, who use the situation of societal unrest to their advantage, can 
affect both the authority of the mission as well as the local population’s willingness to 
respect the rule of law. In the worst case, this might lead to the formation of self-proclaimed 
“security forces” that take over law enforcement, often applying discriminatory and human 
rights violating rules, which threaten the safety of the local population and the international 
staff as well as the outcome of the mission as a whole.591 As a consequence, the UN must 
improve its ability to establish the necessary legal institutions and political capacity to control 
the situation, such as ad hoc judicial measures and an interim administration facilitating the 
transformation to a system based on democratic principles and the rule of law. The inclusion 
of both international and local personnel in capacity building is crucial; only through a 
combination of both levels can compliance with human and minority rights be secured and 
implemented. Once sufficient security is established, the UN should focus on sustainable 
rather than temporary solutions in the process of reconstruction of civil and political 
institutions. 
The fact that there is a need for improvement is not new. Several concepts and ideas 
exist on how the protection of minorities and intervention in conflicts could be streamlined 
and made more effective. These needs and ideas fall two broad categories: legal measures 
and political measures. The following paragraphs will give an overview of potential 
improvements, recommendations, and policy. 
 
5.1 Legal Measures 
As long as minority rights are a matter of international law, the relevant legal issues 
could and should be addressed as much as possible through judicial or quasi-judicial means. 
Judicial approaches facilitate a clearer and more nuanced understanding of the implication of 
minority rights norms. These are important means to strengthen the rule of law, address 
limited grievances and claims, make guarantees operative, and seek consistency of the 
respective regime of rights and duties. Independent expert committees such as the HRC or 
the CERD review the compliance with the relevant treaty. Their jurisprudence is an 
                                                 
591 See HANSJOERG STROHMEYER. “Policing the Peace: Post-Conflict Judicial System Reconstruction in East 
Timor.” University of New South Wales Law Journal 24/1 (2001): 171-182. 
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important source for clarification of concepts and the content of the rights concerned. The 
determination of whether the adequate and appropriate opportunities are provided to 
minorities, e.g., to receive education in their native language or to practice their own religion, 
should be made by judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. Notions such as “legitimate aim”, 
“reasonable and objective justification”, “proportionality”, and so forth, are elaborated upon 
to a large extent by human rights courts or quasi-judicial bodies such as the HRC.592 
A judicial body would need empowerment to apply minority rights provisions, not 
only involving states, but also private parties. The trend of individual criminal 
responsibility in international law may eventually lead towards expanding the judicial 
approach to human rights and humanitarian law in general.593 An alternative to a fully 
judicial supervision of the implementation of minority rights would be the advisory role 
of judicial bodies or quasi-judicial control. A system of judicial and/or quasi-judicial 
supervision would favor consistency in approaching minority issues, which current 
instruments and institutions with weak or ad hoc enforcement procedures and case-by-
case approaches can hardly satisfy. 
The experience of the HRC interpreting Article 27 of the ICCPR shows that 
justiciability is dependent on the context of each case. Rights cannot be determined without 
context – and it is precisely the context that gives Article 27 rights their substance, form, and 
influence. This is crucial; judicial investigation, fact finding, and analysis are needed to 
determine the context and scope of the rights of ethnic groups. As long as judicial scrutiny is 
absent on the international level, one can hardly expect domestic bodies to investigate and 
enforce.594  
 
The achievements of the UN human rights treaty bodies have been considerable, 
despite the fact that their decisions lack legally binding powers or may lead to restrictive 
measures against non-cooperative governments. However, there is room for improvement.595 
First, the reporting system should be reevaluated to determine if it meets the needs for 
                                                 
592 PENTASSUGLIA, Minorities in International Law, 207/208. 
593 See for example LAURENCE R. HELFER and ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER. “Towards a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication.” Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 282-391. 
594 PENTASSUGLIA, Minorities in International Law, 207. 
595 See more detailed Ibid., 211-213. 
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dealing with minority issues. The current procedure is very complicated, bureaucratic, and 
difficult to access for representatives of minorities.  
Second, the human rights treaty bodies should rely more on information delivered 
directly by the minorities concerned and by NGOs working in the field, in order to counter 
inadequate state reports. A new pattern of investigation and information processing based 
on the systematic availability and consideration of non-state sources would help to overcome 
gaps in information and inconsistencies. No NGO participation is currently allowed in UN 
human rights treaty bodies dealing with minority issues.596 Closely cooperating with other 
actors in the international human rights forum, expert bodies should be able to assess human 
and minority rights compliance of member states on the basis of state and non-state sources 
of information. The establishment of a database and the use of modern communication 
could help to overcome impasses and enhance information flows. 
Third, regarding the optional individual complaints procedures (e.g., before the HRC 
and CERD), it is important to inform minority members of their existence, of the criteria of 
admissibility, and of the use for minority members after the domestic remedies have been 
exhausted. Due to discrimination and violations of their rights, persons belonging to 
minorities lack education and access to resources to bring their case before an international 
body. Specific engagement by the UN and by NGOs to overcome this issue may help 
minorities to gain access to international institutions.  
Fourth, the case law of the HRC is of great importance regarding the clarification and 
development of human rights and minority rights law. However, it has proven to be limited 
as a lot of cases regarding minorities are concerned with the rights of indigenous peoples 
who constitute a special case within minorities. Consequently, important areas such as 
linguistic and religious rights as well as education remain unexplored and await further 
clarification. 
Fifth, the UN Working Group on Minorities should actively contribute and 
communicate with the treaty bodies, providing them with advice and expertise. It can foster 
stronger awareness of minority issues or should be able to report violations directly to the 
committees.  
                                                 
596 Exemptions are the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child. 
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As long-term strategies for enhanced respect of human rights based on dialogue, 
investigation, and jurisprudence evolve, the treaty bodies play an important role in 
developing guidance on how to handle minority rights in an international legal context. If 
communities rely on solely political mediators, they risk inconsistent application of 
international rules. In this context, judicial institutions such as courts or the quasi-judicial 
UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies, offer advantages.597 But as instruments for 
responses to severe human rights violations and ethnic conflict, the treaty bodies are less 
suitable in their present form. If a choice has to be made, monitoring the ongoing status of 
human rights should be favored over accounting for past abuses. The UN human rights 
treaty bodies have to be seconded by efforts of other human rights agencies such as the 
OHCHR in order to secure proper implementation of human rights provisions in the 
aftermath of conflicts. Monitoring of human rights in post-conflict situations is usually 
relatively short-term, because in most cases it is built into a peace agreement or part of a 
peace keeping mission. UN activities to improve the human rights situation and political 
stability in conflict affected countries become more effective with careful monitoring and 
capacity building. However, this is difficult to achieve in some cases because governments 
prefer technical assistance and advice and resent monitoring and critique. Human rights 
monitoring is designed to strengthen confidence in the peace process and the achievement 
of justice for the victims. In the words of the UNSG, “United Nations human rights 
activities must inspire public trust. Promotional activities without adequate and effective 
protection will not win that trust.”598 
 
Establishing a rule of law-based, post-conflict society requires a governing structure that 
enjoys both legitimacy and authority. The structure has to be based on a solid legal basis, 
taking into account international legal standards and the principles of good governance.599 
The failure to establish a responsive and efficient judicial system as part of a transitional 
                                                 
597 RATNER, Does International Law Matter, 698. 
598 Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UN Doc. A/58/1 (2003), paragraph 177. 
599 See CHRISTIAN AHLUND. “Major Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in a Post-Conflict Environment.” 
New England Law Review 39/39 (2004/2005): 39-44.  
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administration can erode local support for the peace process as a whole.600 Building and 
rebuilding faith in the rule of law after a violent conflict requires both a mental as well as a 
political transformation.  
The training of personnel, human rights education, and the establishment of an 
independent judiciary should be among the first goals of a UN mission. Swift efforts to 
reestablish respect for law can contribute to the reconciliation process. Failures to prioritize 
law enforcement can undermine the credibility of the whole mission.601 PADDY ASHDOWN, 
UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina until January 2006, writes about the 
experiences: “In hindsight, we should have put the establishment of the rule of law first, for 
everything else depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair political system, the 
development of civil society, public confidence in police and the courts.”602 The Brahimi 
Report recommended “a doctrinal shift in the use of … rule of law elements and human 
rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening 
rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict 
environments.”603 
 
Judiciary functions in post-conflict situations are often entrusted to international 
military personnel on a temporary basis. This is not an ideal solution as independence cannot 
be guaranteed and the military personnel often lack the necessary expertise for the task. The 
creation of a network of “stand-by” jurists that could be deployed in conflict areas on short 
notice would help to overcome this impasse. Furthermore, it would facilitate the creation of 
a local judicial system as the international jurists could provide the locals with the necessary 
training to develop the capacity to run the judiciary system themselves.  
Better results might also be achieved by working more closely with national institutions 
and representatives of minorities. The establishment of links between domestic and 
                                                 
600 See the findings of the study by WENDY S. BETTS, SCOTT N. CARLSON, and GREGORY GISVOLD. “The 
Post-Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the Lessons-learned in the Efforts to Establish a 
Judiciary and Rule of Law.” Michigan Journal of International Law 22 (2000/2001): 371-389. 
601 See SIMON CHESTERMAN. “Rough Justice: Establishing the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Territories.” Ohio 
State Journal of Dispute Resolution 21/1 (2005): 69-98. 96/97. CHESTRMAN reviews the establishment of the rule 
of law in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and East Timor and concludes that the failure to recognize the importance 
of judicial consistency led to missed opportunities and the loss of credibility of the international community. 
602 PADDY ASHDOWN. “What I Learned in Bosnia.” New York Times, 28 October 2002, A25. 
603 Brahimi Report, paragraph 47 (b).  
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international institutions could create a new international architecture in which the primary 
actors are domestic institutions of states – courts, legislatures, executive branches, 
administrative agencies – that interact quasi-autonomously with one another and with their 
international counterparts.604  
 
Judicial approaches are however, relatively ineffective in handling claims that are 
connected with deep-rooted ethnic conflict and social and political problems. The case-by-
case approach taken by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies dealing with minority rights is not 
enough to introduce the policy change necessary to solve ethnic conflicts and to respond to 
the problems that go with violence.605 The UN human rights bodies must overcome the 
political selectivity; they must create enforcement mechanisms and compliance with their 
decisions; and they must broaden their agenda to effectively address problems of minorities 
and those affected by ethnic conflict, which requires them to work closely with emergency 
powers for quick and effective responses of gross human rights violations.606 Many human 
rights questions include controversial aspects and are subject to policy considerations. 
Furthermore, there is a need for complementary approaches that provide appropriate means 
for addressing human rights issues and ethnic conflict in multiple situations. 
 
 
5.2 Political Measures  
Minority rights and, obviously, ethnic conflict are highly political issues that cannot be 
solved by legal measures alone. A review of the work by the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights observed:  
[M]inority rights often involve highly political issues: the degree of autonomy which a 
territorially concentrated minority may seek; the degree of funding for minority schools, 
cultural events, etc.; or the decision to which languages will form the official languages of the 
state. None of these issues are susceptible to judicial resolution, even by reference to standards 
                                                 
604 Like the relationships between the domestic and the community institutions in the EU. See also 
SLAUGHTER, Pushing the Limits of Liberal Peace, 137-139.  
605 See PENTASSUGLIA, Minorities in International Law, 208. 
606 See ROBERTA COHEN. “Human Rights and Humanitarian Emergencies: New Roles for UN Human Rights 
Bodies.” Refugee Policy Group, Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Refugee issues, September 
1992.4.  
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established by minority instruments. Indeed, there is emerging evidence that non-judicial 
bodies, capable of engaging in an ongoing dialogue as to the meaning of minority and peoples’ 
rights, and their application in particular circumstances, are better placed to resolve minority 
issues than formal adjudication bodies.607 
 
As such, it is important that minority issues are not only addressed by judicial and quasi-
judicial institutions, but also by the political UN bodies. The UN must strengthen its human 
rights decision-making capacity, particularly its ability for credible fact-finding, political 
analysis, and the development of authoritative interpretations of the content, scope, and 
meaning of human rights norms. There needs to be proactive engagement if the UN’s 
limitations regarding human rights, especially in the context of conflict, is to be overcome. 
The office of the Secretary-General has a unique and important role to play in preventing 
and responding to human rights violations in ethnic conflicts. It would be desirable to 
involve the WGM, the OHCHR, and the UN treaty monitoring bodies in regular 
consultations with the office of the UNSG. A more proactive advisory role of human rights 
institutions in ethnic conflict resolution may lead to further initiatives of the UNGA, the 
member states, regional organizations, and NGOs. 
There is scope for both human rights diplomacy and human rights advocacy. Proactive 
engagement is inherent to the idea of the promotion of human rights. However, it has to be 
pursued carefully with due respect for sovereignty of states and with regard to the special 
needs of the actors involved. While there can be advancement and unification on the 
normative and interpretative level, human rights based missions have to be based on a case-
by-case approach.  
 
There is a need for a strategic mobilization and coordination of institutions and 
interaction on the international level in order to effectively address ethnic conflict. A flexible, 
team-based, and non-hierarchical strategy608 would have to address four elements: first, it is 
important that international intervention in ethnic conflict needs to reach the actual conflict 
and its actors; second, operational control of relief efforts should be taken over by actors in 
                                                 
607 See RACHEL MURRAY and STEVEN WHEATLEY. “Groups and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly 25/1 (2003): 213-236. 236. 
608 See also ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES and ABRAM CHAYES. “Mobilizing International and Regional 
Organizations for Managing Ethnic Conflict.” In International Law and Ethnic Conflict, ed. David Wippman, 
178-210. Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 1998. 209/210. 
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the field in order to avoid misunderstandings and weak policy analyses; third, the goals of the 
intervention, if military or non-military, should be realistic; and fourth, the method used 
should focus on inclusion, political accountability, and credibility of international actors 
involved.  
Several ideas exist on how these aims could be achieved. Fact-finding missions, the 
opportunity of a complaint mechanism for minority rights violations, and research for a 
better understanding of the root causes of minority problems in order to better address them 
were among the ideas presented in the 2004 session of the Commission on Human Rights 
and its Sub-Commission.609 Other departments, especially the UNSG, have developed 
thoughts on how the current problems could be overcome and how the UN system of 
conflict resolution and human rights protection could be strengthened. Three proposals will 
be looked at more closely: (1) the possibility of making UN interventions and peace 
operations more effective through the establishment of a standing force, (2) the creation of a 
special position within the UN that is concerned with minority issues and ethnic conflict 
resolution, and (3) the opportunity to set positive incentives for states to comply with human 
and minority rights. 
 
5.2.1 The Establishment of a UN Force 
Three measures can help the UN increase the probability for successful peace 
operations. First, a thorough diagnosis of life-threatening conditions and consequences 
before the deployment of UN troops and frequent assessments of progress can help the UN 
to get a better understanding of the needs in conflict situations. Second, rapid deployment of 
integrated, multilateral forces combining civil and military elements can bring useful skills. 
These include nation-building, cultural knowledge, mediation abilities, and resource and 
logistics support not only for the basic needs (relief efforts) and infrastructure repairs 
(reconstruction), but also of societal wounds (rehabilitation). And third, intensive 
                                                 
609 See the OHCHR Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Specific Groups and Individuals: 
Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/75 (2004). 
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engagement at the international, national, and local levels can help ensure that the conflict 
does not reemerge and that injustices and corruption are contained.610 
Some UN peace operations fulfill these conditions and can be considered as successes 
of UN intervention. These successes show that it is possible for the international community 
to do something about ethnic conflicts, even though their efforts do not always succeed. The 
Australian-led UN intervention in East Timor in 1999 to stop the fighting between pro- and 
anti-Indonesian forces after the East Timorese vote for independence is among the most 
successful engagements of the UN in ethnic conflicts. Similarly, the UN-authorized Regional 
Assistance Mission under the leadership of Australia has been successful in establishing 
peace and stability in the Solomon Islands in 2003. The UN Mission in Cyprus may have 
failed to prevent the partition of the island in 1974, but it was able to maintain relative peace 
and security. In the aftermath of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the international 
community under the lead of the OSCE and the EU invested many resources and efforts in 
the reconstruction and prevented a significant escalation of the ethnic conflict in Macedonia. 
The UN Office in Burundi that was established in 1993 after a coup d’état probably 
prevented a genocide of a similar scale to the one in Rwanda.611  
However, one should not forget that with the exception of Burundi, most of these 
conflicts took part in places that were geographically, politically, or economically significant 
for the Western community. Given the fact that most ethnic conflicts today take part in 
developing countries, it is important to establish a reaction mechanism that is not dependent 
on the strategic interest of power states.  
With the increase of UN peace operations and the growing complexity of these 
operations, there have been several instances in which the lack of a rapid deployment 
capability has had tragic consequences and led to great problems in the field.612 The analysis 
of the failures of the UN to react to ethnic conflict, human rights violations, and even 
genocide in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfour, suggests that the UN needs intervention forces 
                                                 
610 See WILLIAM B. WOOD. “Post-Conflict Intervention Revisited: Relief, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and 
Reform.” Fletcher Forum of World Affaris 29/1 (Winter 2005): 119-132. 130/131. 
611 See http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/humrep97/glregion.html. 
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that can deploy more quickly to be able to save more lives.613 Article 43 of the UN Charter is 
the legal mechanism by which the UN could have created an on-call military force after 
World War Two.614 This aim seems politically unachievable in the near future.  
However, there are some other possibilities to create rapid deployment measures and/or 
standing forces. In the short run, governments should strengthen their standby capabilities 
of national forces for multinational peace operations. The United Nations Stand-by 
Arrangements System (UNSAS) is based on conditional commitments by member states for 
specified resources within the agreed response times for UN peacekeeping operations. These 
resources can be military formations, specialized personnel (civilian and military), as well as 
material and equipment. The resources agreed-upon remain on “stand-by” in their home 
country, where necessary preparation, including training, is conducted to prepare them to 
fulfill specified tasks or functions in accordance with United Nations guidelines. Stand-by 
resources are used exclusively for peacekeeping operations mandated by the UNSC.615 On a 
logistical level, rapid deployment can be achieved by having lighter forces with less heavy, 
highly technological weapons that require fewer cargo flights and preparations. The 
downside of this approach is that shedding protective weaponry and armor would increase 
the casualty among interveners – a trade-off that cannot be taken easily and would lead to a 
decreasing willingness of states to participate in UN missions. An alternative is to pre-
position troops and heavy weaponry in areas that are prone to ethnic conflict and where they 
are likely to be needed – today especially in Africa and Southeast Asia. Interventions could 
be launched from these bases, thereby serving as rapid reaction forces. One obstacle is 
however, that African and Southeast Asian countries might oppose the establishment of UN 
military bases as a form of neo-colonialism. Another daunting obstacle is the unwillingness 
                                                 
613 See the Report of the Independent Inquiry, 39-41 and 55-57. 
614 Article 43 of the UN Charter reads:  
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace 
and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a 
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, 
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.  
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness 
and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.  
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security 
Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security 
Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance 
with their respective constitutional processes.  
615 On the UNSAS, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas_files/sba.htm. 
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of states to dedicate resources and troops for those purposes that might not match with their 
national interests.616 
The deployment of regional troops to assist in humanitarian emergency situations is 
another idea. This option has worked well in the European context, especially within the 
framework of the OSCE. The U.S. launched a similar project in the mid-1990s to train 
African forces for humanitarian intervention.617 The idea behind it was to overcome the 
deadlock caused by the lack of political will by the West, as African states might be more 
willing to intervene in conflicts on their own continent. However, there are several 
shortcomings. First, the training focused on peacekeeping in post-conflict situations and did 
not include peace enforcement training or other skills needed to intervene in humanitarian 
emergencies.618 Second, the initiative did not provide for heavy weaponry at African bases, 
which would have to be brought in ad hoc in case of a crisis. Third, the training focused on 
national units and did not include the preparation for multinational coalition operations that 
would be needed in case of large scale interventions.619 
More ambitious advocates of UN rapid deployment actions suggest more global and 
permanent measures. Former Under Secretary-General and “founding father” of UN peace 
keeping operations BRIAN URQUHART, for example, suggests a small, elite, permanent UN 
force composed of volunteers with the task of rapid reaction to pave the way for the larger 
operation, for which the troops will be contributed by the member states.620 
The Brahimi Report proposes “rapid and effective deployment capacity” with the goal 
of fully deploying traditional peace keeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a 
UNSC resolution establishing such an operation, and within 90 days in the case of complex 
peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report recommended further that the UNSAS should 
be improved and several coherent, multinational, brigade-size forces and the necessary 
                                                 
616 See KUPERMAN, Humanitarian Hazard. 
617 Africa Crisis Response Initiative, founded in 1996, was transformed into the African Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance in 2004. The program’s goal is to increase the capabilities of these 
militaries in areas such as human rights, interaction with civil society, international law, military staff skills, 
and small unit operations. The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program has a 
growing record of supporting African militaries that have afterwards participated in peacekeeping or peace 
support activities throughout the continent. This program is funded by the Department of State 
peacekeeping operations account.  
618 See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/acri.htm.  
619 KUPERMAN, Humanitarian Hazard. 
620 BRIAN URQUHART. “Whose Fight Is It?” New York Times, 22 May 1994, A14. 
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enabling forces be created by the UN member states. To support such rapid and effective 
deployment, a revolving “on-call list” of about 100 experienced, well qualified military 
officers, carefully vetted and accepted by UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) should be created within UNSAS. Parallel on-call lists of civilian police, 
international judicial experts, penal experts, and human rights specialists should be available 
in sufficient numbers to strengthen the rule of law institutions as needed, and should also be 
part of UNSAS. Pre-trained teams could then be drawn from this list to precede the main 
body of civilian police and related specialists into a new mission area, facilitating the rapid 
and effective deployment of the law and order component into the mission. Member states 
should establish enhanced national “pools” of police officers and related experts, earmarked 
for deployment to United Nations peace operations, to help meet the high demand for 
civilian police and related criminal justice/rule of law expertise in peace operations dealing 
with intra-State conflict. Regional partnerships and programs should be set up for the 
purpose of training members of the respective national pools in the United Nations civilian 
police doctrine and standards. Regarding the financial resources, the Brahimi Report 
recommended the responsibilities for peacekeeping budgeting and procurement be moved 
out of the Department of Management and placed in DPKO. The amount of US$ 50 million 
should be provided to ensure that the rapid deployment can be properly financed.621 
Regarding human and minority rights violations, human rights field operations within 
the UN peace mission should be strengthened. UN human rights field operations serve 
several different purposes.622 First, even a small number of foreign observers have a 
decreasing effect on human rights violations. Second, the direct knowledge of conditions on 
the ground has proved helpful in clarifying the needs of the population, the nature of the 
abuses, and the underlying causes of conflict. This knowledge can be used in further 
processes such as trials of perpetrators before domestic and international courts. Third, 
verification of abuses and monitoring of a post-conflict situation by international personnel 
can influence the peace process in a positive way, as it happened in El Salvador or 
Guatemala. Fourth, UN human rights field operations can engage in the training of the 
police and members of the justice system. Fifth, UN field operations are able to facilitate the 
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return of refugees and internally displaced persons by providing information, food and 
shelter, as well as mediation between the refugees and the population remaining in the 
territory (usually of the same ethnic group as the perpetrators). Finally, UN field missions 
can serve as communication points for local and international NGOs and civil society in 
general that are concerned with institution-building and developing a human rights culture. 
 
The UN faces a severe dilemma: it should play the role of the police force and “relief-
and-rescue service”623 for the world, but it is not able to take on this role for two reasons. 
First, the UN was not designed as a “relief-and-rescue service”. The UN was created in the 
spirit after the Second World War “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” 
and “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to 
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties 
and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress 
and better standards of life in larger freedom.”624 In order to be able to respond to current 
challenges such as genocide, ethnic conflicts, and other human rights issues, the UN has to 
reform itself significantly. First steps have already been taken; the establishment of the 
Human Rights Council replacing the Commission on Human Rights, the High Level Panel 
Report, and the continuing UNSC involvement in ethnic conflict issues point to a slow and 
small, but steady development of the UN towards its new role. 
The second reason that the UN cannot take on the role of delivering relief in ethnic 
conflicts and rescuing suppressed minorities, is the fact that member states lack the will to 
contribute to peace operations. The dramatic expansion of the number of peacekeeping 
troops needed, in combination with a severe financial crisis in the early 1990s, led to a 
diminishing enthusiasm by the member states for UN peace efforts.  
 
                                                 
623 See URQUHART, Whose Fight Is It.  
624 Preamble of the UN Charter. 
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5.2.2 A Special Body for Minorities 
A second idea is the creation of a special position for minorities, namely the 
appointment Special Rapporteur (SR), reporting to the sub-commission, a Special 
Representative of the UNSG (SRSG), reporting directly to the UNSC, or a Special Advisor 
(SA) on minorities to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. This person and 
affiliated staff would have the task of facilitating the information exchange and coordination 
between the UN human rights programs and the UN political organs, agencies and NGOs. 
The institutional affiliation depends on the mandate of the position and internal UN 
considerations. An SRSG and SA can offer good offices and engage in preventive 
diplomacy, whereas the role of an SR is usually to conduct studies and gather information 
about a certain topic and report his or her findings to the commission. From a perspective of 
minority protection, the appointment of an SRSG would be the most favorable decision. An 
SRSG would not only be able to offer good offices, but would also report directly to the 
UNSC and thus could exercise the most influence, because ultimately, it is the UNSC that 
holds the real power for effective measures against ethnic conflict and gross human rights 
violations. In the following paragraphs, I will use the abbreviation SRM to refer to all three 
possible positions as they all are built upon the same premises and would have similar goals. 
Furthermore, as the following paragraphs are speculation and recommendations, I will start 
from the best possible outcome from a point of view of minority protection, namely a 
position whose mandate includes the possibility of offering “good offices”.  
An SRM could coordinate information about situations involving minorities at risk and 
could thus overcome the problem that UN human rights bodies are not designed to provide 
early warning and information on violations to the UN security and political bodies. 
Furthermore, the appointment of an SRM could provide the UN with a body concerned 
with minorities and ethnic conflict. As mentioned before, the only other minority specific 
body, the Working Group on Minorities, has a very weak and specific mandate that is not 
designed to deal with ethnic conflict or minority rights violations. An SRM could second the 
efforts of the WGM, while concurrently engaged in fact finding, diplomatic “good offices”, 
and negotiations in ethnic conflicts, thus taking a proactive role in solving minority issues.  
The role and mandate of an SRM could be shaped along the lines of the UN Special 
Advisor to the Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide. The position was 
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suggested in early 2004 and established in July 2004.625 The mandate focuses on prevention 
in relation to “genocide or related crimes”. Consequently, the Special Advisor can become 
involved in situations preceding genocide, including situations that involve the risk of ethnic 
cleansing and gross violations of human rights. This is significant when considering the 
reluctance of states and international bodies in using the term “genocide” to describe a 
situation involving ethnically motivated mass killings. The mandate specifically excludes that 
the Special Advisor determines if a situation constitutes genocide within the meaning of the 
Genocide Convention. The function of the Special Advisor is not to prosecute, judge or 
punish, but to focus on concrete conditions and issues to enable the UN to act in a timely 
fashion.626 
The Special Advisor has to develop a sensitive but determined approach. The mandate 
states that “[t]he methodology employed would entail a careful verification of facts and 
serious political analyses and consultation, without excessive publicity.”627 This shows a shift 
in the UN policy away from the human rights based “naming and shaming” approach 
towards a more direct intervention. The verification of facts within the mandate includes the 
possibility for the Special Advisor to conduct fact finding missions, and the consultation 
could take the form of negotiations and quiet diplomacy. These tasks require the Special 
Advisor to be independent, impartial, consistent, and a person of integrity, with the aim of 
building trust among states, minorities, and within the UN human rights system alike.  
However, financial shortage and the lack of political commitment by the member states 
once again made the establishment of the position difficult. As a result, the current Special 
Advisor holds a part-time position (40%) and his office has two staff members (one DPA, 
one OHCHR). The discrepancy between resources allocated and tasks at stake is obvious.628 
The main purpose of appointing an SRM is to support the largely reactive function the 
UN system regarding human rights and ethnic conflict by a pro-active, action-oriented 
                                                 
625 Outline for the mandate of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, UN Doc. S/2004/567. The 
first Special Advisor is the Argentinean human rights lawyer and former political prisoner Juan E. Mendez. 
The position was originally designed for a Special Representative, reporting directly to the UNSC. Due to 
internal concerns in the DPA and the OHCHR, the ultimate appointment was the somewhat lower status of 
a Special Advisor who is reporting to the UNSG, and through the UNSG to the UNSC. 
626 Ibid. 
627 Ibid.  
628 See more detailed ERIK FRIBERG. “Genocide Prevention: The Potential of the Special Advisor to the 
Secretary-General.” Human Rights Tribune des droits humains 11/2 (April 2005): 1-10. 3. 
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position. In order to achieve this, the SRM needs to be equipped with appropriate human 
and financial resources. NGOs, which often have a broad knowledge of certain issues, can 
contribute by offering independent analysis on matters that might help the SRM to gather 
information. Individual experts may provide advice. 
An SRM could address all the questions of violations that the WGM is unable to. This 
can include the reception of communications by individual or groups reporting violations of 
their rights, investigations and fact-finding, country visits, requests for clarification by the 
government, and the recommendation of measures. An SRM could additionally offer good 
offices and take a preventive diplomacy role. As the SRM would be based in New York 
rather than Geneva, he/she could connect the human rights bodies (Geneva) with the 
conflict resolution bodies (New York) and thus facilitate coordination between human rights 
bodies, the UNSG, the UNSC, and the DPA.629 Furthermore, through the SRM, the UN 
human rights field presence could directly report to the office of the UNSG or the UNSC on 
matters that would be considered gross human rights violations and/or threats to 
international peace and security. 
The mandate of an SRM should thus include: 
• Identification of different kinds of minorities and the different needs they have; 
• Preparation of guidelines and models for dealing with specific issues and elaborating 
examples of good practice; 
• Development of flexible procedures to encourage direct discussions and round table 
negotiations (human rights diplomacy); 
• Encouragement for the creation of new regional and sub-regional bodies to develop 
these procedures on a more general basis.  
 
For the SRM to be effective, several factors have to be considered.630 First and most 
obviously, the UN has to play a significant role in the peace process. Second, the SRM has to 
be well supported by the UN headquarters and by the UNSG in particular. This support is 
crucial not only for the SRM’s position within the wider international community, but also 
                                                 
629 See also Possible New United Nations Mechanisms for the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Minorities. 
630 See JONES, Challenges of Strategic Coordination, 96/97. 
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for its function as a coordinator of multiple UN departments and agencies with the efforts 
of NGOs and local and regional actors. Third, the timing of intervention by the SRM in the 
conflict is crucial for success. If an SRM intervenes after the beginning of the negotiation 
process, his/her ability to influence and shape the process itself as well as the outcome can 
be limited. Finally, the ability of the SRM to ensure effective coordination is also a function 
of the degree to which coordination is part of its mandate. The SRM’s mandate should stress 
the importance of coordination. 
 
Another possibility is the establishment of a commission dealing with peacebuilding and 
post-conflict reconstruction. The UNSC and UNGA decided to establish a Peacebuilding 
Commission in the aftermath of the World Summit in September 2005.631 The main 
purposes of such a commission would be to bring together all relevant actors, to advise on 
strategies for post-conflict peace building and recovery, to provide recommendations for 
coordination of all actors involved, and to develop best practices.632 The commission is 
supposed to have a standing organizational committee responsible for developing rules and 
working methods. This committee should comprise seven members of the UNSC, seven 
members of the ECOSOC, five providers of assessed contributors to UN budgets, five top 
providers of military personnel and civilian police in UN peacekeeping missions, and seven 
additional members representing all regions.633 Furthermore, the commission should also 
hold country-specific meetings in which representatives of the country under consideration, 
mediating states, UN personnel, and regional organizations should participate.  
However, there are several disadvantages that go along with the establishment of the 
Peacebuilding Commission vis-à-vis the appointment of an SRM. First, the commission is 
more bureaucratic and thus not as effective in taking over the tasks provided by its mandate. 
Second, the commission would not be able to offer good offices, a very important factor to 
strengthen the UN preventive action scheme and to overcome current shortages. Third, the 
commission would never have the same impartiality as an SRM. The fact that the 
commission consists of state representatives who stand for their home state’s national 
interest might lead to a reluctance of conflict states to cooperate with the commission. 
                                                 
631 UNGA Draft Resolution on the Peacebuilding Commission, UN Doc. A/60/L.40 (2005). 
632 Ibid., paragraph 2.  
633 Ibid., paragraph 4.  
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Fourth, many of the countries in the commission will be Western states, which might be 
interpreted as another attempt of “Western imperialism” to impose Western rule since most 
conflicts today take place in developing countries. And finally, while strengthening the UN 
conflict resolution activities, the commission would not be specifically dealing with minority 
issues and ethnic conflict. Thus, one of the major goals, namely the establishment of a 
specific position addressing the needs of ethnic groups, would not be reached. Nevertheless, 
the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission is a step in the right direction and 
underlines the importance of peacebuilding and human rights issues today.  
 
The international community must be prepared to commit all available resources, 
including a full range of political, diplomatic, and military instruments, to deal with violence 
and the settlement of conflict. Such a comprehensive list is beyond provision of any single 
state or even a group of states. One option to achieve this goal would be the establishment 
of an “international crisis management fund” into which each state commits a portion of its 
defense budget. Another option is to assign certain tasks such as fact finding, human rights 
monitoring, and good offices techniques to regional organizations and NGOs.634 This would 
also help to overcome the issue of insufficient commitment by the states. Regional actors 
often have a greater interest to end a conflict and are thus willing to contribute more 
resources to achieve this goal. 
 
5.2.3 Positive Incentives 
The more complex and difficult the conflict environment, the greater is the probability 
of failure in the conflict resolution process. The UN needs to improve its strategy of 
strategic and political analysis of the conflict situation. UN mediators need to set incentives 
for conflicting parties to implement an agreement according to international standards. One 
possibility is to implement a system based on conditionality, for example membership in an 
international organization or other benefits will only be granted if the state complies with 
international human rights standards. 
                                                 
634 See DAVID CARMENT and PATRICK JAMES. “The United Nations at 50: Managing Ethnic Crises – Past and 
Present.” Journal of Peace Research 35/1 (January 1998): 61-82. 78/79. 
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European institutions increasingly connect membership with a coherent human rights 
policy of applying states. Records show that substantial improvement has been made 
through this “conditional” approach, especially by Eastern European countries which are 
now members of the COE and the EU (or negotiating membership). New constitutional and 
legislative provisions and ad hoc mechanisms provide minorities in those countries with an 
embracing protection at the domestic level. For instance, EU action has been particularly 
influential in passing legislation which grants minority education and the use of minority 
languages, especially in Slovakia, Romania, and the countries of the former Yugoslavia.635  
However, one should not forget that this could lead to “double standards”, as not all of 
the Western European Countries have ratified the Framework Convention or investigate 
their own minority related laws. Moreover, there is no independent and permanent human 
rights monitoring body in this context, which may undermine the credibility of the 
supervision in the long run. Responsibility for action rests with political bodies and judicial 
control is limited as these bodies have no obligation to act in case of violations.636 If such a 
policy is adopted by the UN, there needs to be an independent human rights monitoring 
body. This could be assumed by the OHCHR or by the WGM, if its mandate would be 
expanded in that direction.  
The policy of positive incentives was most recently adopted by the creation of the new 
UN Human Rights Council. Membership in the Council is dependent on the human rights 
records of the state. Countries with the worst human rights records cannot run for election, 
and the campaigns of countries running highlight the contribution that these states would 
make in promoting and protecting human rights. The recent elections show that states with 
the worst human rights records have been defeated and that this policy could be 
promising.637 All Council members are required to cooperate with UN human rights 
investigators who will review the human right records of the member states. The members 
                                                 
635 See more detailed PENTASSUGLIA, Minorities in International Law, 216-218. 
636 See also GAETANO PENTASSUGLIA. “The EU and the Protection of Minorities: the Case of Eastern 
Europe.” European Journal of International Law 12 (2001): 3-38. 22/23, 27-29, and 37. 
637 The elections were held on 9 May 2006. Countries with bad human rights records could not be elected, 
including recent commission members Sudan, Zimbabwe, Libya, Syria, Vietnam, Nepal, and Egypt, and 
others of the worst violators, including North Korea, Burma, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, and Ivory 
Coast. A handful of politically powerful violators were elected, including China, Russia, and Cuba. But major 
oil producers such as Iran, which has a very poor human rights record, and Venezuela, which declared it was 
not bound by the council’s new standards, were defeated.  
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of the Council can be suspended for serious human and minority rights violations. 
Furthermore, the new council will have a greatly enhanced ability to address human rights 
violations. It will meet at least three times a year, can easily call special sessions, and is 
required to periodically review the human rights records of all UN member states, including 
the most politically powerful. The council also has the strong mandate of its creation by a 
near-unanimous vote of the UNGA on March 15, 2006. Human Rights Watch states: “The 
new members must seize this historic opportunity to shape a council that will make full use 
of these tools for the advancement of human rights and protection of victims.”638 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
At least five lessons can be learned UN involvement in human rights and ethnic conflict 
resolution. First, the creation of more judicial approaches would clarify the concepts of 
minority rights. Enhanced access for ethnic groups and the admission of other actors such as 
NGOs would contribute to the effectiveness and outreach of the UN treaty monitoring 
bodies. However, it is important to acknowledge that rights to not stand in a political 
vacuum or in isolation to other rights, and that thus they must always be considered in a 
contextual interpretation. Neither the purely judicial approach nor political considerations 
alone are enough to address human rights and minority rights issues. 
Second, greater country and situation specific knowledge could be gained by having 
more local representatives and the establishment of standing capacities for investigations, 
field support, human rights education and capacity building, and advice and assistance 
regarding transitional justice, the rule of law, and human rights.  
Third, the UN needs better coordination and information management. Coordination 
and communication between different bodies, the operating units in the field and the 
headquarters, and the human rights bodies in Geneva and the political bodies in New York 
need to be enhanced, and bureaucratic information flows need to be eased. The streamlining 
of information, political analysis, and rapid deployment measures could enhance the UN’s 
potential to react to ethnic conflict and human rights violations. A minority rights leadership 
                                                 
638 See Human Rights Watch, U.N.: New Council Must Champion Fight for Rights, 10 May 2006. 
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role for an SRM for minorities would enhance coordination between Geneva and New 
York. Closer partnership with NGOs could contribute to fact finding and information 
gathering. NGOs should be allowed to take part in the sessions of the UN treaty bodies, at 
least with advisory status. Their expertise and information could contribute significantly and 
would enhance the UN’s capability for political analysis.  
Fourth, an effective early warning and rapid reaction mechanism needs to be 
established. The question the UN should answer regarding engagement in ethnic conflict is 
not if it should get involved, but when and how such involvement should take place. One 
current problem with the UN is that it acts mostly responsively instead of preventively. If 
the position of the SRM is established, it would significantly contribute to the UN’s 
preventive and conflict resolution mechanism. Other approaches ranging from regional 
forces to a UN rapid deployment unit could ensure faster reaction to systematic gross 
human rights violations.  
And finally and most importantly, new policies should be adopted to set positive 
incentives and enhance the political will of states to contribute to UN efforts. The ultimate 
responsibility for implementation of minority rights rests with the states. At the international 
level, governments are the prime decision-makers and constitute the most powerful force to 
bring about effective measures. Their role needs to be addressed in the context of national 
interests, global interdependence, and the search for regional and international stability. This 
is the most difficult task of all and there is no easy recipe to deal with this issue.  
However, some suggestions can be made. First, human rights education, the 
strengthening of efforts within the UN system, and credible action can lead to public 
awareness which in turn can lead to pressure on states to contribute to international action. 
Good reporting, well-argued opinion, and in particular real time transmission of images of 
suffering generate both domestic and international pressure to act (“CNN effect”). 
However, this only works for “new” conflicts or conflicts in areas of strategic interest of 
major powers. Given the fact that many ethnic conflicts are going on for years and take place 
in “far away” places such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Burma, media 
attention is not very effective.  
Second, international NGOs have been significant advocates of cross-border human 
protection action, extending in some cases to military intervention. Furthermore, they have 
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significant influence and lobbying powers in Western countries. However, competition 
among different NGOs, divisions over which precise policy course is optimal, and reluctance 
to endorse coercive measures can limit NGO influence.639 
Third, positive incentives and conditional benefits can contribute to state compliance 
with international standards. The UN should reward non-violent movements rather than 
armed rebellions. As long as ethnic groups live with the belief that violence will be the means 
to achieve their goal, strategic behavior trying to attract international attention will dominate 
ethnic conflicts. 
Fourth, even small steps count. Given that the application of military force should 
remain an option of last resort, there is still a range of choices between doing nothing and 
sending in the troops. There are always options to be considered before, during, and after 
ethnic conflicts. The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty concludes: “Both policy makers and humanitarian advocates would like to see 
public policy succeed in tackling the most crucial issues of the day. One of the most pressing 
of such issues is how to make good the responsibility to protect those facing the worst sort 
of horrors the contemporary world has to provide.”640 
And finally, the development of guidelines and examples of good practice might attract 
the interest not only of other minority groups, but also of governments. Fields for discussion 
would include: (1) procedures of dialogue between minorities and governments, the role of 
international institutions facilitating the dialogue, and examples of good practice such as the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities; (2) the possibilities for constitutional or 
legislative recognition with examples of national constitutions and assessments of their 
impact; (3) rules for deciding on membership, an analysis of different methods, and the 
discussion of crucial issues like multiple identities and identity politics; (4) an analysis of 
various possible mechanisms for effective participation of representatives of minorities at the 
national level, including an analysis of different voting systems and types of autonomy; (5) 
the importance of fair participation of minorities in public bodies and in public 
administration, including systems for monitoring, for dealing with under-representation, and 
for operating quotas; (6) different approaches to education for minorities, both regarding 
                                                 
639 See also Responsibility to protect, paragraphs 8.21-8.23. 
640 Ibid., paragraph 8.23. 
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separate and integrated schooling and the regulation of the content of the curriculum; (7) the 
impact of discrimination and exclusion in employment and other social spheres; and (8) the 
impact of nationally and internationally sponsored development programs for minorities and 
especially indigenous peoples and possibilities for consultation and participation of 
minorities in these decisions.641 
 
The promotion of human rights is, of course, only one aspect of ethnic conflict 
resolution. However, it should serve as an important measure of the success of actors 
involved in ethnic conflict resolution missions and of the quality of the “peace” itself. 642 The 
extent to which human rights bodies use their authority to address humanitarian and human 
rights emergencies will ultimately determine whether they become relevant to the UN’s 
handling of these crises or whether they remain marginal players. 
Unless the UN succeeds in communicating its message on a global level and getting 
people to call upon their governments to act in accordance with the UN Charter, it will 
never be able to break away from its dependence on world politics and the interests of the 
main powers.643 
 
 
                                                 
641 See more detailed HADDEN, International and National Action, paragraph 65. 
642 See BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN. The International Law and Practice of Early-Warning and Preventive Diplomacy: The 
Emerging Global Watch. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991. 4. 
643 See BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN. “Early Warning in UN Grand Strategy.” In Early Warning and Conflict 
Resolution, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe and Michiko Kuroda, 179-198. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. 184.  
Conclusion 
“Utilizing the power of the law, to prohibit and 
punish, as well as the power of education and information, 
to enlighten and persuade.”  
Letter of CERD Chair644 
 
 
Judge LEARNED HAND said at the ceremony to swear in 150,000 new U.S. citizens in 
the Central Park in New York in 1944: “Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when 
it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court 
can even do much to help it.”645 Liberty, equality, non-discrimination, and respect of basic 
human rights should lie at the heart of every domestic and international order. Without the 
satisfaction of these basic principles, human beings will struggle for their rights, in some 
cases using violence. Minorities are in many cases in vulnerable positions as they are denied 
even basic human rights, and they do not have access to political power. As a consequences, 
ethnic groups rebel, protest, and fight each other. 
It has been the purpose of this study to show how international law and institutions can 
contribute to ethnic conflict resolution. The previous chapters showed points of contact, 
strengths, and weaknesses of international legal approaches, challenges and opportunities of 
the UN, and gave some input for potential improvements. The central task for the 
international community is to develop more responsibility toward the prevention, 
management, and resolution of deadly ethnic conflict.  
The variations in the nature, number, size, and distribution of minorities make it clear 
that there is a need for differentiated approaches to the implementation of principles of 
minority rights on the national, regional, and international level. The response to ethnic 
conflict and minority issues involves a combination of means which should distinguish 
between concentrated as opposed to dispersed minorities, small as opposed to large 
minorities, those living in rural as opposed to urban areas, and those adopting an indigenous, 
traditional lifestyle as opposed to modernized minorities. 
                                                 
644 Letter from the Chairman of CERD in response to a request for information from the UNSG in pursuance 
of CRH Resolution 1993/24, paragraph 7. 
645 LEARNED HAND. “The Spirit of Liberty.” Cited in CHESTERMAN. Rough Justice, 96.  
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Regarding an international human rights approach to ethnic conflict, four conclusions 
can be drawn.  
 
Recognition and promotion of minority rights and elimination of human rights abuses. The first and 
most basic principle is the recognition and protection of minorities. This includes freedom 
from negative ethnicity-driven discrimination and the establishment of institutions that 
facilitate the protection and preservation of an ethnic group’s identity and traditions. The 
right to identity stands out as the overarching guarantee combining minority rights. Specific 
guidelines for recommendations can be derived from various international instruments, 
especially the ICCPR, ICERD, and the UN Minority Declaration. Together, these 
instruments hold the minimum standard and rules for peaceful coexistence and constructive 
cooperation among members of different ethnic groups. 
The absolute understanding of state sovereignty has to be replaced by a more flexible 
model that allows for a broad human rights approach to ethnic conflict and minority issues. 
UNSG KOFI ANNAN stated in his annual report to the UNGA in 1999 that “[s]tate 
sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of globalization and 
international cooperation.” In this context, he sees “[t]he [UN] Charter [as] a living 
document, whose … very letter and spirit are the affirmation of those fundamental human 
rights.” He concludes that we live in “an era when strictly traditional notions of sovereignty 
can no longer do justice to the aspirations of peoples everywhere to attain their fundamental 
freedoms.”646 And DAVID LUBAN argues that “there is nothing regrettable about violating 
the statist order in order to protect human rights; the justice and injustice of war should be 
assessed along the dimension of human rights protection, not state sovereignty protection 
and the [moral evaluation] that places states above individuals is indefensible.”647 
Regarding the quality and status of minority rights, it is important to note that although 
minority rights instruments are proliferating, their reach is limited both substantially and 
geographically. For example, the UN Minority Declaration is universally applicable but 
legally non-binding, whereas legally binding instruments such as the Framework Convention 
                                                 
646 Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly. UN Press Release SG/SM/7136-
GA/9596 (1999). 
647 DAVID LUBAN, “Intervention and Civilization: Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo War,” in Global Justice 
and Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and Political Challenges of Globalization, ed. Pablo de Greiff and 
Ciaran Cronin, 79-115. Boston: MIT Press, 2002. 90. 
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have only a limited geographical scope. The shift to a truly legal approach to minority issues 
calls for clarification and strengthening of minority rights standards through clearly stated 
rights and obligations. Multilateral treaties and customary law should gain a more prominent 
role in a system that is now dominated mainly by “soft law”. More importantly, “shopping-
list approaches”648 should not substitute legally binding treaties that include legal duties. 
Furthermore, minority rights should not only play a role in conflict-related perspectives, but 
also should be seen as “normal” rights addressed to individuals belonging to certain groups. 
If this can be achieved, the granting of minority rights can be an effective conflict prevention 
strategy in multicultural societies. 
The second issue of effective implementation is directly linked to the existence of an 
independent and effective monitoring and scrutiny body. Independent supervision is not 
only needed to investigate abuses, but also to resolve questions regarding the content of the 
provisions and the way they should be applied in practice. Effective implementation of 
international norms point to the core of minority protection. The traditional conflict 
between judicial and political approaches to supervision should be overcome by stressing the 
advantages of each approach in a way that both of them can appropriately serve the aim of 
adequate and effective minority protection.  
Quasi-judicial models of supervision are crucial tools in norm interpretation and dispute 
settlement, thereby improving the coherence of the minority rights regime. The most 
important conclusions that can be drawn regarding the improvement of the compliance with 
minority rights standards include: 649 (1) increased access to information for all parties 
involved – minorities and states alike; (2) increasing the use of non-traditional sources of 
information such as reports of NGOs and participation of representatives of ethnic groups; 
(3) increasing the efficiency and utilization of existing bodies and procedures; (4) increasing 
consistency and follow up capabilities, including the clarification of standards and legal 
criteria; (5) extending the possibilities for quasi-judicial approaches as a fundamental way to 
enhancing the understanding and coherence of the interpretation of norms, as well as 
contributing to dispute settlement. One idea is a universal treaty on minority rights along 
the lines of the UN Minority Declaration.  
                                                 
648 PENTASSUGLIA, Minorities in International Law, 252. 
649 Ibid., 223/224. 
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Accommodation of claims of ethnic groups to determine their own affairs. The issue of minority 
rights should be seen against the background of a continuing process of emancipation and 
empowerment of ethnic groups to combine the enjoyment of their own culture and the 
development of the group’s identity with the active participation in the society of the state at 
large. 
One of the possibilities to ensure the active preservation of the culture of territorially 
concentrated groups is self-government. Federalist models, cultural autonomy, and the 
possibility to actively engage in the state’s affairs through minority participation and power-
sharing arrangements provide opportunities for ethnic minorities to actively and effectively 
participate in the society as a whole and express their claims in a non-violent manner.  
Democratic institutions and power-sharing arrangements despite their difficulties have 
proved to be the most successful means to overcome ethnic divides. Democracy combined 
with minority specific power-sharing (e.g., consociational arrangements) provides the 
institutional mechanisms for dispersed and territorially concentrated ethnic groups and 
minorities to secure their rights and pursue their collective interests.  
Mutual accommodation is the preferred strategy to settle ethnic conflict. The 
acknowledgment of the other group’s right to existence, culture, and ethnic identity is a first 
step towards mutual recognition and accommodation of claims.  
 
International engagement is extremely important. Ethnic conflict resolution should be backed 
by active involvement of international and regional organizations as well as major powers 
and regional leaders. International actors have many reasons for seeking conflict resolution 
at an early stage of an ethnic conflict. First, through active engagement and credible 
commitment, violations of human and minority rights of ethnic groups can be restrained or 
stopped. Second, the threat of regional destabilization can be diminished or avoided. Third, 
the economy and trade are dependent on the political stability in the country. A functioning 
economy and well established diplomatic relations in turn contribute to the prevention of 
ethnic conflict. Economic development, good governance, post-conflict reconstruction, and 
human rights are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. 
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Human rights should shape the approach taken by the international community. The 
United Nations must comply with human rights norms, which means neither tolerating gross 
violations nor committing violations itself. At the same time, human rights advocates should 
not demand the impossible, namely full compliance with human rights norms, in a country at 
or emerging from war. Furthermore, they should be aware of ongoing negotiations and 
carefully consider the best strategy to implement human rights standards while at the same 
time avoiding endangerment of peace negotiations. To be effective, third-party intervention 
in ethnic conflict aiming at the promotion and protection of human and minority rights must 
be channeled toward the establishment of local institutions capable of assuming promotion, 
protection, and enforcement of human rights rather than toward simply investigating and 
punishing violations until the mandate expires and third parties withdraw.650 
The most important option for bringing an international law and particularly a human 
rights approach into ethnic conflict resolution is by fostering human rights education, 
standard-setting, and institution-building. Educating groups and individuals about their 
rights and obligations under international law can help to promote a better understanding of 
non-violent possibilities to express ethnic claims. 
 
UN communication strategies and coordination between different UN agencies, the UN and other 
organizations, and  the UN headquarters and field missions have to be strengthened.  The development 
towards a coherent system of minority protection and ethnic conflict resolution within the 
United Nations system can only be achieved if the historical disconnection between the UN 
human rights bodies in Geneva and the UN political bodies in New York can be bridged. 
The appointment of a special rapporteur/representative/advisor on minorities would be a 
good strategic position to facilitate this process. 
 
In conclusion, it is obvious that ethnic conflicts cannot be settled through law alone. 
Various political, psychological, and other tools are needed to complete a successful 
negotiation and establish peace in an ethnic conflict. However, international law could 
provide a framework for ethnic conflict resolution. Law and politics mutually construct and 
shape each other. While political approaches do not take into account the whole range of 
                                                 
650 See also PUTNAM, Human Rights and Sustainable Peace, 248-250.  
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legal considerations, legal approaches cannot be fostered without the political context. 
Therefore, while acknowledging legal limitations, institutional actors concerned with 
supervision of minority rights should never be forced to subject their decisions to short-term 
political goals or political ideologies.  
If faced with a political problem such as ethnic conflict, international law can contribute 
to determining the scope of solutions by offering options that have been used before. The 
study of past problems and the efforts to manage it will assist in making choices in the 
present. In other words, international law can contribute by offering: 
specialized historical knowledge: in this instance the knowledge about previous efforts – 
expressed through formal rules and principles, institutions, and actions – to inhibit the 
eruption of intercommunal violence and to limit the destruction once eruption has occurred 
and knowledge about the express or implied preferences of contemporary governments 
concerning relevant norms and behavior naturally incident to their enforcement.651 
 
International law should not be understood in the simple formalistic sense which means 
“applying rules”. International law should be the “language” of the dialogue –  the context in 
which a dispute is settled. International law is not simply an institutionalized means for 
recording judgments, but a means to influence the policy choices of states and thus increase 
the predictability of the behavior of states. In this context, international law can play both a 
passive and an active role in ethnic conflict resolution. Passive in the way that international 
law constitutes a source of basic rule of the society and provides the infrastructure of the 
relationship between the parties. The law exists as an “advisory opinion”, which shapes the 
red lines and parameters of mutual relations between the parties. The law can also play an 
active role; international customary law, international humanitarian law and human rights law 
laid down in various treaties and agreements create responsibilities that influence the policy 
choices of the actors and thus increase the predictability of the actions taken by the actors. 
Furthermore, the conflicting parties do not only have claims and interests, but also rights 
and duties under international law. These rights and duties represent the starting point of 
every negotiation and every settlement. The goal of negotiation in an ethnic conflict is to 
reach an equitable and durable solution, not perfect justice. 
Sustainable prevention and resolution of ethnic conflict requires the development of 
practical ways for individuals and groups to peacefully coexist and, with time integrate 
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voluntarily on the basis of shared values and interests in a manner and to a degree acceptable 
for all.652 The international legal framework can contribute to this aim by developing the 
practical tools to close the gap between early warning, responsive action, conflict resolution 
and peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. Both regarding the legal basis and the 
institutional framework, there remains much room for improvement, especially concerning 
coordination, information and analysis structures. The suggestion in this study is that a 
coherent international legal approach to ethnic conflict will not take the form of a 
comprehensive theory or a new legal class such as human rights law. It will consist of a set of 
norms and practices coming from human rights law, humanitarian law, and international 
criminal law that form the basis for approaching ethnic conflict. It will involve awareness of 
the uniqueness of situations and issues at stake in each case and thus has to be flexible both 
in structure and in efforts of implementation. International law does not provide specific 
solutions, but it can provide a palette for institutional redesign and act as a guide to 
overcoming ethnic conflict.  
 
                                                 
652 See ERIK FRIBERG. “Minority Protection through Genocide Prevention: Bridging the UN Human Rights 
and Political Organs.” Unpublished paper, 2005. 
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